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Abstract
F r ien d o f Governm ent or D a m n e d T ory :
T h e Cr ea tio n of th e Lo yalist id en tity
in Re v o l u t io n a r y N ew H a m psh ir e , 1 7 7 4 - 1 7 8 4 .

BY
J.L. W alsh

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
S eptember 1996

The dissertation examines the creation of loyalist identity during
the American Revolution. Two distinct identities were fashioned, one
by the loyalists themselves and a second competing identity which
was created for them by their opponents, the radical faction of the
revolutionary movement. Both identities were created consciously
and for political or economic motives.
The identity created by the loyalists through their actions and
words is to be found in a close reading of the claims filed with the
Claims Commission created by Parliament in 1783. The dissertation
argues that loyalists self-fashioned an individual political identity, as
part of the creation of a self-conscious minority seeking redress from
the British government for the losses they suffered during the war,
and as individual participants in an ideational community formed by
the trauma of a generation at war. The self-fashioned identity found
its expression in the memorials presented to the Claims Commission
and in the public and private writings of various participants.
Simultaneously, the rebel leaders, writers, and ideologues created
another identity for their enemies. Through legal fictions such as bills
of attainder and confiscation, through pamphlets, and through
vii
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newspapers, rebel leaders and writers created an identity for the
loyalists as traitors, bloodthirsty acolytes of a demonized British King,
and enemies of the country of their nativity. The content of the
claims are supported and supplem ented by petitions, trial
transcripts, newspaper accounts, and pertinent official documents of
the "rebel" government.
The dissertation enters into the ongoing discussion concerning the
communal history of self-conscious minorities, as well as an
exploration of political identity. The work also analyzes the
revolution in New Hampshire in terms of a culture war, a discursive
battle between two ideologically opposed groups, each striving to
convince the populace in general of the desirability of embracing its
vision of the way society ought to be. This study also adds to the
growing num ber of works which concentrate on the loyalist
experience at the provincial level.

viii
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Introduction

Because human beings are bound together by sympathy,
the reflection in the glass is necessarily not of one person
only. The common, the shared and the general is to be
found in the particular, if that particular is truthfully
described, and with imagination. To discover such a
common truth is an intrinsic good.1

A considerable number of the inhabitants of British North
America at the outset of the rebellion in 1774-75 made a conscious
choice to remain loyal to the constitution and crown of Great Britain.
Those residents of New Hampshire and the other rebellious colonies
faced hardship, harrassment, and community sanctions for as long as
they remained in their homes. Their choice, to remain loyal, was an
act of identification. Not only did they proclaim by their actions and
words their loyalty to Britain, they also opened the door to a new
identity imposed upon them from without by their rebel opponents.
This study, though it began as a straightforward narrative of loyalist
activity and attributes with a concentration on the province of New
Hampshire, has been transformed by the use of the concept of
identity. The loyalists of New Hampshire and those of the other
provinces became, by the end of the rebellion, a scattering of self
1Mary Wamock, Imagination & Time. Oxford: 1994. p. 144.
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conscious m inority communities, each bound together not by
proximity but by a shared experience, a generational trauma.
As I read deeper and deeper into the largest concentrated body
of loyalist writings, the records of the commission which examined
the claims and losses of the American Loyalists, it became apparent
that something more had transpired than could be described in a
simple narrative history. As linguistic usages were replicated again
and again (such as in the claim of Robert Fowle when he, as others
had also, referred to "American sufferers" and identified himself as a
"distressed loyalist"), not only in the writings of men from the same
town or even the same province, I began to see a pattern emerging, a
pattern that I have in terp reted here to dem onstrate

the

transform ation of the identities of men from th at of British
Americans to that of American Loyalists; from contented provincials
to "zealous sufferers." That is, they identified themselves differently
than they had before the rebellion as individuals and as a group.2
An individual identity consists of four personae: the "who" we
think we are, the "who" we project ourselves to be, the "who" we are
perceived to be by others, and the "who" others project us to be.3
These four personae are in a constant state of flux. Changes in one
area may precipitate changes in another. One loyalist, Stephen

2Anselm Strauss in Mirrors and Masks The Search for Identity. Glencoe, IL:
1959. p. 21 "any group of people that has any permanence develops a
'special language,' a lingo or jargon, which represents its way of identifying
those objects important for group action." Strauss goes on to add that it is a
"necessity for any group to develop a common or shared terminology."
3This is my own theory, based upon observation and my reading in the
literature on identity and imagination.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

Holland, began the year 1774 as Stephen Holland the respected,
prominent, gentleman landowner residing in Londonderry, New
Hampshire. He was a magistrate and militia officer, a veteran of the
previous war, and an Irish emigre. All of these factors and many
more combined to create in his mind a picture of who he was.
Holland's identity was apolitical until he assisted in the apprehension
and return of some deserters from the British garrison in Boston. By
engaging in that public act, Holland sent a message to those who
observed his actions. He was projecting a part, at least, of his identity
as a loyal citizen of New Hampshire (the "who" we project ourselves
to be), at this point still a royal province, one of many in British
North America. Simultaneous to Holland's projection of his identity
through actions, observers in the community interpreted what he
had done as the act of someone else, someone who held the "identity"
of an enemy to the community. This is the third persona, the "who"
perceived by others. Some members of Holland's com m unity
perceived him to be, by his actions, inimical to his country, to be
other than what he perceived himself to be. Holland attemted to
moderate the effect of his projected identity by another public
action, the signing of the Association Test in 1776.4 One such action

4The Association Test was a printed oath sent out by the rebel government in
Exeter in June and July of 1776 to every town in the province. Most if not all
the other provinces circulated a similar oath, the idea for the oath having
come from the Continental Congress. The purposes of the oath and the public
signing "ceremony" are discussed at length in Chapter 2. The vast majority
of the residents of New Hampshire signed the oath, the returns from which
can be found in Nathaniel Bouton and Albert S. Batchellor, eds., New
Hampshire Provincial and State Papers. 40 vols. Concord NH: 1874-1910. This
study utilizes volumes VII, VIII, and XXX, which contain the Journals and
Papers of the New Hampshire Assembly, 1774-1784, among other things, and
hereinafter referred to as NHPP.
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was insufficient to change the perception of his neighbors, however,
and the persona as perceived soon became the reinvented persona as
projected from the observers among the community. In other words,
Holland was perceived to be an enemy, a tory, by some members of
his community in response to the identity he projected through his
words and actions. Once the observers had perceived Holland to be
an enemy, they reinterpreted his actions as those of someone else, as
the actions of someone they began to create from their perceptions of
who Holland was. By 1777 the community had created another
identity for Stephen Holland, one it publicly proclaimed as "who"
Holland was, though he never embraced or accepted that identity as
his own. The community needed a "new" Stephen Holland, one it
could revile and charge with treason for its own political purposes.
The rebels needed to create the new identity for Holland and all of
the loyalists in order to discredit them in the eyes of the general
public and secure the support of the populace for the rebel agenda.
The who we think we are is not necesarily the person we see in
the mirror. Our self-image is not pegged to external appearance, nor
is it necessarily tied to reality at all. Our concept of self is a product
of imagination. We see ourselves as who we want to be. We may
define ourselves in many ways: by personal physical characteristics,
by intellectual or spiritual characteristics, by profession, as in the
case of the two physician loyalists, Stephen Little and Josiah
Pomeroy, by material attainments5 or by a combination of all of
5Michael A. Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness From
Attraction to Social Identity. New York: 1992. p. 36. "self regard is linked with
what is owned, with what is one's own."
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these attributes. We may even define ourselves based on
relationships with others. But we all have a self-concept, a mind's
eye view of who we are and a surety of our own uniqueness.6
At the same time we each project a public image, an identity of
who and what we want others to believe us to be. This is a mask7 we
wear in public, a persona we put on when interacting with others. It
may or may not correspond to our own self-image. We may have an
image we wish to hide from others or one we believe is unworthy of
public scrutiny. Or we may be so secure in our own self image, our
identity, that we proclaim it publicly. In such a case the mask
corresponds with our self perception.8 In the case of the loyalists,
such public proclamation had enormous consequences.
A third edition of who we are is the person perceived by those
around us. In one sense, that perceived persona may correspond
faithfully to the mask we wear. We may successfully project an
identity which others can perceive and accept. But observers are
6Hogg, The Social Psychology o f Group Cohesiveness p. 90. "one's conception
of self as unique and distinct from all other humans, and /o r in terms of
unique interpersonal relationships."
7I borrowed the idea of a mask first from Joseph Campbell who discussed
masks in a social role in a multi-part interview with Bill Moyers. The mask
was then reiterated by Strauss in Mirrors and Masks. Strauss's was the oldest
book on identity consulted for this study, and one of the best written of the
lot. The bastard children of Clio have of late revelled in their obtuseness,
seeming to wish to conceal their work in verbal shrubbery so dense a
Cooper's Pathfinder would be daunted.
8Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 9. "identity is connected with the fateful
appraisals of oneself - by oneself and by others. Everyone presents himself
to the otheres and to himself, and sees himself in the mirrors of their
judgements. The masks he then and thereafter presents to the world and its
citizens are fashioned upon his anticipations of their judgements. The others
present themselves too; they wear their own brands of mask and they get
appraised in turn."
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weighted with their own baggage, their perceptions filtered through
their own Kantian matrices, and what we project may not always be
what they perceive.
A fourth identity, implicitly connected to the previous type, is
that which is created by outsiders and imposed upon individuals or
groups.9 Observers may take their cues from the mask we wear, but
their own perceptions and prejudices can produce a completely
different result. And that phenomenon may be exacerbated by some
political or social agenda. That was certainly the case in 1774, and
remained so for the duration of the rebellion. Whether identified by
their own volition or singled out and painted with the broad epithet
of traitor by enemies within the pre-war community, those who
were labelled as loyalists suffered social and civil debilities as the
result. The loyalist identity became the vehicle for exclusion from the
home community and the bond that caused new communities to
coalesce around the shared experience of the war.
Identity was also central to the culture war that coincided with
the military struggle for or against independence. Both sides in the
civil/culture war, the rebels and the loyalists, possessed a vision of
what they thought the proper course was for the America of their
future. The loyalists thought that adherence to a reformed social
contract with the mother country was the safest and most beneficial
course the colonies could take. The rebels on the other hand saw no
hope in the eventual conciliation of what they perceived to be real

9The technical term is "status forcing," the imposition of identity on
individuals or groups from outside. Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 80.
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grievances. In the course of their ideological struggle for the
allegiance and faith of the mass of the population, the rebel writers
who controlled the majority of the media of the time, the presses,
constructed a new identity for their ideological opponents.10 That
identity, based on the rebel perceptions of the role the loyalists
played in the conflict and their own political agendas, formed the
basis for one portion of the new national myth created by rebel
writers as the basis for the new country which emerged from the
war.11
Three somewhat different perspectives on identity have
contributed to the development of this study: the philosophical view,
the sociological, and the social-psychological. Recently historians have
also begun to develop arguments based on identity, and this study
seeks to engage in that discourse among the works of Pagden, Canny,
Greene, Elliott, and Zuckerman. Some debt is especially owed to
Greene's essay "Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados

10Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 21. There is a tendency for groups to develop
derogatory terms for other groups or members of groups. "Groups are
inevitably in conflict over issues - otherwise they would not be different
groups - and since events inevitably come to be viewed differently by those
who are looking up or down the barrel of the gun, it is useles to talk of
trying to eradicate from the human mind the tendency to stereotype, to
designate nastily, and to oversimplify." See also James Davison Hunter,
Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America. New York: 1991. and Bruce
Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction o f Society, Comparative Studies of
Myth, Ritual, and Classification. New York: 1989.
lln When nationalistic movements form, they and the countries which emerge
from them must quite literally create new mythical national histories."
Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 167 and see also Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism. London:
1995. 2nd edition. Especially chapters 3 & 5.
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as a Case Study," and John Elliott's introduction to a volume of essays
edited by Anthony Pagden and Nicholas Canny.12
The use of identity as a tool as discussed in this study, indeed
the whole concept of analyzing a person's identity, is certainly
culture specific and may be historically specific as well. By that I
mean that the concept of identity raised here may be peculiar to
Western culture and be rendered meaningless in the traditions and
cosmologies of peoples not descended or educated in the ideas and
history of European civilization. This modem analysis of identity
may be equally foreign to the actors we seek to understand through
the study of identity. Since the loyalists acted and wrote as they did,
two centuries of philosophers have added to the codification of
identity. Since the 1770s, new scholarly disciplines have arisen to
explain and categorize the whole range of the human experience into
a series of generalizations.

The complex questions of social

relationships begin with the philosophical pursuit of who we are.

12The essays cited are especially concerned with the development of colonial
identities vis a vis the metropolitan identity of the various homelands. They
draw considerably on the experiences of the provincial elites and uniformly
lament the lack of evidence regarding identity formation among the
underclasses of their respective societies. The evidence for loyalist identity
formation cuts across class lines, though it too does not reach as far into the
lower strata of society as one might wish. The experiences and ideas of black
loyalists, for instance, would contribute a whole new perspective to the story,
and might really exemplify the term "loyalist sufferers." Nicholas P. Canny,
"Identity Formation in Ireland: The Emergence of the Anglo-Irish;" John H.
Elliott, "Introduction: Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World;" Anthony
Pagden, "Identity Formation in the Atlantic World;" Jack P. Greene,
"Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study;"
Michael Zuckerman, "Identity in British America: Unease in Eden;" and
Anthony Pagden and Nicholas P. Canny, "Afterward: From Identity to
Independence," in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., Colonial
Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800. Princeton, NJ: 1987.
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The philosophical construct of identity is concerned with
differentiating between entities, with being able to assign a label to a
particular thing or person and "identify" it. David Oderberg
contended that "identity is a matter of 'succession of parts, connected
together by resem blance, contiguity, or causation."'13 One
philosopher, Roderick M. Chisholm, suggested that "most physical
things are similarly reducible to evolving systems of composita."14
That is, Chisholm and others would argue that physical objects, ships,
chairs human beings, etc., consist of physical systems, atomic
structure and larger, which themselves change over time. But the
object itself remains the same. Chisholm used the example of a ship.
If the ship, the SS Columbia, let us call it, loses a plank on a voyage
and the plank is replaced with an aluminum one, the ship retains its
identity as unique and distinct. Over the years it loses more and
more planks, and those planks are replaced with aluminum planks,
until finally the whole hull of the ship is made up of aluminum
planks. Is it still the same ship, bearing the same name to be sure,
but is it the same? And then he adds the question: what if the planks
that were removed from the original ship, one by one, were re-used
to build another ship, in the same fashion as the original, and it too
was named the SS Columbia? Are they both the "same"? If you took
passage on the first ship before the loss of the first plank, and then

13David S. Oderberg, The Metaphysics o f identity Over Time. New York: 1993. p.
59.
14Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Loose and Popular and the Strict and
Philosophical Senses of Identity," in Norman S. Care and Robert H. Grimm,
eds., Perception and Personal Identity. Cleveland: 1969. p. 99.
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thirty years later took passage again in the all-aluminum version,
would you be correct in calling it the same ship?
Chisholm answers that "when we say of a physical thing
existing at one time that it is identical with, or the same as, a
physical thing existing at some other time ('this is the same ship we
traveled on before') we are using the expression 'the same as1 or
'identical with' in a 'loose and popular sense.' But when we say of a
person existing at one time that he is identical with, or the same
person as a person existing at some other time ('the ship still has the
same captain it had before'), we are using 'the same as' or 'identical
with' in a 'strict and philosophical sense.'15 So Chisholm is arguing
that human identity is not transitive. "'Continued uninterrupted
existence is therefore implied in identity,'"16 or more simply, a
named identity presupposes persistence over time, and a human
identity is different from and more formal than the identification of
other sorts of physical objects.
Once we have determined that we are real and identifiable, we
turn to uniqueness. Mary Wamock made the individual identity
accessible to the non-philosopher in Imagination & Time. She
demonstrated there the distinctive nature of the human species and
related that distinctiveness to identity. "It is not to be wondered at,
therefore, that each one of us thinks of himself as a u n iq u e
individual: for so we all are. Not only are our bodies distinct from
each other's as spatio-temporal objects, but our way of perceiving,
15Chisholm, "Senses of Identity," p. 82.
i-^ Q u o te d

from Thomas Reid in Chisholm, "Senses of Identity," p. 94, note 22.
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thinking and remembering, the actual pathways through which this
is achieved are not, microscopically, identical with one another. Our
consciousness has developed, in detail, as our own."17
Wamock further supplied the bridge between philosophy and
social psychology. Wamock suggested that "the idea of a person who
has a discernible identity through time is an idea that is, in an
important sense, social. To think of myself as a continuous individual
human is necessarily to acknowledge that there are other human
persons in the same boat."18 Social psychologists, like sociologists,
study identity as a means of understanding the interplay between
humans, individuals and groups. Historians too may use that
paradigm,19 and that is the thrust of this study. Once again Wamock
suggested a bridge between us all: memory. "We can not only be
identified by someone else as persisting through time; we can so
identify ourselves by the operation of conscious memory, and the
consequent ability to project ourselves forward into the future, as
well as backwards into the past, to tell stories about how we came to
be where we are."20 Those stories are both the grist of the historian's
mill and subsequently the flour he or she produces.

17Wamock, Imagination & Time. p. 124.
18Wamock, Imagination & Time. p. 125.
19 In referring to Erik Erikson, "the notion of identity has served me, as it so
brilliantly served him, as an agent for organizing materials and thoughts
about certain aspects of problems traditionally intriguing to social
psychologists." Identity can serve historians as well, as Erikson himself
proved. Strauss, Masks and Mirrors, p. 9.
20Wamock, Imagination & Time. p. 125.
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Social psychology is deeply concerned not only with personal
identity but even more with social interaction. To understand how
interaction takes place and why, the social psychologist must
understand identity. As Strauss suggested, "the act of identifying
objects, human or physical, allows a person to organize his action
with reference to those objects."21 Or, when we know who or what
something is, we know what to do. Such basic human interaction is at
the core of all social interaction, from face to face confrontations
between a pair of individuals to the organization of societies; "the
longstanding debate about the nature of the individual and collective
actors has been in an important sense one concerning identity and
processes of identification."22
We want to know about identity because identity is at the core
of all social relationships. The breakdown of the existing society at
the outset of the revolution precipitated the transform ation of
individual and communal identities. The rebel faction became the
normative mode for the identitities of its members and eventual
adherents, while some individuals who could not accept the structure
of the new social contract became outsiders, remaining loyal to the
status quo ante bellum. Our analysis of the loyalist identity helps to
explain the reluctance of the other colonies of the first British Empire
toward joining the revolutionary movement. To be sure, geographic

21Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 45.
22Burkhart Holzner and Roland Robertson, "Identity and Authority: A Problem
Analysis of Processes of Identification and Authorization," in Roland
Robertson & Burkhart Holzner, eds., Identity and Authority, Explorations in
the Theory o f Society. New York: 1979. p. 3.
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distinction played a role in the loyalty of the island colonies, as did
fear of slave rebellion, but Canada and the Floridas were contiguous
with the rebel provinces and remained deeply loyal. Indeed they all
became refuges for the disapponted loyalists whose expectation of
eventual victory was dashed.
It could be argued that the truly important transformation of
identity took place in the years before 1774 and involved the
colonial elites who made up the Faction23 that would lead the
rebellion in America. Certainly a change took place which allowed or
perhaps forced a change in perspective, a change which predicated
the move toward independence. The radical rebel leadership no
longer saw themselves as British Americans but as simply
Americans.24
The identity transformation this study is concerned with did
not take place prior to the rebellion. The change which overcame the
loyalists was caused by the traumatic events of the period from 1774
to 1784. Their identities changed from British Americans to
"American sufferers," from contented and prosperous provincials to
23The term "faction" is used repeatedly in letters and in memorials to refer to
the rebel leadership while it remained a dissenting political element. Once
the situation had exploded into rebellion, the "faction" was transformed into
the enemy by terms like "usurpers," and "rebels." See Earl of Dartmouth to
Lieut.-General Thomas Gage, April 9, 1774 in K.G. Davies, ed. Documents of the
American Revolution 1770-1783. Colonial Office Series. KX Volumes, Dublin:
1974. Vol. VII, p. 85. See also the repeated use of the term in Ann Hulton's
letters cited below.
240n the theoretical underpinnings of the rebel movement see Bernard
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA:
1967. Other works also treat the changes in the thought of the American
leadership, among others, Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People The Rise o f
Popular Sovereignty in England. New York: 1988; Gordon S. Wood, The
Radicalism o f the American Revolution. New York: 1991, stand out.
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victims both of their rebellious neighbors and of a government which
could not or would not supply the means to preserve their world.
For some, the loyalist identity was ephemeral. A num ber of
loyalists were subsumed back into English society somewhere in the
British Isles. Stephen Holland retired to Ireland. Others became a
part of one or another new community of loyalists in the Caribbean
where their contributions have been appreciated and celebrated
since. One of those was Josiah Pomeroy who waived his claim for
compensation in return for an immediate grant to set sail for
Jamaica.25 The majority of loyalists who left their homes ended up in
Canada, particularly Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Even before the
end of the war John Wentworth had assumed a new role in the
colonial government, that of Surveyor of the King's Woods in Nova
Scotia. Soon after the Peace of Paris he was made governor of that
colony. Thousands of loyalists flowed into the new lands set aside by
government in the two Canadian provinces where they built new
communities and new lives based upon their shared identity as
Loyalists.26

25See for instance Wilbur H. Siebert, The Legacy o f the American Revolution
to the British West Indies and Bahamas. Columbus, Ohio: 1913.
26The most recent studies of the loyalist diaspora include a number of essays
on the concept of community in the loyalist settlements of Canada. These
include: Ann Gorman Condon, "The Loyalist Community in New Brunswick,"
Janice Potter-Mackinnon, "Loyalists and Community: The Eastern Ontario
Loyalist Women," Jane Errington and George A. Rawlyk, "Creating a BritishAmerican Political Community in Upper Canada," and Neil Mackinnon, "The
Nova Scotia Loyalists: A Traumatic Community," all to be found in Robert M.
Calhoon, Timothy Barnes, and George A. Rawlyk, eds., Loyalists and
Community in North America. Westport, CT: 1994.
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Philosophers have studied the concept of identity in its most
abstract form. They are concerned with the most pure form of
identity, the archetype. Social scientists (psychologists, sociologists,
and some historians) have delved into the subject of identity for the
purpose of understanding group dynamics. The interaction of classes,
communities, and other groups has been investigated from the
perspective of identity. But the uses of identity up until now have
been for the most part confined to studies of identity based on race,
religion, ethnicity, class, or gender.
The loyalist identity transcended those categories. There were
black and white and Native American loyalists. There were male and
female loyalists. There were Irish and Scotch-Irish; there were
American bom and English bom; Presbyterians, Anglicans, probably
Catholics and Jews, and Quakers; and loyalists came from all
economic classes as well. This study departs from previous work to
explore the creation of a political identity. Indeed it does not begin
with the development of corporate identity, but rath er seeks to
explore the emergence of the personal loyalist identity on the
individual level and then to show that the combination of the
proclaimed identifiable loyalists took on the attributes of a loyalist
community. The loyalists as community can be seen both as the
actual geographic communities formed after the war in Canada and
elsewhere, and as the ideational community of common experience,
common trauma, which transcended geography and bound all
loyalists regardless of their residence with the identity as members
of a community bom in a shared experience, a shared suffering, a
shared betrayal, a shared exile.
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Imagination created the loyalist identity. On one level,
individuals imagined themselves bound by ties to the government,
the crown, the homeland, which their rebellious neighbors sought to
break. At the same time individuals on the other side imagined them
to be enemies and traitors to the cause of independence.
On another level the loyalists as a group imagined themselves
as a force which fought to preserve a life they had already lost.
While controversy raged in the years leading up to 1774, those who
would be loyalists could not imagine the lengths to which their
neighbors would go, and did not discern the steps that were taken.
The loyalists did not see the slow and subtle takeover of local
governments and presses by the Faction until the hold of the rebel
leadership was complete. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, the
loyalists as a group were blind to the inevitability of their loss so
clear in hindsight. Only after the war am id regrets and
recriminations were they forced to accept the loss of property and
social identity they had striven to preserve. The new identity they
then embraced was a bitter one, the "suffering loyalist," the "zealous
sufferer."
The rebels, with the hubris of victors, began the process of
mythologizing a new identity for their loyalist opponents early in the
war, branding them with the mark of traitor, and eventually weaving
a new identity for old neighbors characterized by duplicity, cupidity,
and savage brutality. Even in New Hampshire, where the absence of
military action provided no experience of the sort common to the
other provinces, the retold stories of atrocities and betrayal served
as the basis for the fabrication of a dark loyalist identity.
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The quotation which begins this introduction describes the process
the study has taken. By examining the words and actions of the
individual loyalist, I have sought to find the "common, the shared
and the general." With those, we may perceive the loyalist identity,
and understand the role of political identities as they compete to
define communities.
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Chapter One.
The New Hampshire Loyalists:
Questions and Sources
I. The Loyalists
Stephen Holland was a gentleman of Irish birth, a former
British officer who retired to the New Hampshire town of
Londonderry following the Seven Years War. Through personality
and wit, and not a little landed wealth, Holland waxed in prominence
throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, achieving considerable
influence at the town and province levels. He was, as were most men
of his station, active in the magistracy and as a militia officer, and
was not unknown to the governor and his circle of friends. Holland's
wealth, his interest, was closely bound to the fate of his adopted
home. When rebellion came to New Hampshire in December of 1774,
Holland remained aloof (though he had already signalled his position
by apprehending deserters from the British army and returning
them to Boston earlier in the year). He resigned his offices at the
town and provincial levels as soon as the reins of government were
seized by the rebels, and apparently subsided into retirement. He
even signed the Test Oath in 1776. By 1777, however, Holland's real
identity became known as his actions on behalf of the British were
revealed to his friends, neighbors, and opponents alike. Stephen
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Holland was a loyalist. At least that is how historians of the m odem
era would identify him. His contemporaries differed along political
and cultural lines, some calling him a traitor, others calling him a
friend of government. Whichever he was, his personal identity was
transformed between 1774 and 1784. The wealthy gentleman from
Londonderry became the "zealous sufferer" of London, and
eventually the pensioned invalid living out his days in his native
Ireland.
This study will explore that transformation of identity, a
transformation that was not confined to Stephen Holland, but which
applied to all of the loyalists of New Hampshire, and possibly to the
vast majority of the loyalists of British North America. The
transformation Holland and his fellow loyalists underwent took two
forms. First, an internal change occurred, prompted by the decision
to remain loyal. Whatever their personally held identities (the "who"
they conceived themselves to be) each loyalist confronted a need to
make a decision regarding the future of his political identity.
Loyalists, as demonstrated in the shared language of those who left a
written legacy, sacrificed property and security, position, and in
some cases family,1 in order to support their shared conception of
law and government. The events of the years from 1774 to 1784
iOne example being David Fitzrandolph of Woodbridge, CT. His "brothers took
the opposite part." Loyalist Transcripts, Transcripts o f the Manuscript Books
and Papers o f the Commission o f Enquiry into the Losses and Services o f the
American Loyalists Held Under Acts o f Parliament o f 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 o f
George III, preserved amongst the Audit Office Records in the Public Record
Office of England. Examinations in London and New York, 1783-1790. 60 vols.
New York Public library. Microfilm Edition, Dimond Library, University of
New Hampshire. Quotations from these volumes which include claims from
throughout British North America will hereinafter be referred to as Loyalist
Claims. Reference to Loyalist Claims, David Fitzrandolph, vol. XV, p. 379-388.
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produced a change in personal identity for most, if not all, of New
Hampshire's loyalists. This change occurred at the level of personal
identity and subsequently on the level of community identity.
Once the loyalist had broken with the faction by publicly
affirming or projecting his new identity through words or actions, he
was no longer a functioning member of his former community. The
members of the local and provincial communities perceived the
words and actions of loyalists in a new and different way. While to
the average loyalist, his actions might seem consistent with all past
actions, in light of circumstances those actions had new meaning to
those members of the community who observed them. The observing
members of the community perceived another "who", another
persona for their loyalist neighbors.
Subsequently the rebel faction created another identity for
their domestic opponents. Utilizing a near monopoly of the press,
rebel writers authored a new corporate identity for the "damned
tories." While struggling with a personal and communal identity
crisis, the loyalists were also engaged in a culture war, a discursive
battle which would determine the future course of American society.
Part of the rebel strategy in that war was the alteration of the
loyalist identity. The rebel writers created a new persona for their
former neighbors, turning them into traitors who would betray their
country, their families and their God on behalf of the demonized king
of England.
Historians have argued that it was not the loyalists who
changed. As Mary Beth Norton suggested: "...Americans did not
"become" loyal to the empire: they remained loyal to the empire. ...
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some loyalists adhered to their original allegiance through what
might be termed political inertia... The burden of making a break
with the past rested with the revolutionaries, not the loyalists despite radical rhetoric to the contrary."2 While it may well be true
that the initial decision to rebel or not was in reality a more difficult
and pronounced change for the rebels, such a conclusion does not
obviate the central issue here. The individuals who remained loyal to
King and country underwent a profound alteration of their personal
identities, as well as a major shift in their perceptions of themselves
as part of a community. For a considerable number of loyalists, their
membership in a community was term inated, and it became
necessary for them to find a place in a new one. For others, especially
those who chose to keep a very low profile, geographic shifts were
unnecessary or undesirable, and a new role was slowly created
within the old social framework. As Norton suggested,"There must
have been thousands of other Americans who retained their fidelity
to the crown but who were neither willing nor able to abandon their
homes, speak out against their rebel neighbors, or take up arms to
defend their point of view."3
This work began with a simple question, well fram ed by
Bernard Bailyn in the introduction to his biography of Massachusetts
governor Thomas Hutchinson: "why any sensible, well informed,
right-minded American with a modicum of imagination and common

2Mary Beth Norton, The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England,
1774-1789. Boston: 1972. p. 8.
3Norton, The British Americans, p. 7.
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sense could possibly have opposed the Revolution."4 It took little
effort to find at least some answers in the wealth of recent
scholarship on the subject of loyalists. In the preface of what remains
the most comprehensive study of loyalists to date, Robert M.
Calhoon's The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781, the
author described his study as an attem pt to understand the
motivations and perceptions of the loyalists. Calhoon stated that "the
co-ordinated study of motivation and perception is less superficial
than the cataloguing of attitudes and more manageable than the
search for the deeper roots of behavior."5 The recitation of the
"attitudes" of the loyalists had been done earliest by Van Tyne and
then with success by Nelson.6 Indeed a superficial treatm ent of
loyalist attitudes appears in most studies of the Revolution in general
and certainly all of those concerned with the origins of the split with
Britain. Calhoon did not avoid the exploration of publicly
demonstrated attitudes, but sought deeper for the real motivation.
Calhoon suggested a definition for "motivation - the compelling
reasons, influences, predispositions, and dictates of self-interest,
temperament, conscience, intellect, fear, and plain confusion - that
impelled the loyalists to act as they did." Calhoon also stated that the
examination of motivation was "supplemented by an examination of
the loyalists’ perception of their roles in society." He supplied another
4Bemard Bailyn, The Ordeal o f Thomas Hutchinson. Cambridge, MA: 1974. p. ix.
5Robert M. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781. New
York: 1972. p. xi.
6Van Tyne, Claude H., The Loyalists in the American Revolution. Reprint.
Gloucester, MA: 1959. William H. Nelson, The American Tory. Oxford: 1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

useful definition: "the process of giving structure to thoughts and
sensations, perception encompasses man's self-image, emotional and
intellectual dexterity, and stamina, the imperatives that govern him
in moments of conscious choice, as well as the predispositions that
operate in periods of routine."
Calhoon and many others have suggested a num ber of
"motives" - reasons why many chose loyalty as opposed to rebellion.
By examining the traits of loyalists one can indeed define a number
of common characteristics. Many loyalists were wealthy and a break
with Britain might have had serious consequences on their fortunes.
Many also held lucrative posts in the structure of the royal
government at the provincial level. The end of royal government
meant the end of such sources of income. Others were apparently
motivated by family considerations; ties to staunch loyalists by blood
or marriage often prompted a similar political stance. According to
some, religion too played a role. Rhys Isaac and Catherine Albanese,
among others, have demonstrated some causal relationship between
religion and the formation of opposing ideologies in the coming of the
Revolution. They have clearly demonstrated the uses of religion and
religious imagery in the pursuit of a cultural victory, as well as the
importance of ritual in revolutionary society.7 One scholar, J.C.D.
Clark, has gone so far as to suggest that religious differences were a
contributive cause of the Revolution, as well as of movements in

7Catherine Albanese, Sons o f the Fathers, The Civil Religion o f the American
Revolution. Philadelphia: 1976. Rhys Isaac, The Transformation o f
Virginia,! 740-1790. Chapel Hill, NC: 1982.
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Atlantic society as a whole.8 This is not to claim that religion had no
place in the Revolution. Clearly pastors played an important role in
disseminating Whig ideology to the populace and had a part in
convincing the average provincial to embrace the revolutionary
cause.9 But as Bernard Bailyn has suggested, we know far more about
the ideological origins of the rebellion from the side of the rebels
than we do from the perspective of the loyalists: "recent historical
writings have allowed us to see with some clarity the pattern of
fears, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions that became the ideology of
the revolution - which alone in my judgment, explains why certain
actions of the British government touched off a transforming
revolution in America - ...until we look deliberately at the
8J.C.D. Clark, The Language o f Liberty 1660-1832 Political Discourse and Social
Dynamics in the Anglo American World. Cambridge: 1994. Clark's theory
suggests that the clash between the Anglican Church and the varied
dissenters was the primary division between loyalists and rebels. While
religion played a part in the controversy in a variety of ways, that sort of
dichotomy is far too simplistic and is completely without support in any of
the sources I have found. Surely many loyalists were High Church Anglicans
and would have welcomed the establishment of an episcopal seat in America.
The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had considerable influence as
well. Part of the controversy between the colonial leadership and the
government did revolve around the episcopacy fight, but the granting of
political rights to Catholics in Canada was a source of irritation too. Fingers
were pointed at Quakers because their religion forbade any participation in
the war, yet few if any identifiable Quakers joined the loyalist exodus in New
Hampshire. Of far more importance is the use of religious imagery by rebel
writers. Supporters of the rebellion characterized it in colorful biblical
imagery, while employing equally colorful descriptions of the loyalists as
demons and savages. On religious divisions as part of the revolutionary
controversy see also Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope o f Heaven: Religion,
Society, and Politics in Colonial America. New York: 1986; Jon Butler, Awash
in a Sea o f Faith: Christianizing the American People. Cambridge, MA: 1990;
and Carl Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Sceptre, Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas,
Personalities and Politics, 1689-1775. New York: 1962.
9See Donald Weber, Rhetoric and History in Revolutionary New England. New
York: 1988. A useful collection is John Wingate Thornton, The Pulpit o f the
American Revolution. Reprint. New York: 1970.
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development from the other side around, we have not understood
what the issues really were, what the struggle was all about."10 This
study attempts in a small way to begin to answer that challenge.
All the myriad collection of motives ascribed to those who
remained loyal fail to tell the whole story. For every wealthy loyalist
there was a wealthy rebel. For every family relationship honored by
a decision to retain the same political stance, there was a family tom
apart by differences of political opinion. Men and women on both
sides of the religious divide made their decisions concerning the
American rebellion without considering its impact on their church
membership or their immortal souls. Some were moved by one or
more of the factors mentioned, while others might have been driven
by wholly different reasons. Must there have been some allencompassing reason which convinced loyalists to remain loyal at the
outset of the rebellion?
This study argues that while interest, family, and religion
played some part in the decision to remain loyal, the language in
which the loyalists describe their memories demonstrates a deep
distrust and antipathy for the forms of government by which the
rebels took and maintained control. There was a perception on the
part of nearly all of the loyalists studied that the rebels were
engaged in a coup based upon illegal and unnatural acts, that the
government imposed by the radical rebel "faction" was contrary to
the liberties of Englishmen and a hypocritical farce compared to the
rhetoric of liberty and justice constantly bombarding the senses of
10Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, p. ix
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every literate resident of the province. The language of loyalists who
voiced their beliefs during and after the rebellion indicates their
utter loathing of the rebel government and echoes a visceral sense of
wrongness felt by the loyalist observers. They saw an assem bly
which met in defiance of law and which itself created the system of
committees which usurped the executive and judicial powers as
understood by most Englishmen.
For some of the most prominent men of the province no real
decision was needed. The majority of the provincial elite had the
decision made for them by the actions of the crowds who mobbed
and harassed them in the streets. The governor, John Wentworth,
and many of his closest associates were compelled to flee before the
end of 1775 for fear of continued mob violence. The precipitous
nature of this flight allowed for no reflection until safety was
assured. Upon consideration, a few returned to the province at the
earliest opportunity. Daniel Rindge, a councillor, returned in 1778 to
Portsmouth. George Meserve, former stamp distributor and confidant
of Governor Wentworth, tried to return after the peace. Meserve
attempted a suit to recover his property on the grounds that he had
fled New Hampshire "while she acknowledged her dependence on
Great Britain and consequently prior to the political existence of the
United States."11 The suit was unsuccessful and Meserve died in
England without ever receiving compensation for his losses. On the
other hand, Robert Fowle, who departed the province in 1778 under

11 The core of this study is based upon the five manuscript volumes at the New
Hampshire State Library, Concord, NH. Hereinafter cited as NH Claims. NH
Claims, George Meserve, vol. II, p. 1365-66.
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indictment for counterfeiting, successfully returned to the province
after the war and lived out his life near Rochester.
The majority of New Hampshire loyalists stood their ground for
as long as possible. One member of the Governor's Council even
preferred to remain. George Jaffrey of Portsmouth quietly weathered
the rebel takeover until his arrest in November 1775. He was
ordered to remove himself ten miles from Portsmouth or the coast
where the rebels felt he was less of a danger, but the intervention of
General Sullivan alleviated even that mild sentence. Jaffrey died in
Portsmouth in 1802. Theodore Atkinson, a relative and friend of John
Wentworth and chief justice of the province, remained as well. The
respect accorded him by virtue of his reputation for fairness and
honesty protected Atkinson from official sanctions and mob
harassment until his death in 1779. But Jaffrey and Atkinson were
old and well connected.12 They also remained quietly aloof from the
politics of the province.13 For the average loyalist who resisted the
12It is likely that respect for their age and connections preserved the two in
tranquility. The connotations of that respect have been best and most
recently been described by Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism o f the American
Revolution. More needs to be done to study the correlation between age and
the decision to remain loyal. It would be extremely interesting to assemble a
statistical analysis of the loyalist claimants, not only of New Hampshire but
throughout the rebellious colonies. To do so with the 49 New Hampshire
claimants would be fruitless, the sample too small. It would be far more
valuable to include all the 5000 or so loyalist claimants. To incorporate such
an effort within the confines of this study would be impossible. It is possible
to make some generalizations, based upon the extensive information found in
the claims, as will be seen below in Chapter Six. In general, however, I do not
think that age was a factor in the decision to remain loyal.
13Though we might speculate that they, like Mark Hunking Wentworth, may
have argued quietly and with dignity among their circle of acquaintances.
The newspapers are full of complaints by radical rebel writers concerning
an anonymous Portsmouth elite which remained throughout the war
conspicuously loyal or at the least neutral. Those men were accused of
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rebel takeover and its continued governing, life was neither quiet
nor secure.
Some loyalists proclaimed their identity early by their words
and deeds. Outstanding among them was Simon Baxter of Alstead
who began to resist the rebel takeover by protecting the court of
quarter session in Grafton county in 1774. As a militia commander
he refused to march his troops to Boston in 1775. By these acts he
proclaimed his political and ideological affiliation, he proclaimed his
personal identity as a loyalist. He then became a target for the rebel
government. Baxter's experience also illustrates one of the strategies
employed by the rebel government to intimidate and control its
perceived domestic enemies. Baxter was arrested and taken before
the local committee of safety at least thirteen times in 1776 an d
1777. While to the rebels such a record would seem reasonable as a
means to promote internal security, to the loyalists this was an
insufferable breach of the rights of an Englishman. Baxter was not
alone in this sort of treatment. Many loyalist writers complained of
similar occurrences.
The closing of the law courts from 1775 until sometime in 1777
was a major part of the rebel strategy. By depriving the populace of
the normal means of social control, the acts of the committees, both
local and at the provincial level, were beyond judicial scrutiny. The
providing intelligence to the enemy, of plotting a takeover of the assembly,
and of generally obstructing the rebel cause. Wentworth, the Governor's
father, remained in the province until his death also, refusing to abandon
his home to the rebels. Although there is no evidence that these elders
actually acted from a loyalist perspective, their mere presence and the
prominence they represented must have had some quiet influence in the
town. If it had not, the rebel writers might not have complained so
vociferously.
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only appeal was to the rebel dominated assembly, not an arena in
which a loyalist could expect a fair hearing. In January of 1776 the
rebels created a plan of government which they thought would serve
during the period of hostilities. This "constitution of 1776" called for
legislation which would re-establish law courts. Courts subsequently
established remained closed pending the appointment of judges (an
act the loyalists found to be particularly offensive since justices of
the peace could only be commissioned under a royal writ). The new
plan of government called for the formalization of the already sitting
committees of safety in each town, and gave them discretionary
powers to arrest, try and punish anyone suspected of political crimes
as well as some police powers to protect the citizenry during times of
uncertainty. The plan also vested executive power at the provincial
level in the hands of a state Committee of Safety which would hold
all of the reigns of government when the legislature was not in
session.
Loyalists viewed this rebel government as illegitimate. In the
shared language of a self-conscious minority they referred to the
rebels as usurpers. The rebellion and the government it produced
were termed "un-natural."14 The frequent use of such a term seems,
in the intellectual and spiritual climate of the time, significant. The
late eighteenth century was a pivotal period during which the rise of

14Though this study is particularly concerned with New Hampshire as a "case
study" of the development of the loyalist identity, an examination of the
claims from other provinces has shown that the language ascribed to the
loyalists of New Hampshire was used by the loyalists of the other provinces
as well. See for example, Loyalist Claims, Weart Banta, vol. XV, p. 295-302;
Reverend George Panton, vol. XV, p. 15-28; Reuben Tucker, vol. XIV, p. 103116. etc.
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scientific rationalism was superseding superstition. The ideas of
"natural" and "unnatural" held meaning in both a scientific sense and
in a religious-spiritual sense. By attributing characteristics of the
"unnatural" to the rebel movement, the loyalists were denying the
rebellion any basis either in the law of God as handed down through
religion, the Common Law of England which all held in deepest
reverence, or in the laws of nature.
The loyalists made a conscious choice to remain loyal.15 That
choice carried with it a transformation of identity which was in many
cases publicly proclaimed through acts and words. The proclamation
of a loyalist identity by either words or actions carried consequences.
Like their rebel counterparts, the self-proclaimed loyalists were a
minority at the start of hostilities. The vast majority of Americans
were convinced of the righteousness of neither party, and merely
wished to continue their lives along the path of security and
prosperity. This study investigates the development of the loyalist
identity on the personal and communal levels as it emerged in the
context of the Revolution in New Hampshire. It examines the acts
that loyalists used to identify themselves as loyalists publicly and
privately. Once identified as such, loyalists were subject to physical,
economic, and legal consequences. The rebel government found a
number of coercive means useful. Mob action was employed early in
the conflict as a method for sweeping loyalists out of the province

15Norton may be correct in her argument that loyalists remained loyal and
that the rebel choice to seek independence was the greater break with the
past, but that hardly obviates the enormity of the decision to follow such an
unpopular and dangerous course. Norton, The British Americans, p. 7.
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and of intimidating those who rem ained. After the plan o f
government of January 1776 "legitimized" the committees of safety,
those committees and their armed bands constituted a dense local
network of surveillance and repression. Suspected loyalists could be
and were arrested at any hour of the day or night and put on trial by
the committees themselves. In the course of these arrests, loyalists
were physically m anhandled and their property abused or
destroyed. Intimidation and harassm ent drove most outspoken
loyalists from the province by 1778.
Loyalists began to proclaim their position and thereby their
identity in 1774. Several men, including Baxter and Holland, were
active in returning British deserters to Boston which angered the
rebel activists. Baxter also organized a group of like-minded men
who kept the court open in Grafton County, angering the rebels there
even further. John Fenton of Plymouth publicly proclaimed his
position early in 1775 when he assumed his seat in the assembly
amid a storm of criticism concerning the legality of the governor's
extension of the vote in that and two other towns. But by then, in the
spring of 1775, the rebellion had already begun in New Hampshire.
For our purposes, the rebellion began with the capture of Fort
William and Mary by a rebel mob in December 1774. It became clear
at that point that Governor Wentworth had lost control of the
province. When word reached the governor that a mob planned to
seize the stores of gunpowder and weapons at the fort, Wentworth
called upon the militia to stop the mob. But that mob was no random
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mob at all.16 It was led by many of the most prominent men of the
province and numbered in its ranks the very militia Wentworth
sought as enforcers of the law. Without control of the militia,
Wentworth was left with no coercive power whatsoever. His request
for British troops was denied due to the equally tenuous situation in
Boston. That denial probably saved lives on both sides in the
province, and left New Hampshire in the unique position of having no
British military presence on its soil throughout the war.
Wentworth was caught off guard by the loss of his coercive
powers, and equally surprised by the loss of both the assembly and
the media as means of expressing loyalist positions to the public.
The assembly, which had once gladly supported the popular
governor and his predecessor, Benning Wentworth, was by 1774
firmly under rebel control. The legislature refused to cooperate with
the governor's attempts at conciliation, and in the summer of 1775
refused to seat the elected delegates Wentworth hoped w ould
provide him a voice in that house. The assembly ignored the
governor when he dissolved them by meeting on their own authority
and illegally in a tavern in Exeter. The rebel leaders of the mob were

16See John Derhak, "The Portsmouth Uprising of 1774 and the Crowd Actions
at Castle William and Mary: A Case Study of a Popular Uprising in Colonial
British America." Master's Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1991. Also
of interest on the question of the mob involved in the raid on the fort are:
Theodore Crackel and Martin Andresen, "Fort William and Mary: A Case Study
in Crowd Behavior," Douglas H. Sweet, "New Hampshire on the Road to
Revolution: Fort William and Mary, A Decisive Step," and Darryl I. Cathers,
"Powder to the People: The Revolutionary Structure Behind the Attacks on
Fort William and Mary, 1774," all in Historical New Hampshire, Vol. XXIX, No.
4, Winter 1974.
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also the rebel leaders of the assembly and many would hold
responsible positions in the new government and the military.17
Before Wentworth and his circle were aware of the critical
nature of the situation in New Hampshire, they had lost the means to
respond. With the militia and the government under rebel control,
the loyalist response could only have been to the court of public
opinion. But that too was to be denied. Mobs patrolled the streets
obviating the possibility that individuals could convince their fellow
citizens to support the governor or the crown. At the same time the
rebels controlled the only newspaper in the province, the N ew
Hampshire Gazette of Portsmouth. The rebel leadership was
cognizant of the power that a free press might hold, and acted to
ensure their control of content to the extent they could. Daniel Fowle,
the printer, was at one point called before the assembly and
admonished for printing the continuing series of articles written by
Daniel Leonard under the pen name of Massachusettensis in his
pages.18 But Fowle's imagined objectivity was hardly an issue. The
New Hampshire Gazette carried very few pieces even remotely
17The use of the term "mob" and the nature of the Portsmouth mob are
discussed in Chapter Four. Unlike the mobs of Boston and the other major
port cities, the Portsmouth mob does not seem to have had a long and
illustrious history of engaging in "politics out of doors." The Portsmouth
variation coalesced as a means of policing loyalist activity in the seaport
town, and had a constant presence. See Chapter Six.
18Fowle also printed John Adams' Novanglus letters written in reply to
Massachusettensis, though they began to run several weeks after
Massachusettensis appeared, they occupied space just next to Leonard in all
subsequent issues. Daniel Leonard, of Taunton, Massachusetts was a
prominent loyalist, and became Chief Justice of the Bermudas after the
rebellion. See Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches o f Loyalists o f the
American Revolution, with an Historical Essay. 2 vol., Boston: 1864. vol. I, p.
546. Hereinafter cited as Sabine, Sketches, p. 10-12.
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favorable to the loyalist cause. The rebel writers on the other hand
flooded the paper with letters expressing the "whig" position, and
Fowle reprinted dozens of articles from Boston, Philadelphia, and
elsewhere, including occasional pieces from England by writers
expressing their support for the American position.
The war of words carried on in the pages of the Gazette and its
short-lived cousin in Exeter19 replaced the

m ilita r y

struggle which

encompassed the other provinces of British North America. The
battle for the support of the majority of the population of the
province of New Hampshire was fought in print. That battle has in
m odem times been termed a "culture war." Both sides of the
ideological struggle sought to convince the populace that its vision of
the controversy with Great Britain was righteous. Unprepared for the
fight, loyalist writers were nearly silenced, and the rebel writers
were left relatively free to sway public opinion with countless
articles.
As part of their strategy, the rebel writers created their own
version of the loyalist identity. By 1778 the loyalists were portrayed
by rebel writers as savages capable of terrible atrocities like the
deliberate introduction of small pox into rebel-controlled cities such
as Philadelphia. The loyalists were represented as the evil minions of
a newly demonized King George in, to be feared even more than

19Robert Fowle, alleged counterfeiter and loyalist memorialist, printed the
New Hampshire Gazette or, Exeter Morning Chronicle from July 1776 until
his arrest and imprisonment in 1777. Fowle was the nephew of Daniel Fowle
of Portsmouth and learned his trade at the newspaper there. Though counted
a loyalist, Robert Fowle printed no articles favorable to the loyalist position
while his paper was in publication.
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British regulars. The imagery called upon by rebel writers evoked
long standing fears of Indian raids and compared loyalists to the
uncivilized savages who had long ravaged rural settlements. Toward
the end of the war a new and more sophisticated enemy was
revealed, loyalists who pretended to be of the rebel party but who
sought to subvert the new government by seeking election to town
and provincial offices. After the defeat of British arms was in sight,
the fear of the savage depredations of loyalist traitors was replaced
by the new fear of loyalist subversion.
The culture war began with the emergence of the power of the
rebel faction in 1774. Men who proclaimed their loyalist sympathies,
and by extension, their loyalist identity, did so by their actions.
Those actions were met with coercive force. Between December of
1774 and January of 1776 most of that force was carried out by
mobs. Loyalists who identified themselves publicly were set upon,
often beaten, and frequently imprisoned. It was common for those
arrested on suspicion of loyalism to be restricted to their homes or
farms, or to be removed from the vicinity of the coast for fear that
they would aid an anticipated invasion by British troops. Others
fared far worse. Benjamin Hough, a magistrate in the New Hampshire
Grants territory, was seized by a mob, beaten, and had all of his
property taken. He was then tied to a tree, given 200 lashes, and
banished.20
The rebels were aware even in the early stages of the rebellion
of the power of words. Dissident preachers had to be silenced as well.
20Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 544.
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The Presbyterian minister in Bedford, John Houston, found his church
closed against him in 1775. Refusing to retire without a fight,
Houston was seized by a mob and forced to ride a wooden rail for six
miles with kitchen tongs tied around his neck. He fled to the New
Hampshire Grants, but never found another parish.21
After January of 1776 mob action was replaced with the quasilegal operations of the local committees of safety. Their watchfulness
and coercive powers of arrest and im prisonm ent were deemed
adequate by the rebel government. This became especially true after
the Test Oath was circulated. Also referred to as the Association Test,
the oath was recommended by the Continental Congress to all the
provinces as a way of identifying dissidents and of binding the
signers to the cause. Those who refused to sign the Oath were
selected for special attention, watched and harassed by the
committee men. The loyalists still residing in New Hampshire at that
point tried to maintain a low profile whether from a desire to merely
continue with their daily lives or to engage in quietly subversive
activities. Stephen Holland, among others, worked to g a th e r
information and recruit loyalists for the British. He sent men to join
the army in Boston and then in New York, and carried on secret
communications with British prisoners being held in Reading,
Massachusetts. When he was finally arrested in 1777, Holland was

21Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 546. The significance of the kitchen tongs is
another mystery. I would speculate that the tongs may have been symbolic
of the passage in Isaiah which refers to the cleansing of the tongue with
burning coals. Perhaps the mob was warning Houston of the fate which
awaited him if he were to return to his church and attempt to preach an
unpopular message.
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accused of being a leader in a major counterfeiting operation, the
same group of which Robert Fowle was a part. Other loyalists chose
to quietly accept what would come. Unlike Stephen Holland who
signed the Test Oath, Reuben Kidder refused. Kidder, the richest man
in New Ipswich, a magistrate and militia colonel, had been a land
agent for John Wentworth prior to the rebellion. But Kidder took no
active part in resisting the rebel government and was left alone, his
property intact. He died in New Ipswich in 1793.22
The victory over Burgoyne at Saratoga prompted a shift in the
rebel strategy toward the loyalists still in their midst. With the
spectre of invasion removed the rebel governm ent in New
Hampshire felt free to all but abandon its physical harassment of its
domestic opponents and concentrate instead on more subtle and
more profitable ways of dealing with dissenters. The obvious
advantage of this shift toward a legal strategy was that it could be
applied to those who had fled already as well as those who remained.
The rebel government first enacted a series of laws concerning the
definition of treason. Once they had defined their targets they passed
two more laws in 1778 which provided for the banishment of any
persons who "have left or shall leave this State...and have joined or
shall join the Enemies thereof,...thereby not only basely deserting the
Cause of Liberty,...but abetting the Cause of Tyranny."23 The Act of
Proscription and Banishment was quickly followed by an Act of
Confiscation, a law which allowed the state to seize the property of
22Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 602.
23NHPP, vol. VH, p. 810-812. and p. 813-814.
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specifically nam ed loyalists. The property so acquired by the
government was to be sold at auction with the proceeds to be paid
into the state treasury. It was however contended by the loyalist
victims of these laws that a considerable amount of this confiscated
property or the proceeds was diverted into the hands and pockets of
certain individuals highly placed in the rebel faction. Among those
mentioned by loyalist claimants were Matthew Thornton and John
Langdon, two men remembered in modern times as patriots of
standing.
The majority of active loyalists had departed the province by
the time the new laws affecting their status and property w ere
enacted. The peculiar circumstances

prevailing

in New Hampshire

produced unusual results. New Hampshire loyalists did not carry on
any guerilla resistance to the rebel government. Those who served in
a military fashion did so in other provinces either as members of
loyalist units (such as Wentworth's Volunteers) or in units of the
regular British army or navy. Because their activities were thus so
diffused, scholars have questioned the number of loyalists from New
Hampshire and even more the depth of their commitment to the
British cause.24 While this study does not purport to argue the
quality or quantity of New Hampshire loyalism, it does contend that
the loyalists of that province shared identifying characteristics with
the loyalists of other provinces. Those shared characteristics were

24Robert M. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781. New
York: 1973. p. 294; and more vehemently, Wallace Brown, The King's Friends:
the Composition and Motives o f the American Loyalist Claimants. Providence:
1965. p. 7.
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borne out in the actions by which the loyalists proclaimed their
individual identity as loyalists, and in the shared language which
they used to express themselves publicly and privately during and
after the war. That the New Hampshire loyalists did not foment an
uprising can be explained by the absence of any serious British
threat aimed at the province throughout the war. As other studies
have shown, particularly Paul Smith in his Loyalists and Redcoats,
most loyalists remained quiescent until a British military presence
drew them out. The rebel governments with their networks of
committees and their control of the militia in every province, were
capable of swift and sure retaliation should loyalists have attempted
any actions without the support of nearby British troops. As Smith
points out, loyalist military activity was nearly always in concert
with and predicated by British military activity or plans for such
intervention. Poor timing on the part of British commanders, among
other factors, conspired to slowly erode the confidence of activist
loyalists in the efficacy of British strategy and the potential for a
British victory. In the absence of any British support whatsoever, the
loyalists of New Hampshire chose to go elsewhere as far as their
military participation went. On the one occasion when a British
operation brought troops into some proximity with the province, the
loyalists responded by flocking to join Burgoyne on his trek toward
New York. Among those was Simon Baxter who had the distinction of
being the only provincial officer in Burgoyne's command who refused
to sign an oath of allegiance to his captors after the Battle of
Saratoga. Baxter alone was imprisoned with the British officers and
after a while made his escape. Baxter had chosen not to identify
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himself any longer as a provincial, or as a New Hampshire man; he
identified himself as a loyal British-American. There was, to him, no
question of accepting the offered parole and returning to his old life.
This study demonstrates the emergence of a loyalist identity,
separate from the identity the loyalists once shared with th eir
neighbors. The loyalists retained their allegiance to the British
Empire and thereby remained British Americans.25 The rebels chose
to alter their own personal and communal identities as well, though
the analysis of that identity transformation remains for another
project. The loyalist identity was transformed on the personal level
and was dem onstrated through words and actions. It was also
transform ed on the community level. Two types of loyalist
community em erged from the traum a of the revolutionary
generation. One sort was the geographic community formed by
aggregate settlements of loyalists in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, the
Floridas, and the West Indies; other exile communities formed in
London and Bristol, though these were temporary. The other was a
community of the mind and spirit which encompassed all loyalists
regardless of their physical location. All of the loyalist generation
suffered similarly. Those who chose to remain quietly safe at home
shared to a degree the experience of their more venturesome
brethren. But the loyalists who left their communities either to flee
or to take up arms shared an enormous sense of loss and dislocation
25A surprising number of loyalists referred to their former neighbors as "the
Americans." By doing so, they were separating themselves from those of
their neighbors who had rebelled. This distinction was true for native born
loyalists more often than those who had emigrated to America. See for
example Loyalist Claims, Elisha Laurence, vol. XV, p. 29-36.
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which altered their perception of who they were singly and in
relation to each other. They could not as a group go back to the way
things were as those who stayed behind eventually did. Though
individuals sought repatriation after the war, far more chose to
establish themselves in new places, where they could remember
their past and build a new future conscious of who they were and
the changes which had brought them this new identity.
H. Sources
This study relies first of all on an analytic reading of the
Loyalist Claims as a central source for inquiry. The claims provide
the largest extant body of loyalist writing collected into one archive
and authored by over 5000 individuals. The claims are an important
source and support the existence of a loyalist community, a selfconscious minority whose goals were articulated in a shared
vocabulary. The shared language of the claims also supports the
existence of a distinct loyalist identity.
The documents we now call the Loyalist Claims came into
being as a result of an act of Parliament in 1783. That the claims
even exist is evidence of the existence of a vocal minority community
which formed in London during the war, and which agitated
incessantly during and after the war for governmental assistance to
those who had lost their living and property as a result of their
loyalty.26 The majority of the claims were filed in London during the
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original term of the commission which ran for two years. Due to the
overall quantity of claims, over five thousand all told, the term of the
commission was extended by Parliament, and the work was not
completed until 1790.27 In 1786 hearings were held in Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick to assist those who were unable to make the
passage to England, but who yet had claims pending. An agent,
British lawyer John Anstey, was sent to the United States to gather
evidence.28
The original documents are now in the Public Record Office,
Audit Office, in London, and consist of 146 bound volumes and 139
bundles of loose papers. During the nineteenth century the papers
were stored in a sort of basement in Somerset House where they
suffered from dampness, and some time during their stay there,
fourteen volumes went missing, and are presumed destroyed.29 In
26Norton, The British-Americans. For an examination of the exile community
in England, this book has no rival.
27Gregory Palmer, ed., Revised Edition o f Biographical Sketches o f Loyalists o f
the American Revolution by Lorenzo Sabine. Westport, CT: 1984. p. x. Palmer
provides an excellent introduction to the revised edition of this 19th century
classic, including a concise overview of the claims process. Referred to
hereinafter as Palmer, Sketches.
28Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xi.
2 9 In his Introduction to the New Hampshire Claims, Stevens suggests that at
the time the loss was discovered, Americans were suspected of stealing and
destroying the missing papers, though he offers no reason why that might
have happened. B.F. Stevens, ed., New Hampshire Loyalist Claims. Stevens
transcribed all of the claims and correlated the papers in the bound volumes
with those found in loose bundles. He then arranged the claims
alphabetically by individual last name and by province of origin. If a
claimant had property loss claimed in one province but was a resident of
another, Stevens arranged the claimant by residence. Thus if a
Massachusetts resident lost property in New Hampshire, his or her claim
would probably be placed in the Massachusetts volumes. If the claimant was a
resident of New Hampshire, and lost property in another province, his claim
would be found in the New Hampshire claims. If the claimant had residence
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about 1904 B.F. Stevens undertook the transcription of the Claims,
and it is those transcripts which we have the good fortune to use in
this country.
Most claim "files" contain other documents such as wills, deeds,
maps, depositions, letters, etc. in support of the individual's claim.30
Many "files" also contain petitions submitted earlier in the war to the
treasury for temporary support. The centerpiece of each claim was
the "memorial" which consisted of one or more pages in which the
claimant set forth the circumstances under which he was asking the
British government for compensation of his (or her) losses. Length
varied depending on the experiences of the writer as well as the
complexity and amount of property claimed as lost.
The memorials themselves followed a pattern. Each began with
a brief salutation to the Claims Commission which varied only
slightly from one to the next. The second part identified the writer,
sometimes including his profession and place of residence. It was at
that point that prominent men listed the offices they held under the
crown or provincial governments, and their annual value in salary or
fees. Then came a recitation of the acts each memorialist performed
which had identified him as a loyalist. The most commonly used
phrase was "rendered him obnoxious to his neighbors" or some
in two states and lost property in both, it appears Stevens may have included
him in both. One New Hampshire claimant listed considerable land in
Massachusetts, and may indeed have lived there, but had also claimed losses
in New Hampshire, so Stevens inserted a note that the extensive
Massachusetts losses could be found in that claimant's papers relevant to that
province.
S^For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the bundles of documents which
comprise each claim as "files."
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variation of those words. Once the memorialist had established his
identity as a loyalist, he recounted the consequences of his actions.
This usually encompassed a recitation of the "sufferings" he
underwent on behalf of government including being harassed by
mobs, arrested, imprisoned, shot at, insulted, robbed, and so on. The
stage thus set, the final portion of the memorial consisted of a list of
property lost. Those lists ranged from a single paragraph to hundreds
of pages supplemented by maps and deeds. Stephen Holland was
able to acquire a copy of the inventory taken by rebel leaders when
the contents of his house were sold. Robert Fowle appended a copy of
his bill of sale dating to the time of acquisition of his printing
equipment which provided a detailed list of the contents of his shop.
On the surface, the similarity from one memorial to another can
be explained by the appearance of a manual written anonymously
and published in 1783 which explained the law that established the
Claims Commission and the claims process to those who might want
to participate. But beyond a self-help manual, the consistency of the
memorials is itself testimony to the existence of a self-conscious
group, a community whose members cooperated with each other in
the writing of their memorials and supported each other's stories
with affidavits. Indeed Stephen Holland wrote several memorials on
behalf of friends who were unable to do so themselves by virtue of
distance or frailty.31

3 1The Nova Scotia claimants were often assisted in the preparation of their
memorials by agents. The papers were conveyed to London and then a
personal interview was conducted in St. John.
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Of the more than 5000 loyalists who attem pted to receive
compensation for their losses, New Hampshire loyalists filed fortynine claims with the Claims Commissioners.32 One of the claims was
filed on behalf of three brothers, James, John, and Patrick McMaster,
though James was the only one of the three resident in the province
of New Hampshire. Three claims were filed by women, Mary
Achindoss, Joanna Dix, and Elizabeth Wentworth, though others were
pursued by widows after the death of their claimant husbands.33
32I have focused primarily on New Hampshire and thus the forty-nine claims
of the New Hampshire loyalists form the core of the evidence for my
interpretations. However, I have also read and taken into consideration the
claims of those from other provinces and have found nothing to contradict
the conclusions of this study. To put that number into some perspective, the
New Hampshire Claims constitute less than one percent of the claims filed by
loyalists from all provinces. But the number of New Hampshire loyalists was
small as well. Sabine could identify only another hundred or so who did not
file claims. At the time of the signing of the Test Oath, in New Hampshire
there were 8,972 adult males eligible to sign. Of those, 773 or 8.6% refused
{NHPP vol. VIII, pp. 204-296). Refusal did not necessarily indicate that the
individual was a loyalist, nor did signing preclude an eventual turn to the
loyalist camp. All that these numbers can tell us for sure is that only 49 New
Hampshire loyalists filed claims. Based on the number of adults in the
province in 1776, we can speculate that: only a very small number remained
committed loyalists throughout the conflict and survived it; or that not very
many had lost enough property to make it worth the time, effort, and
expense to file a claim; or that perhaps only a few New Hampshire loyalists
heard about the opportunity afforded by the compensation process. However,
if we look at the total number of claims filed, over 5000, and compare that to
the number of loyalists estimated to have departed the provinces by the end
of the war, between 80,000 and 100,000, we see that only 5% of those who left
their homes behind filed claims. Why that was so is a mystery yet to be
solved.
^ N H Claims, Thomas Cumings, vol. I, p. 361; John Fenton, vol. II, p. 533-4;
Donald McAlpine, vol. Ill, p. 1140; George Meserve, vol. Ill, p. 1288;
Bartholomew Stayers' claim was continued by his son, Vol. II, p. 1704; The
petitions and claim of James Nevin was filed by his wife, Isabella, though in
his name. He had been Collector of Customs in the Port of Piscataqua, and a
member of the council. But he died in 1769. More on Nevin's claim below. The
petition in the name of Benjamin Whiting was actually written by Stephen
Holland on behalf of Whiting's son, Leonard, who lived in Merrimack, NH.
His father's estate had been confiscated and sold, but Whiting provided no
proofs.
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The New Hampshire claims, taken as a group, provide an
important source for examining the Revolution from the perspective
of those who felt compelled to adhere to the crown and thereby
suffered either personally or in terms of lost property. More often
than not, most claimants had suffered in both respects. They also
provide a window on the soul of a community, a group of individuals
drawn together in a common effort to find redress for their losses,
despite the fact that some of them never met. This community was
drawn from all of the rebellious provinces, and though we will
concentrate almost exclusively on the story of the New Hampshire
loyalists, we can extend their views and their experiences to their
brethren of whatever province.
The Claims are the largest single collection devoted to the
writings of loyalists, and perhaps more important, the writings of
ordinary loyalists. As such, they provide a unique perspective on the
thoughts and ideas of ordinary men and women, a glimpse of their
identity as individuals, the sum of which becomes the loyalist
community.
The Claims represent the articulation of a self-conscious
minority group attempting to establish an identity, a community
seeking a place, seeking to establish its own worth within a new
society because its old society had been ripped apart by war and
because its members have suffered displacement and loss. Second,
the claims provide an analytic framework within which we can
reconstruct the story of the rebellion as experienced by the losers.
A second considerable body of evidence for the conclusions
adduced herein lies in the records of the rebel government: Journals

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

of the House and Council; correspondence among rebel leaders, and
correspondence between the committees of the various towns and
the government at Exeter. These can all be found in the published
Provincial and State Papers. Volumes 7 and 8 cover the years under
consideration. In addition the memoirs, letters, and other papers of
various loyalists have also been consulted and are cited as necessary
in the text. Among the most useful of printed collections was the
series of Documents o f the American Revolution, 1770-1783. The
twenty-one volumes in that series contain useful letters and official
communications to and from the Colonial Office throughout the war,
as well as numbers of documents acquired by correspondents and
enclosed from one to another.
Newspapers of the time provided a wealth of information
especially during the discussion of the culture war which fills
Chapter Six. For our purposes I have analyzed the full run of the
"loyalist" paper in Exeter, the New Hampshire Gazette or Exeter
Morning Chronicle, as well as ten years of the New Hampshire
Gazette of Portsmouth, the only paper which spanned the years from
1774 to 1784.
This study is informed by a number of works on the American
Revolution. The general state of affairs on the eve of the Revolution
can be found in Jackson T. Main's The Social Structure o f
Revolutionary America. More timely and useful is Robert A. Gross's
The Minutemen and Their World.34 Among the studies concerning

34jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure o f Revolutionary America.
Princeton: 1965; Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World. New York:
1976.
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the causes of the Revolution were John C. Miller's The Origins o f the
American Revolution, Edmund S. Morgan's The Stamp Act Crisis and
Inventing the People, Gordon S. Wood's Creation o f the American
Republic and The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, (which also
contains a brilliant description of colonial society) and Bernard
Bailyn's Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution . 35 Older, yet
still of value, was Lawrence Henry Gipson's The Coming o f the
Revolution.36 Several scholars have suggested economics played an
important role in the causes of the Revolution. Among those are Marc
Egnal's A M ighty Empire, Thomas Doerflinger's A Vigorous Spirit o f
Enterprise, and Gary Nash's The Urban CrucibleA7 T.H. Breen argues
persuasively that economics, particularly planter debt, did not weigh
heavily in the decision of the planter aristocracy to rebel.38 Oliver
Dickerson suggested that it was not the Navigation Acts themselves

3 3John C. Miller, The Origins o f the American Revolution. Boston: 1943;
Edmund S. & Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to
Revolution.Chapel Hill, NC: 1953. Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People,
Gordon S. Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York:
1969 and Radicalism o f the American Revolution. Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution. See also Edmund S. Morgan,
The Birth o f the Republic, 1763-1789. 3rd edition. Chicago: 1992.
38Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Coming o f the Revolution, 1763-1775. New
York: 1962.
37Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire, The Origins o f the American Revolution.
Ithaca, NY: 1988. Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit o f Enterprise,
Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia. New
York: 1986. Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible, Social Change, Political
Consciousness, and the Origins o f the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA:
1979.
38T. H. Breen, Tobacco Culture, The Mentality o f the Great Tidewater Planters
on the Eve o f the Revolution. Princeton, NJ: 1985.
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which drove a wedge between Britain and her colonies as much as it
was the conduct of the customs officers.39
Some works describe the social and cultural effects of the
Revolution. One of the finest is Charles Royster's A Revolutionary
People at War, but John Shy's A People Numerous and Arm ed is
equally helpful.40 Don Higginbotham discussed the war in a larger
context in his War and Society in Revolutionary America.41 Another
look at the Revolution and its impact on America over time is
Michael Kammen's A Season o f Youth.42
The war itself is well described in Robert Middlekauffs The
Glorious Cause.43 From the British perspective, a fine account of the
war in its political and military aspects can be found, first among
others, in Piers Mackesy's The War for America, 1775-1783.44
Another admirable study from that side of the Atlantic is Jeremy

39OIiver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution.
Philadelphia: 1951.
40Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental A rm y and
American Character, 1775-1783. Chapel Hill, NC: 1979. John Shy, A People
Numerous and Armed, Reflections on the Military Struggle for American
Independence. Revised Edition. Ann Arbor, MI: 1990.
41Don Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider
Dimensions o f Conflict Columbia, SC: 1988.
42Michael Kammen, A Season o f Youth: The American Revolution and the
Historical Imagination. New York: 1978.
43Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 17631789. New York: 1982.
^Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783. Cambridge, MA: 1965. See
also Michael Pearson, Those Damned Rebels, The American Revolution
Through British Eyes. New York: 1972.
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Black's War for America.45 Barbara Tuchman investigated the naval
side of the Revolution as well as the Dutch connection in The First
Salute.4(> Many more works too numerous to list consider th e
Revolution in general and from particular perspectives. Most were
not consulted for this study, but are certainly w orthy of
consideration for the general study of the Revolution. Two newer
works require m ention here. Robert Leckie has penned an
enormously detailed narrative of the Revolution centering around
the undeniable importance of George Washington to its success as
well as the reciprocal effect of the success of the war on the career of
the commander-in-chief.47 We, however, are far more concerned
with a more limited view of the war, that of the loyalists.
As mentioned previously, the definitive narrative of the
loyalist in the American revolution is Robert M. Calhoon's The
Loyalists in Revolutionary America. Before Calhoon only Claude H.
Van Tyne48 had explored the loyalists in such depth, and no one has
since. We have seen the emergence of loyalist studies of two kinds:
the ideological exploration and the local study. First among the
ideological studies was Nelson's The American Tory.4'3 Accepted as

45jeremy Black, War for America, The Fight for Independence 1775-1783. New
York: 1991.
^Barbara W. Tuchman, The First Salute. New York: 1988.
47Robert Leckie, George Washington's War, The Saga o f the American
Revolution. New York: 1992.
48Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution. Reprint.
Gloucester, MA: 1959.
4^William H. Nelson, The American Tory. Oxford: 1961.
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the earliest and most respected of works concerned with the loyalist
ideological position, Nelson errs in this slender volume by c o n tin u in g
to perpetuate the stereotypes concerning loyalists without fully
understanding the motivations behind the ideology he so faithfully
documents. His use of the pejorative term "tory" is a prime example.
As will be explored below, the loyalists eschewed the use of the term
referring to themselves. A fine recent example of an ideological
examination of the loyalists is Janice Potter's The Liberty We Seek,
while Calhoon's collection of essays, The Loyahst Perception and
Other Essays, is also extremely useful.50
Many valuable studies of loyalism at the provincial level have
been published. Early works include Harold Hancock's pair of books
on Delaware loyalists: The Loyalists o f Revolutionary Delaware and
The Delaware Loyalists, 51 Robert DeMond's study of North Carolina
Loyalists,52 Siebert's work on the Floridas and the Indies, and
Pennsylvania.53 Recently, new monographs have appeared dealing
with the role of the loyalists in the war at the provincial level. These

50Janice Potter, The Liberty We Seek, Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York
and Massachusetts. Cambridge, MA: 1983. Robert M. Calhoon,
51Harold Bell Hancock, The Delaware Loyalists. Reprint. Boston: 1972. and The
Loyalists o f Revolutionary Delaware. Cranbury, NJ: 1977.
52Robert O. DeMond, The Loyalists in North Carolina During the Revolution.
Hamden, CT: 1964.
53Wilbur H. Siebert, The Legacy o f the American Revolution to the British West
Indies and Bahamas: A Chapter out of the History o f the Loyalists. Reprint.
Boston: 1972; Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785; The Most Important
Documents Pertaining Thereto, Edited with an Accompanying Narrative. 2
vols. Reprint. Boston: 1972; The Loyalists o f Pennsylvania. Columbus, OH:
1920.
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include Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia, by Adele Hast, and
Philip Ranlet's The New York Loyalists. 5 4 Hast demonstrates the
connection between the presence of British m ilita ry activity and the
level of loyalist commitment in the two proximal areas of Virginia.
Ranlet's study seemed unusually concerned with denying the
assumed intensity of loyalist commitment in the province of New
York. Previous studies have asserted that the number of loyalists
was extremely high in New York, as it may have been in the
Carolinas and Georgia. Ranlet argued that the numbers of loyalists
were artificially high due to the British occupation of New York for
most of the war, and that the majority of New Yorkers were indeed
rebels or at the least neutral. Robert Lambert has ably described the
role of the loyalists in the province of South Carolina in his South
Carolina Loyahsts in the American Revolution . 55 Those works and a
collection of article-length community studies of loyalist activity
collected by Robert Calhoon and others56 have dem onstrated the
54Adele Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia, The Norfolk Area and the
Eastern Shore. Ann Arbor, MI: 1979; Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists.
Knoxville, TN: 1986. See also Robert O. DeMond, The Loyalists in North
Carolina During the Revolution. Reprint. Hamden CT: 1964.; Adele Hast,
Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia The Norfolk Area and the Eastern Shore.
Ann Arbor, MI: 1979. Though separated by nearly forty years in their
writing, the two studies here exemplify the type of localized work being done
on loyalist activities. Both attempt an analysis of loyalist activities before and
during the rebellion, DeMond in a rather straightforward way characteristic
of his generation, provides a comprehensive narrative of the activities of
loyalists in specific contexts. Hast brings to bear the sophisticated tools of the
more recent prosopographic school, analyzing every possible quantifiable
variable to achieve much the same result, an exploration of the actions of a
minority in a specific area over a certain span of time.
55Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American
Revolution. Columbia, SC: 1987.
56Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community.
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need for further inquiry on the local and provincial level into the
loyalist experience, while at the same time setting the standard for
innovative scholarship such inquiries demand. These studies raise as
many questions as they answer. Jean Hankins, in an examination of
Sandemanian pacifists in Connecticut reminds us of the work yet to
be done on the relationship of religious principle to loyalism in other
areas, particularly the relationship between rebel activity and the
Quakers who were singled out for persecution by the Continental
Congress.57 Rebecca Starr pointed out the ephemeral nature of the
loyalist persuasion in a study of loyalists on Daufuskie Island, South
Carolina. Though adamant during the war, the population of that tiny
island reverted to their provincial American allegiance at the
Revolution's conclusion.58 In the same collection David Maas and
Joseph Tiedemann examine the conflict and problems incumbent
upon communities as they strive to reconcile themselves to the
presence of neighbors who were once characterized as b itte r
enemies. Maas studied the problem of amnesty for returning
loyalists in Massachusetts, while Tiedemann considered the means of
conflict resolution in post-war New York.59

57Jean F. Hankins, "Connecticut's Sandemanians: Loyalism as a Religious Test,"
in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community, pp. 31-44.
58Rebecca Starr, '"Little Bermuda': Loyalism on Daufuskie Island, South
Carolina, 1775-1783" in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community, pp. 5564.
59David E Maas, "The Massachusetts Loyalists and the Problem of Amnesty,
1775-1790," and Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Patriots, Loyalists, and Conflict
Resolution in New York, 1783-1787," in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and
Community, pp. 65-74 and pp. 75-90.
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There remains a great deal to be done. Provincial studies of
Georgia and New Jersey are lacking, as are modem monographs on
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Massachusetts. More could be done with
North Carolina, and none of the provinces has been exhausted. There
is no modern treatm ent of loyalism in New Hampshire. Otis G.
Hammond published a brief treatment of the loyalists of New
Hampshire in 1917,60 and nothing more was done on the provincial
level until Robert Brown's dissertation in 1983. Brown's thorough
and informative study concentrated on a narrative of the loyalist
experience in New Hampshire, and related that experience to the
political context of the province.61 The only other work remotely
relevant is Paul W ilderson's excellent biography of John
Wentworth.62
The dissertation does not follow a narrative form. Instead, each
chapter explores certain themes which thread their way through the
history of loyalism in New Hampshire. Chapter Two discusses the
proclamation of individual loyalist identities through words and,
more demonstratively, by actions. The shared language of the Claims
as weH as other written sources supply much of the evidence. The
660tis G. Hammond, Tories o f New Hampshire in the War of the Revolution.
Concord, NH: 1917.
61Robert M. Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire and the Loyalist
Experience: 'Surely We Have Deserved a Better Fate.'" Dissertation,
University of New Hampshire, 1983. While Brown provides a valuable
introduction to the loyalist experience, this study diverges from his
excellent narrative to concentrate on the process of identity transformation
and the formation of the new ideational loyalist community.
62Paul W. Wilderson, Governor John Wentworth & the American Revolution
The English Connection. Hanover, NH: 1994.
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actions of various loyalists are of special interest as expressions of
deeply held beliefs which translate into the physical expression of
personal identity. Beginning with a brief treatment of what might be
described as the "original identity," the chapter explores the evidence
of the expression of the loyalist identity. This expression corresponds
to the second form of identity described previously, that which is
publicly proclaimed by words and actions.
Chapter Three describes the experiences or "sufferings"
recounted by the loyalists as a result of the rebel response to their
proclamation of identity. The rebel government at all levels spent a
great deal of effort in trying to identify those they feared to be
potential or real enemies and even more effort in the attempt to
either drive those so identified from the community or maintain
strict control over their persons. Once observers perceived the new
identity proclaimed by some of their neighbors, sanctions were
imposed including community pressures and the official responses of
the rebel government. The public proclamation of the loyalist
identity produced an "other" against which the norms of community
behavior might be set. Though not deliberately chronological,
Chapters Two and Three concentrate on the early stages of the
rebellion. Most loyalists proclaimed their choice in the period
between the taking of Fort William and Mary in December of 1775
and the summer of 1777 when a number of New Hampshire loyalists
joined Burgoyne as he marched southward. The response of the rebel
authorities during that period was repressive, relying on a strategy
of physical coercion by means of mobs and later by the committees
and their bands of militiamen. While Chapter Two considers the
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"who" the loyalists projected themselves to be through their words
and actions, Chapter Three analyzes the responses of the observers
of those projected identities and attempts to construct the perception
of the loyalist identity upon which the rebels based their responses.
Chapter Four considers the shift in rebel strategy away from
physical reprisals on the absent or remaining loyalists. The rebel
government constructed a legal identity for the loyalist enemies and
used that device to augment the dwindling state treasury. Based on
their perceptions of the loyalist identity, the rebel government
projected their own definition of those individuals whose actions
failed to conform with community standards. The assembly created a
new definition of treason based on the actions which the loyalists
had already taken including leaving the province and taking up arms
with the British army. By identifying individual loyalists as traitors,
the rebel government was then able to condemn large numbers of
suspected loyalists without due process and subsequently confiscate
large amounts of personal and real property. The chapter combines
the uses of the "who" the loyalists were perceived to be by their
opponents and the "who" the rebel government constructed the
loyalists to be for the purposes of its own political agenda.
Chapter Five explores yet another way in which the rebels
created and imposed an identity on their opponents. This chapter
argues that the rebellion was in fact a culture war in addition to the
political and military struggles. In the course of that cultural battle,
the rebels engaged in a form of discourse in which they created a
new and highly negative identity for their ideological opponents, an
act of political myth-making so powerful that it has withstood the
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passage of years and been accepted as fact by generations that
followed.
Chapter Six details the emergence of the loyalist identity on the
community level. Through an analytic reading of the Loyalist Claims,
I argue that a loyalist community existed, though not necessarily
corresponding to geographic boundaries. This ideational community
is demonstrated through shared language, experiences, and goals.
The memorials and their supporting documents are the last
expressions uttered by large numbers of the losing side in both the
rebellion and the culture war. Loyalist historians would attempt to
reconstruct the events of 1774 to 1783 for the reading public, but
their efforts were lost to the vast majority of the populace in the new
republic in America. Only a disinterested British audience would see
the fruits of their labor. The claimants did not write for the public.
Their stories were told in the hope that the government which had
failed so miserably to protect their homes and fortunes by force
might compensate them for their losses in some fashion. They wrote
also to counter the m yth created by the rebel writers and
promulgated in print to the world. They wrote to dispel the stories of
cowardice and savagery which tainted their self image and to set
right the tale of the loss of America which had taken place one farm,
one shop, one home at a time.
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Chapter Two
Demonstrating Loyalty:
Loyalist Acts as Profession of Personal Identity.

Though I have no mistrust but that all and much more
than I have wrote is strictly true, yet if your Excellency
should happen to mention anything above related among
your friends, be pleased to conceal my name, who have
no inclination to expose my person to the resentment of
these Sons of Violence.1
This chapter is concerned with the actions of New Hampshire
loyalists, primarily those who petitioned for redress of their losses to
the British government during and after the war. The memorialists
provide a cross-section of the loyalist generation. All levels of society
were represented among the claimants, from the governor of the
province, John Wentworth, to the post rider, Bartholomew Stavers,
who had served the Boston to Portsmouth route. Those who had once
achieved wealth were represented among the claimants. Benning
Wentworth, the governor's nephew, owned many thousands of acres
of land in the interior of the province despite the fact that he had not
yet come of age at the outset of the rebellion.2 On the other hand,
1Reverend Henry Caner to Governor John Wentworth, November 8, 1773, from
Caner's letterbook, quoted in Catherine S. Crary, ed., The Price o f Loyalty,
Tory Writings from the Revolutionary Era. New York: 1973.
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Levi Warner of Claremont asked compensation for losses amounting
to £70 sterling. He had lost everything, house, livestock, and the loom
on which he had earned his living as a weaver.3 A common thread
binds them all, their desire to be regarded as loyalists, to embrace
that identity not only as a means to an end, the reimbursement of
their losses, but as a way of putting a label to the experience they
had undergone, a way of again becoming a part of a group expressed
as "we" or "us" denied them by the fact that they had been shunned
by their neighbors, excluded from their communities, and exiled
from their homes.
Asked to identify himself in 1773, the average resident of New
Hampshire would probably have given his name and then defined
himself in terms of the town in which he lived and by his occupation.
Josiah Pomeroy, "of Keene," and "Physician," would be the public
identity of one man who very shortly would redefine himself in a
very different way. The lives of individuals w ere

closely

circumscribed by life at the local level. Few members of interior
communities had any ties with provincial society or politics, and
fewer still had any contact at all with the trans-atlantic network of
imperial politics and trade. Provincials thought locally just as they
lived locally, and their self-defining characteristics were primarily
local. There is little evidence to suggest that any change came about
due to the outbreak of rebellion in 1774, at least for the vast
majority of the residents of the province. Only a small percentage of
2NH Claims. Benning Wentworth, vol. IV, p. 1878-1881.
3NH Claims, Levi Warner, vol. IV, p. 1868.
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the people of New Hampshire made a difficult choice in the months
following the sacking of Fort William and Mary, a choice between the
easy path of acquiescence to rebellion, or the far more difficult one of
loyalty to the constitution and crown of Great Britain.
The acts committed by the loyalists varied widely in kind and
took place over a period of years. Whatever their nature, the acts of
loyalists had effects on two levels. The first level was that of
immediate consequences. When an individual acted in such a way as
to be identified as a loyalist, he usually suffered some consequence.
The immediate consequences of loyalist actions can be divided into
physical consequences and legal consequences, each of which will be
treated fully in the next two chapters. We are concerned for now
with the second level of consequence derived from loyalist acts, the
definition of self as loyalist on the one hand and the identification by
others, the rebel faction, of loyalists as enemies. With the commission
of a loyalist act, the loyalist affirmed his own identity to himself and
to the community at large. In so doing, he allowed others to form
judgments of their own as to who he was. When a loyalist committed
a loyalist act, he was defining self in a certain way, defining self as
equivalent to loyalist at the very time the act occurred. On the other
hand those outside the act might not identify the actor as a loyalist
immediately depending on the length of time it took to perceive that
the act had occurred or indeed that it had occurred at all. Any
number of loyalist acts probably occurred and yet remained
undetected, lost to the knowledge of both sides forever. We however
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are concerned with acts known at least to the actors, and in most
cases to the community as a whole.4
New Hampshire in the period from around 1773 until 1779
was a community in a state of flux. Like a region about to be struck
by an earthquake, tremors forewarned of the troubles to come. The
minor disturbances occasioned by the Stamp Act crisis of 1765-6
went for the most part unheeded. By the early 1770s the economy of
New Hampshire was strong and growing,5 and but for the
disagreement with the mother country over taxation, things could
not have looked brighter. The royal governor, John Wentworth, was
well liked and diligent, and understood well the concerns of the
inhabitants of his native province. He had a long range plan to
enhance the productivity, prosperity, and growth of his province.6
But two factors conspired to change all of that. First, Wentworth's
connections in London, especially his distant kinsman Rockingham,
were no longer right in the center of power. The absence of powerful
friends at court deprived Wentworth of influence on the one hand
and defenders on the other. Instead of being able to have his

4These acts committed by loyalists fall into the type III category of the self
definition process as postulated in Roy F. Baumeister, Identity, Cultural
Change and the Struggle for Self. New York: 1986. Throughout our lives we
make choices in what we will or will not do, choices which are informed by
who we are, or at least who we perceive ourselves to be, and the results of
those choices, actions, are thus guided by our self concept or identity, and
subsequently reinforce that identity in our own minds and in the eyes of
observers. See also David J. De Levita, M.D., The Concept o f Identity. Paris:
1965.
5Speech of Governor John Wentworth to the New Hampshire Assembly, April
8, 1774. NHPP, vol VII, p. 361
6Wilderson, Governor John Wentworth, infra.
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concerns and those of his citizens heard, his close ties to government
were nearly severed. On the other hand he was forced to adhere
much more strictly to his instructions, thus alienating himself from
those at home who disagreed most with government's policies.
And those who disagreed most were not a

m in o r ity

in the

province. Because of long and deep connections7 between many in
New Hampshire and many more in the neighboring province of
Massachusetts, the radicalism of the patriot faction in Boston was
quickly and easily transmitted to the less urbane but equally
excitable faction in New Hampshire. Thus an explosive tremor such
as the Boston Tea Party on December 16, 1773, was felt with only a
little less force in the streets of Portsmouth six months later. The
arrival of a consignment of East India Company tea to the hands and
warehouse of Edward Parry did not go unmarked, and the brewing
crowd forced the luckless agent to forward the odious tea on to
Halifax. In September as well, Parry was forced to send on the tea
destined for New Hampshire's cups at the behest of Portsmouth's
vigilant crowd. The further narrative of the events of 1774 and 1775
are fairly well known and far better told elsewhere.8 Yet some
background will help to fully understand the situation.
7See for example Robert Zemsky, Merchants, Farmers, and River Gods, An
Essay on Eighteenth-Century American Politics. Boston: 1971. and David E
Van Deventer, The Emergence of Provincial New Hampshire, 1623-1741.
Baltimore: 1976. also J.L Walsh, '"For the Setteling and Establishing of Order
in the Administration of Justice There:' Law and Society on the Piscataqua,
1640-1679." MA Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1989.
8For an in depth account of the days leading up to war in New Hampshire see
Jere R. Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism, New Hampshire Politics and
the American Revolution, 1741-1794. Cambridge, MA: 1970 and Wilderson,
Governor John Wentworth. For a complete examination of American culture
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The action by Parliament in passing the Boston Port Act in
response to the destruction of the tea in Boston was an incendiary
event. Because of the close ties alluded to previously, the radical
leaders of New Hampshire's Assembly warmed to the cause of their
southern neighbors and formed an ad hoc committee o f
correspondence in January 1774. That action came about as a direct
result of a letter from the Speaker of the House in Massachusetts
addressed to the Speaker in New Hampshire. Within a few weeks
Governor Wentworth dissolved the Assembly.9 When the new
Assembly met in May another committee was appointed, this one to
stand ready to "correspond as the occasion may require."10 That
occurrence on Saturday May 28, prompted Wentworth to begin a
series of adjournments calculated to remind the House that the
Governor still had the right to control their deliberations. Failing to
obtain the acquiescence of the Assembly, Wentworth dissolved the
legislature on June 8th, calling its activities "inconsistent with his
Majesty's service and the good of this government."11
Wentworth had some idea what was going on, though he did
not fully comprehend the extent of his predicament. His agents had
informed him of the presence of letters in town suggesting the
summoning of a "Congress of the Colonies," and the governor thought
that by first annoying the members with the short adjournments and
prior to and during the Revolution see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the
American Revolution.
VNHPP, vol VII, p. 352
10NHPP, vol VII, p. 366.
llNHPP, vol VII, p. 369.
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then dissolving the Assembly altogether, he could persuade them to
ignore the attempts by other colonies to draw New Hampshire into
some sort of alliance.12 But Wentworth had underestimated the
strength of the radical faction he had himself helped to create. By
extending the reach of government in the creation of counties,
Wentworth had fostered the emergence of more local leadership than
had previously been possible and diluted the control of the
Portsmouth elite on the hinterlands. By creating a prosperous new
underclass of m inor officeholders desiring to replace their
entrenched predecessors in the political arena, Wentworth h a d
created fertile ground for the insemination and incubation of radical
notions. The insurgent faction at home, combined with the
intransigence and blundering policy of Parliament, created a difficult
situation for Wentworth. Within a few days of the dissolution of the
Assembly in Portsmouth, a provincial convention was called in
Exeter. The participants had first attempted to meet in the house
meeting room in Portsmouth, but the governor entered the room
with the Sheriff and proclaimed their meeting illegal.13 The purpose
of the convention was the choice of delegates to the "American
Congress" called for September in Philadelphia, and the procuring of
funds to underwrite the expenses of those chosen.
In October Governor Wentworth committed an act which in
retrospect destroyed what little influence he yet retained a n d

12John Wentworth to the Earl of Dartmouth, June 8, 1774, in NHPP, vol VII, p.
369.
13John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, July 6,1774, in NHPP, vol VII, p. 410.
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forever marked him as an opponent to the rebellious faction.. The
situation in Boston had deteriorated to the point that General Gage,
the military governor of Massachusetts, could not find carpenters to
build barracks for his men. Gage then requested aid from his fellow
royal governor and John Wentworth complied, sending a party of
artisans from the Wolfeborough area to Boston. When the radicals
discovered what Wentworth had done, they published the story in
the newspaper, stirring a mob against the home and person of
Nicholas Austin of Middletown who had had the misfortune of being
Wentworth's agent in the recruiting of the carpenters. More about
Austin's fate later. The modem reader can scarce credit the violent
outrage occasioned by the mere act of supplying workmen to the
government in Boston. Obviously Wentworth erred in misjudging the
depth of feeling in New Hampshire, the strength of the connection,
the sympathy felt between the radical faction in the northern colony
and their southern neighbors. If he had not, and if he had rashly
relied on the act remaining a secret, he would be remembered as a
man of extreme stupidity. He was instead pilloried in print as an
enemy to liberty.
With the colony in an ever-increasing state of agitation, an
urgent dispatch arrived from Boston. Carried by Paul Revere, the
letter from the Boston Sons of Liberty arrived in Portsmouth on
December 13, 1774. It contained a warning that as a result of an
order by the King in Council bearing the date of October 19, 1774, all
arms and armaments were prohibited from being exported to
America. An arms embargo would quickly put the patriotic faction at
a severe disadvantage, increasing the coercive power of the troops

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66

now in Boston but perhaps soon to walk the streets of Portsmouth.
Moreover, it was feared that all powder and other munitions now in
America might be subject to confiscation.
The next day the sound of a drum summoned a mob at noon.
At Wentworth's request, Chief Justice Theodore Atkinson went out to
the mob and reproved them. However the mob was unimpressed and
at around three in the afternoon, their numbers swollen by th e
arrival of a contingent from New Castle and Rye, the mob surged into
position outside Fort William and Mary. The Fort's commander, John
Cochran, faced the mob with only five men. Despite firing off four
cannon and all their small arms, the tiny garrison was overwhelmed
from all sides, restrained, and the powder magazine stripped of 100
barrels of powder. No one was killed in the fracas. The following
night the fort was overwhelmed again by a party from Durham and
surrounding towns led by Major John Sullivan. The m arauders
carried off several cannon and sixty muskets, leaving only a number
of heavy guns behind.14 Royal authority was effectively non-existent
from that point. The militia refused to heed Wentworth's summons,
and the leaders of the popular faction defied all demands for the
surrender of the stolen munitions or the ringleaders of the mob. On
December 26, 1774, Wentworth issued what am ounted to a
proclamation of rebellion.
The new year brought no good for Wentworth and the other
loyalists. Warships had arrived in Portsmouth harbor,

H.M.S.

Canceaux on December 17th and H.M.S. Scarborough on the 19th.
^NHPP, vol VII, p. 423.
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Their presence did nothing to lessen the tension, nor did the
departure of the Canceaux. Scarborough rem ained and h e r
commander, Captain Barclay, would further exacerbate the situation.
Wentworth, however, would not surrender to despairing of a
peaceful solution to the crisis. Despite the sitting of a second
provincial convention at Exeter on January 25, 1775, Wentworth
issued writs on the 28 th, calling for the election of a new Assembly.
Wentworth hoped that a new Assembly could be controlled well
enough to undo some of the actions already undertaken by the
radicals. In order to control the house, however, Wentworth needed
more votes than he could expect as things stood at the end of the
session of the previous year. So the governor sent election writs to
three towns in Grafton county, an area not represented in the house
previously, but sure, he thought, to return representatives friendly
to the governor's interests. Once the election results were known, the
governor was disappointed. He decided to postpone the sitting of the
assembly until May.
In the meantime tensions waxed and waned between the
radicals and the governor, generally predicated by the actions of
Captain Barclay and the Scarborough. Barclay occasionally seized a
ship or prevented fishermen from earning a living, and each occasion
prom pted retaliation from the townspeople.15 By the time the
15The details of these few months' occurrences may be had from the excellent
works in note 4. It is interesting to note how the actions of minor actors
could so impact the course of nations. Had Barclay been a bit more diplomatic,
would tensions have escalated to the point that Wentworth was driven from
town? Or is it possible that the continued presence of the royal governor
might have exercised some restraint on the radicals preventing the full
participation of New Hampshire in the revolution?
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Assembly sat in May and requested an adjournment until June, it
would seem that no hope for peaceful settlement remained. The main
shock had occurred with its epicenter in the Massachusetts towns of
Lexington and Concord. When the House gathered on May 5th a
thousand New Hampshire men were under arms and surrounding
Boston. When they reconvened on June 12, a mob had ransacked the
town of Portsmouth on May 31 because of yet another provocation
by Captain Barclay. On the 13 th the New Hampshire House refused
again to seat the members from the three new towns and refused to
further consider Lord North's conciliatory proposal.
Wentworth adjourned the House until July 11 and asked them
again to consider the proposal. Unfortunately Wentworth chose his
friend John Fenton to be the agent of that proposal. Fenton was
dam ned on two counts with the radicals. First, he was a British
officer living in retirement and a close friend of the governor. A
beneficiary of Wentworth's land distribution policy, Fenton was quite
wealthy. He was also outspoken in his support of royal authority,
having gone so far as to write an open letter to the people of Grafton
County and the province in general immediately after the skirmish at
Lexington. In the letter Fenton had cautioned his readers to stay on
their land and work their crops, as he feared a certain lack of
provisions soon if the situation did not improve. He further argued
that to leave the northern reaches under-populated would increase
the threat of Indian and Canadian invasion.16 This act of Fenton's

16NHPP, vol VII, p. 480. The letter is, on its surface, hardly inflammatory. It is,
however, a thinly disguised threat and an obvious attempt to intimidate those
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destroyed what little credibility he might have carried when he
subsequently acted on Wentworth's request and repeated th e
resolution in the Assembly, to consider the conciliatory proposal.
Fenton had so aroused the ill feelings of the radicals that no sooner
had he departed the House meeting room and gone to visit
Wentworth, that a mob gathered outside the governor's house, calling
for his surrender. The Wentworths and their guest ignored the mob
until shortly a cannon was brought up and aimed at the front door.
Fenton surrendered himself and was hustled away to Exeter under
guard. The Governor, probably fearing for the safety of his wife and
infant son more than his own, retired to Fort William and Mary
where he remained.17 More or less trapped in the fort, Wentworth
realized he had lost all control. At best he was able to exert some
influence and moderate the tensions between the radicals and the
warship in the harbor, bur even that little ended on August 13.
It was no tragic incident which caused the end of ta c it
cooperation between the people of Portsmouth and the enemy ship
in their harbor. Instead, it was the letter of someone styling himself
"A. Traveller.” Dated from Watertown on August 7th, the letter
expresses outrage at the arrangement by which the townspeople of
Portsmouth had agreed to supply fresh beef to the Scarborough
while the ship promised to leave fishermen unmolested. A. Traveller
must have been a true radical to find it so unimaginable that
civilized communication could still be carried on between the
who would support the rebel cause. As a result of the letter, Fenton was
obliged to take up residence on the Scarborough.
17Wentworth to Gage, June 15, 1775, in NHPP, vol VII, p. 381.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

inhabitants of a town in British North America and a ship of war
belonging to the Royal Navy. A. Traveller must have been under the
impression that a state of war existed, or that little or no chance
remained for the continuation of the political connection between
Great Britain and her colonies.
That assumption had not yet been reached by the majority of
the people of New Hampshire. The journals of the Provincial Congress
contain numerous petitions and other official documents expressing
the cautious feeling of many towns concerning the ultimate act, the
seeking after independence, most of which do not favor severing ties
even after the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia. That
moment was yet nearly a year away as A.Traveller penned his
vicious attack on mutual coexistence.18
Because of the public outcry following the letter, supplies were
cut off to the Scarborough on August 13. Barclay was faced quickly
with the choice of staying on station and watching his crew starve, or
retiring to Boston.19 Once the Scarborough was gone, Wentworth
would have been left nearly alone in a hostile country. Few remained
in Portsmouth by this time who would or could venture to physically
stand with the governor in his need, and of course he had his family
18The letter from A. Traveller is printed in NHPP, vol VII, p. 388. The journals
of the Provincial Congress can be found as an extension of the journals of
the House of Representatives beginning in NHPP volume VII and continuing
into volume VIII.
19Of course someone might well ask why the Scarborough could not have been
resupplied by other ships from Boston or other friendly ports. One can only
suppose that the cost of keeping Barclay's men provisioned would have been
prohibitively expensive and may have required the services of a vessel that
Gage could ill afford to give up the use of, as he himself was at the time fairly
besieged in Boston and needed supplies of his own.
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to consider. Thus on August 23rd 1775 John Wentworth boarded
H.M.S. Scarborough and left Portsmouth for the last time.20 Though
he would not miss the quarters of Fort William and Mary, the
accommodations he would soon find in Boston were not much better.
It was after the taking of Fort William and Mary in December
of 1774 that loyalists began to reveal themselves. It was not an overt
act of "here I am, come and get me" at all. The actions which resulted
in the label of loyalist being applied to an individual were probably
not consciously conceived in that way at first if at all. Each loyalist
acted in a situation as he or she felt the circumstances warranted at
the time. Few if any consciously thought about how to act in a way
that would proclaim their loyalty to the world. Instead, the loyalists
acted in such a way as to express their beliefs indirectly.
Wentworth was not alone in his attempt to stem the tide of
popular frenzy, though at least one memorialist left before the real
trouble began. Bartholomew Stavers of Portsmouth, the postrider
between Portsmouth and Boston, went to England in 1774 because
"for his loyalty and expressing his zeal and attachm ent to his
Majesty's person and government he gave so much offence to the
Rebels in New Hampshire that he became thereby extremely

20Just under a month later on September 21, 1775 John Wentworth entered
New Hampshire one last time. Wentworth landed at Gosport, Star Island in
the Isles of Shoals in order to officially prorogue the Assembly, a last futile
act by a man who was and is regarded as one of the most capable and
effective royal governors of the colonial period. Wentworth did not at the
time despair of returning to his province in happier times, and did not leave
America for England for two more years. Wentworth was back in America in
1783 as Surveyor General of His Majesty's Woods in North America, and soon
was appointed governor of Nova Scotia, cf. Daniell, Experiment, pp. 89-92.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

obnoxious."21 Stavers1main crime in the eyes of his neighbors was
the maintaining of a public room in his house where the King's health
was drank on occasion. At the time, Stavers thought little of what
was said and done in his house, though years later after experiencing
the results he related those circumstances as though they were a
defining moment in his life.
Benjamin Whiting revealed himself to his neighbors when he
"exerted his utmost influence to prevent the people joining in the
violences then pervading the continent."22 John Holland, of Amherst,
was arrested carrying dispatches for Governor Wentworth from
General Gage. His act of identification was more overt and specific.
Holland was in consequence confined until 1778 when he escaped
and joined Sir Robert Pigott in Rhode Island.23 John Cochran, the
former commander of Fort William & Mary, identified himself when
he left with Wentworth in 1775 and served on active duty through
October 1784.24
Thomas MacDonogh of Portsmouth came from the position of
Deputy Collector of Customs in Charlestowne, South Carolina in late
1771 and became private secretary to Governor John Wentworth.25

21N. H. Claims, Bartholomew Stavers, vol. IV p. 1704.
22N. H. Claims,, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V, p. 2539.
23N. H. Claims,, John Holland, vol. II p. 771.
24N. H. Claims,, John Cochran, vol. I p. 319. Cochran was quite vague about
where he served, but he did not appear on McDonogh's muster roll from
Wentworth's Volunteers. See Appendix 1.
25N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1160.
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MacDonogh's acts of identification were more extensive. He claimed
to have "exerted himself to prevent such acts of violence" referring
to the incident of the tea shipment, mentioned above, consigned to
Edward Parry in Portsmouth destined to be exchanged for a ship
load of masts. The mob found out about it and sought to destroy it.26
He further claimed to have "safeguarded the Rev. Mr Peters" and
shepherded a "load of blankets destined for troops in Boston with the
most imminent danger to his personal safety."27 MacDonogh held
several rather lucrative offices, Deputy Surveyor of the Woods at
£200 per year, Deputy Auditor at £50 per year, Receiver General of
the Qjiitrents at £100 per year, and Deputy Secretary of the Province
for which he listed no income amount.28 While his interest certainly
lay with the preservation of royal authority, it is unlikely that he
could have anticipated any real success in stemming the flow toward
rebellion by the actions he took. MacDonogh accompanied the
governor to Boston aboard the Scarborough and became a member of
Wentworth's Volunteers, in proof of which he provided a muster roll
dated October 16, 1777 29
But the isolated acts of the few were not enough to stem the
tide of a radical takeover in the capital. The small circle centered

2&N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1161. Wentworth, through
McDonogh, was able to prevent any violence reulting from the tea
shipments. See Daniell, Experiment, p. 80 and Wilderson, Governor John
Wentworth, pp. 230-239.
27N. H.

Claims,Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1163.

28N. H.

Claims,Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1172-73.

29N. H.

Claims,Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1177-80.
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around Wentworth had lost all influence with the active majority of
the town's citizens, and had no effective means of either defending
themselves or of coercing the compliance of the populace. Futile as
they were in the long run, their acts served as a means of selfassertion and self-affirmation. Neither Wentworth or his supporters
consciously sought to set themselves apart, only to offer their
example as a definition of proper conduct. They did not yet embrace
the title loyalist, but merely sought to remain constant to their
offices or deeply held belief that the proper and reasonable course of
action was to remain steadfast in support of royal authority.
Thus during these critical months, William Torrey of
Portsmouth "undertook to execute the office of Justice of the Peace"
and "in consequence....he became obnoxious to his countrymen"30 In
his attempt to comply with the proclamation of rebellion issued by
the governor, Torrey acquired the hatred of the radicals. He was
especially detested because he also owned a "valuable sugar house &
stores" with his partner George Meserve.
Meserve was a prominent member of the Portsmouth elite. He
had obtained a grant of 5000 acres for his father's service as an
officer in the late war. The elder Meserve was killed in action at
Louisbourg in 1758.31 George Meserve had also been distributor of
stamps in 1765 and he was roundly despised for his acceptance of
the appointment as stamp distributor even though he never carried
out any duty of that office. He was forced to resign the position
3°N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1780.
31N. H. Claims, George Meserve, vol. Ill p. 1288.
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under pressure almost instantly.32 George Meserve became collector
of customs around 1770 and held that post "until the late Rebellion
took place."33
The sugar house was, according to Torrey, the only sugar works
in New Hampshire at the time. It cost £1500 to build and yielded an
annual profit of £400.34 But the works were "plundered and
destroyed by the populace in their rage. At the time your
memorialist was carried from Portsmouth to Exeter under guard to
be tried for treason against the state."35 Of course he was not
arrested and tried merely for owning the sugar house, nor even for
being in partnership with Meserve. Late in

1774 Torrey and

Meserve cooked up a deal with Thomas McDonogh to lease the sugar
works and store houses as barracks for the troops that were then
expected from Boston. When the radicals discovered this the mob
destroyed the buildings "and rendered it entirely useless,"36 thus
preventing its use as a billeting space for troops that would never
come.
Not all loyalists opposed the radicals or faced their wrath in
Portsmouth. Zaccheus Cutler of Amherst was a prom inent
merchant.37 In March of 1775 a number of soldiers deserted from

32N. H. Claims, George Meserve, vol. Ill p. 1288
33JV. H. Claims, George Meserve, vol. Ill p. 1289
34N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1781.
35N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1780.
36N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1808.
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"His Majesty's troops stationed in Boston" and General Gage asked
Governor Wentworth for his aid in returning those suspected of
having fled to New Hampshire. Wentworth directed Cutler, and all
justices of the peace and other magistrates to assist in the
apprehension of such. "Actuated by his own zeal for Government
[Cutler] exerted himself for that purpose and actually carried one of
the said deserters to headquarters at Boston by which means he
rendered himself so obnoxious to his countrymen that it was utterly
unsafe for him to return home or even go out of the town of
Boston."38 Benjamin Whiting of Hollis, Sheriff of Hillsborough County,
was "firmly attached"39 to the interest of government. He spent the
months before independence "exerting his utmost influence to
prevent the people joining in the violences then pervading the
continent"40
But Portsmouth was the center of radical activity during 1774
and 1775, primarily because of the rapidity of communications
between that town and Boston. It was there that John Fenton,
"having exerted himself to the utmost of his power to support
government in opposition to a Faction as a magistrate,"41 found
himself trapped in a most uncomfortable role.

37N. H. Claims,, Zaccheus Cutler, vol. I p. 405-6.
38N. H. Claims,, Zaccheus Cutler, vol. I p. 406.
39N. H. Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V p. 2537.
40N. H. Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V p. 2537.
41N. H. Claims,, John Fenton, vol. II p. 529.
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Fenton became commander of Fort William & Mary in June of
1775. He was elected to the Assembly in 1775 from Plymouth as one
of W entworth's new delegates, one assured of s u p p o rtin g
government. But he "was, on moving in the House Lord North's
Conciliatory Bill, expelled"42 and then, as stated above, carted off to
jail in Exeter. Eventually Fenton acquired a position in the Customs
House in Dublin, though when he went to England to pursue his claim
he contracted a palsy and died.
Another official, John Fisher, resided in Salem, but as a multiple
office-holder had interests in New Hampshire, as well as having
married a woman well connected in the province. He was "collector of
the customs for the port of Salem & Marblehead, "as well as "Naval
Officer for the Province of New Hampshire" and "Deputy Naval Officer
for the Ports of Newbury and York."43 He "left Salem unable to
continue there to exert on behalf of government,"44 but found
himself in a like situation in New Hampshire. In October of 1775 he
was warned that all remaining officers of government were to be
seized and he fled to New York and then proceeded to England,
arriving in January of 1776.45 For Fisher, as for Fenton, merely
continuing to function in the appointments previously held was
42N. H. Claims,, John Fenton, vol. II p. 515-16.
43N. H. Claims,, John Fisher, vol. II p. 549.
44N. H. Claims,, John Fisher, vol. II p. 549-50.
45N. H. Claims,, John Fisher, vol. II p. 549-56. Fisher was given a stipend of
£ 160 per year soon after his arrival and was appointed Under-Secretary of
State in October, 1781. Fisher's career was government. By 1788 he held the
post of Secretary of the Excise which paid £603.11.06 and Distributor of
Stamps which added £284.13.04.
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enough to be defined as an enemy. But could they have done
otherwise? Part of a person's identity is shaped by the work he does.
Offices were a means of identification, just as the other variables of
life serve to differentiate one from another.46
As occupation provides one indicator of personal identity, so
too do values. The loyalists acted to affirm traditional values, to
support duly constituted government, to preserve the system as it
was, though they recognized the same flaws as the radicals. Simon
Baxter of Alsted fought to preserve traditional authority. In Cheshire
County Baxter "opposed the measures of the Rebels, raised men to go
and protect the Courts in 1774"47 Already in 1774 the radicals were
attempting to undermine the traditional forms of authority, forms
they would soon abandon for a time.48
Many provincials were shocked and dismayed by the news of
the "battle" at Lexington. William Vance of Londonderry was vocal in
his beliefs and found himself confined to his farm after April 19,
17 7 5.49 Vance was arrested again in May 1777 and held in Exeter
jail until January 1778. He was then confined to his farm yet again
until he escaped in May 1779. Vance joined the British army in
Rhode Island and "was employed on Secret Services for government"
until the end of the war.50
46Baumeister, Identity, pp. 18-25.
47N. H. Claims,, Simon Baxter, vol. I p. 134.
48As will be seen in Chapter Four, the rebels closed all of the courts for an
extended period in order to consolidate their hold on the populace.
49N. H. Claims, William Vance, vol. IV p. 1864.
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Not all of the acts attributed to the loyalists were acts of
commission. In some cases the failure to m eet com m unity
expectations was an equally powerful means for the identification of
a loyalist. Edward Goldstone Lutwyche of Merrimack, commander of
a regiment of militia, refused the summons to march his regiment "to
the assistance of the Rebels on the evening of the 19th [of] April,
1775, the day on which the affair at Lexington took place."51
Lutwyche was "obliged immediately after his refusal to escape by
night & took refuge in the Town of Portsmouth where at that time
the disaffection was not so general as in the country."52 Robert Lewis
Fowle, the maligned printer of the New Hampshire Gazette and
Exeter Morning Chronicle, was persecuted for "refusing a company in
the Rebel service."53 Simon Baxter was guilty of yet another act of
omission "because he would not join in their Measures against the
King and Parliament of Great Britain.54 Fowle and Baxter withstood
the persecution in their respective communities until they joined
Burgoyne.
John, James, and Patrick McMaster were merchant brothers
from Scotland who came out in the mid to late 1760's, first to Boston
but then opened an office in Portsmouth where one of the brothers,
James, resided. "Bound by their allegiance they constantly rejected
SON. H. Claims, William Vance, vol. IV p. 1865.
51N. H. Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. Ill p. 1047.
52N. H. Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. Ill p. 1048.
53N. H. Claims, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol II, p. 657.
54N. H. Claims,, Simon Baxter, vol. I p. 134.
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and opposed by every means and arguments in their power the
insidious attempts of the disaffected."55 Their refusal to sign the
nonimportation agreement or "the Test" "drew upon them the
indignation of the adverse party."56
Refusing to participate in a community ritual was an act of
omission which carried enormous social consequences. When the Test
Oath was administered, even the Quakers were pressed to sign, and
questioned rigorously when they explained th eir reasons for
refusing. George Glen was no Quaker, however, and "he having
refused to take a Test Oath"57 found himself the victim of "the
animosity of the inhabitants."58 His neighbors refused to work for
him or with him. Glen describes himself as having acted with "zeal
and attachment"59 to government. Early in 1777 Glen refused a
commission as major in the continental army and "became more and
more suspicious in consequence thereof."60 He felt forced to flee as it
had become "unsafe and impracticable for him to stay in that
country."
Much has been made in previous studies of the Test Oath or
Association Test circulated among the towns in April of 1776. It

55N. H. Claims, James McMaster, et al, vol. Ill p. 1230-31.
56N. H. Claims, James McMaster, et al, vol. Ill p. 1232.
57N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
58N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
59N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
60N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
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would seem that when historians are confronted with something as
interesting as a list of names, we immediately set about to draw a
number of inferences from those names. We further complicate
things by going back and attaching as much information to each of
the names that we can, things like occupation and religion, in hopes
of better understanding why the names are there or why other
names are not. Such has been the case with the Association Test
lists.61 We may have, in our attempts to make order from chaos and
read information from lists, forgotten the ritual significance of the
oath, the importance of the act of belonging, and the cold reality of
the consequences to those who boldly refused to sign and stood their
ground for honor's sake. The proponents of the Association Test
recognized the fact that they must identify those who would not
stand with them. There was of course the New Testament passage
wherein Christ is quoted as saying that he who is not with us is
against us, and only through a public test could the radicals whose
grasp was still unsure on the reigns of power be assured of who was
who.
Yet the analysis of a list, like the Test Oath, contains its own
pitfalls. We might, like the rebel leaders, assume that anyone who
refused to sign the oath was at least someone worthy of suspicion, if
not an openly proclaimed enemy. Yet in New Hampshire, the non
signers numbered many who were easily identifiable as Quakers. The
act of omitting to sign the oath did not label these men as loyalist,

61Robert Munro Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire and the Loyalist
Experience," p. 77-84.
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though the Continental Congress and several other states would make
such a presum ption and order careful attention paid to the
Quakers.62 New Hampshire's Quakers had been prom inent and
important in the community since the 1660s, and no rebel leader
suggested that they be persecuted for their religion. In the case of
Quakers, one determinant of identity, Quakerism, superseded the
possibility of another imputation based on the refusal to sign.
On the other hand, it was presumed by the rebel authorities
that anyone who did sign the oath was a friend, a potential fellow
rebel. Non-signers were considered potential enemies but signers
could be trusted. But not in every case, it would seem, since one of
the most ardent loyalists of New Hampshire signed the Association
Test in Londonderry where his position may indeed have preserved
his influence regardless. Stephen Holland, whom John Langdon would
one day curse, signed the oath 63 Yet Stephen Holland was the
quintessential loyalist.
Holland was not related, or particularly beholden, to John
Wentworth. Though Irish by birth, he had resided in the province for
a long time. Holland served seven years, in the "war that ended in
1762"64 before settling himself and his family in the young but fast
620n the other hand a number of Quakers in New Jersey refused to sign the
Test Oath there and soon after joined the British army, some in noncombatant roles, and at least one who "carried arms in a company...of the
New Jersey Volunteers." Loyalist Claims, Joseph Williams, vol. XVI., p. 497504. Se also Loyalist Claims, Samuel Smith, vol. XVI, p. 31-42. Smith was also a
quaker and served in the British army as a spy and guide. Loyalist Claims,
Samuel Moore, vol. XVI, p. 125-130; and Robert Fitzrandolph, vol. XVI, p. 113124.
63NHPP, Vol. VIII, p. 250. The Association return was dated June 24, 1776.
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growing community of Londonderry. Holland "held several lucrative
and important offices" including "Colonel of a regiment of Militia"
"Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas" "Clerk of the Peace for the
County of Hillsborough" and "for many years a Member of the
General Assembly, and also a Justice of the Peace of the quorum
throughout the province."65 He took his responsibilities seriously.
When the call went out in 1774 Holland "apprehended several
deserters from Boston, these he secured and sent to their
regim ents."66 Like his fellow magistrate Zaccheus Cutler, "in
consequence thereof [Holland] became very obnoxious67 to what was
at the time called the Whig Party, who threatened to set fire to his
house and bum him and his family to death."68 But Stephen Holland
was neither intimidated nor persuaded to renounce his affiliation. As
the crisis progressed he used his enormous popularity and influence

64N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 777.
65N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 777-78.
66N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
945.
67The word obnoxious appears three times in this narration of Holland's alone.
It also occurs in nearly every narration of a moderately prominent loyalist.
It must have been an enormously popular word at the time and was a
peculiarly apt choice of words. The Oxford English Dictionary supplies at
least two distinctive and appropriate meanings, both of which were in use at
the time. First, one who became obnoxious was "an object of aversion or
dislike; offensive, objectionable, odious, highly disagreeable" This would also
be the primary modem meaning of the word. In addition "obnoxious" meant
"exposed to (actual or possible) harm; subject or liable to injury or evil of
any kind." The loyalist who used this word was clear enough. Not only was
he odious in the eyes of his opponents and or neighbors, but he was also
definitely in harm's way.
68N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
946.
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to "actually prevent the raising of minute men or the choosing of a
delegate in the said Township of Londonderry to attend the
Provincial Congress at Exeter, threatening to commit the people who
were assembled for that purpose if they did not disperse which they
did."69 Even after Wentworth's departure in the summer of 1775,
Holland "supported the interest of his Sovereign upon all occasions to
the utmost of his power"and "exerted himself in uniform opposition
to the measures of their [the radical government in Exeter] usurped
authority."70
Colonel Holland probably felt that his prominence accorded him
some degree of immunity, especially from the attentions of his social
inferiors. Certainly he considered the Exeter government to be
unlawful. According to the deposition of William Vance Esq. of
Londonderry, HoUand held his offices until April 19, 1775 when he
resigned them all. He was asked to resume them by the "Provincial
Congress" and "declined." He was also asked to command a battalion
with the rank of Brigadier General but refused that as well: "to which
offers he turned up his nose in contempt to them and went off
without so much as returning them thanks."71 Nevertheless Holland
remained in New Hampshire, active and free to do much as he
pleased.

69N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
946.
7°N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 778.
71N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
945.
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One thing it pleased him to do brought him further under the
suspicion of the rebel authorities. Colonel Archibald Campbell72 was
taken prisoner early on and held in Reading, Massachusetts.
According to Campbell, Holland visited him frequently while he was
a prisoner in Reading though it was dangerous for Holland to even be
seen with a British prisoner, especially for someone who was already
suspected of loyalist leanings. Holland offered Campbell monetary
assistance and proposed to find a trustworthy courier to take letters
or intelligence to New York. Holland visited Campbell for the last
time in February 1777, saying that his life was in danger and that he
would soon "join the King's Standard and take with him a
considerable number of men who had agreed to accompany him in
the enterprise."73 It is fairly certain that he "engaged a party of men
to join the King's army, but could not accomplish it."74 Apparently
when last he saw Campbell, Holland was aware that his days of
freedom were numbered. He had been harassed before, as were most
of the remaining loyalists who made no secret of their beliefs. "By
being thus zealous and active in the cause of His Majesty's
government and for offering assistance to Colonel Campbell, now
Governor of Jamaica, when he was a prisoner in New England, he not

72CampbeIl was captured very early in the war and held for a year at Reading.
He would eventually achieve the rank of Major General and become
governor of the colony of Jamaica.
73N. H. Claims, Certificate of Maj. General Archibald Campbell, Stephen
Holland, vol. II p. 968-69.
74N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 778.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

only became obnoxious in the country but was repeatedly seized
upon "75
When he was arrested the last time, it was obvious th a t
Holland had "rendered him self obnoxious to the Usurped
government...by his exertions to support the interest of his
sovereign...[and the] constant refusal to take the Oaths of Allegiance
and Abjuration"76 Of Holland's treatment by the rebel government,
we will hear much more in the next chapter. However, William Vance
saw Holland brought into the Exeter jail loaded with chains and
asked what horrible thing Holland had done and the jailer told Vance
that Holland had recruited 100 men the day after Bunker Hill and
had had them take an oath of allegiance and an oath to General
Gage.77 Of course many more charges were laid against him, not least
of which was that he was the head of a sprawling counterfeiting
network.78

75N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 778.
76N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 940. Apparently Holland could
stretch the truth on both sides. As mentioned above, Holland did sign the
Association Test. See , note 58.
77N. H. Claims, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
948. That charge alone would have seen Holland executed elsewhere. In New
Jersey Andrew Pickens, among others, reported two of his associates who had
been engaged in recruiting "hanged for it." Pickens himself would also have
been executed if he had not escaped. Loyalist Claims, vol. XVI, p. 339-344.
78Robert Munro Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire and the Loyalist
Experience" p. 174-178. Brown's assumption that Holland was a counterfeiter
based on charges levied against him by the rebel government seems a bit too
credulous. Robert Fowle was also charged with counterfeiting as were a
number of others who later filed memorials for assistance from the British
government, yet none admit in their testimony to having dared so great a
crime to aid the British cause. Fowle went so far as too offer to testify against
other counterfeiters to protect himself but he never admitted the act itself,
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Colonel Langdon was overheard by Vance to say of Holland,
"Damn him, let him lay there, I hope to see him hanged he has done
us more damage than ten thousand men could have done."79 What
did Langdon mean? He was not referring to any of Holland's future
war activities but rather to his acts of omission: his refusal to support
the rebel cause was a strong example to the people of Londonderry,
the county and the province as a whole. Holland's very existence
threatened the continued success of a government the p riso n er
considered unlawful. Holland's prestige was such that after the point
in time in which Langdon said these things, 133 inhabitants of
*

Londonderry petitioned the General Court on Holland's behalf asking
for his relief and pledging their fuU estates as his security. The
petition was rejected and the names of the petitioners were
published in the newspaper "as enemies to their country."80 Holland
was tried for treason and convicted, and awaited execution. Somehow
he escaped in April of 1778 and made his way to the British army.
Holland became a "town major at Rhode Island,"81 and while there
and it does not appear that he was instrumental in the arrest of any other
loyalists.
79N. H. Claims, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
949.
80N. H. Claims, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
949-50. It is difficult to imagine accepting the Test Oath as a determining
factor in identifying rebels from loyalists. In the case of Londonderry, 375
men signed the oath and 15 refused. Yet within a year, 133 were willing to
pledge their estates to protect Holland. It might be that the third of the
population that Adams suggested remained loyal also signed the oath only to
preserve their personal peace, or that the third which remained
unconvinced believed that Holland was truly innocent of the charges
brought against him. However the question worked out, at least a third of the
men of Londonderry, signers or not, sought to protect Stephen Holland from
the rebel government bent on his destruction.
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was "frequently employed in obtaining intelligence of the enemy and
in secret services that required the most unlimited confidence."82
Holland was the archetypal loyalist. From what we know of
New Hampshire loyalists, most were landed and m any were, like
Holland, prominent in their communities. While the Portsmouth elite
departed with or soon after Wentworth, minor office holders or
professionals remained for some months or years, using their
influence to stem the tide of revolution where they could and passing
on what information they obtained in whatever m anner was
practicable. Stephen Little, Portsmouth physician and surgeon,83
"kept up a constant correspondence with the King's friends within
the British lines and furnished them with every possible proceedings
without."84
Doctor Josiah Pomeroy of Keene was "in the business of
surgeon, physician, and apothecary" as well as a judge in the county
court, "and did employ his best endeavours to keep the county in due
obedience to the King and constitution till 1777 when his loyalty
rendered him obnoxious to the Rebels whose severity compelled him
to secrete himself in Connecticut from whence he was obliged to flee
to New York."85

81W. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 779.
82N. H. Claims, Certificate of Lt. General Richard Prescott, Stephen Holland,
vol. II p. 949.
83N. H. Claims, Stephen little, vol. Ill p. 1015.
84N. H. Claims, Stephen Little, vol. Ill p. 1016.
85N. H. Claims, Josiah Pomeroy, vol. IV p. 1522.
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Elijah Williams, also of Keene, and a prominent attorney,
"always took an open and active part in opposition to the measures
which brought on the late unhappy American War, and thereby
rendered himself so obnoxious to the enemies of the British
Government"86 that he was forced to flee to New York in June 1777.
There, like many other New Hampshire men he joined Wentworth's
Volunteers.
Printer Robert Fowle was accused of "assisting the British
government in the exercise of his profession as a printer," by "among
other things his printing and dispensing the proclamations of General
Howe and General Burgoyne."87 Fowle was eager "to promote the
cause of his Majesty's government until at length he became so
obnoxious to the Usurpers that he was obliged to fly for his life after
being some time confined in prison."88
George Glen of Wolfeborough was a relatively recent Scottish
immigrant, and

farm er;8^ he

was "offered a commission as major in

the continental army, which he however obnoxious he might become
86N. H. Claims, Elijah Williams, vol. V p. 2556.
87N. H. Claims,,' Affidavit of John Wentworth, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p.
679.
88N. H. Claims,, Fowle to Lord North, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 677-78.
Fowle does not mention that much of what caused his imprisonment was the
suspicion of counterfeiting. It would seem that if indeed he was asking for
assistance from the British government he would couch his request in the
best possible light. Therefore if he had materially aided the cause of the
British by damaging the rebel economy through counterfeiting, it seems
only logical that he would mention the fact. He was not shy of mentioning
that he had printed Gage's and Burgoyne's proclamations, a useful service
but not quite as damaging to the enemy as flooding their economy with
bogus bills.
89N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 705.
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thereby, absolutely refused to accept, he became more and more
suspicious in consequence thereof. This event took place early in the
year 1777."99
Holland and the others like him demonstrated that there was at
least one further level of loyalist after the royal officeholders and
Wentworth relatives who left in 1775. Their stories counter
dram atically the experience of a man like Daniel Rindge of
Portsmouth. Rindge was a member of the Council and "not only a
near relation of the Governor's, but his peculiar and confidential
friend."91 Rindge managed to avoid incarceration, though not insult,
until January of 1776, when he fled the province. Unlike Rindge, the
majority of known loyalists who remained into the perilous years of
1776 and 1777 actually acted in response to their beliefs.
The most common act of loyalty was joining a military unit and
serving the King in some capacity. John Wentworth, by his "active
adherence to his duty to his King [found himself] rendered ...
obnoxious."92 Upon departing the province Wentworth began the
recruiting of an unpaid corps of loyalist soldiers which served under
the name of Wentworth's Volunteers. Benning Wentworth, the

90N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
91iV. H. Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV p. 1570. Despite his close affiliation with
John Wentworth, he claimed no overt acts of loyalty in his memorial nor
could he produce any others to support his claim. Rather he assumed that his
pronouncement of loyalty would be enough to earn him his claim. But the
Claims Commission was unimpressed with his record. After fleeing to
England in January 1776 he returned to New York in June of 1777 and then
returned to Portsmouth in April of 1778. There he lived out his life amid his
ideological enemies. His claim was summarily dismissed.
92N. H. Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V p. 1977.
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governor's nephew and former Secretary of the Province, found that
"his attachment and duty to the King's service and

govern m en t

subjected him to the violence of the people." He went with the
governor to Boston and he too served in Wentworth's Volunteers
until November 1777. He was in England by April 1778, and
subsequently took a commission in a regular regiment.93 After his
escape from the clutches of the rebel government, Robert Fowle "took
refuge with General Burgoyne's army, with which he was captured
...”94 Dissembling, Fowle gave a parole to earn his freedom and fled
immediately to New York. There, Fowle "served in a corps of
Gentlemen known by the appellation of Governor Wentworth's
Volunteers until the 14th of December 1781."95 Breed Batcheller of
Packersfield joined Burgoyne in 1777 and "immediately recruited a
company of Loyal Americans."96
Many others were able to resist the persecution of their
neighbors until 1777. Then they too saw the opportunity to serve as
Burgoyne prepared to move south from Canada. Levi Warner of
Claremont, a weaver, joined Burgoyne in 1777, and served until the
end of the war.97 Simon Baxter of Alsted "joined Burgoyne at
Skeensborough in July 1777."93

93N. H. Claims, Benning Wentworth, vol. IV p. 1878.
94N. H. Claims,, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 657.
95N. H. Claims,, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 658.
96N. H. Claims,, Breed Batcheller, vol. I, p. 119.
97N. H. Claims, Levi Warner, vol. IV p. 1868-69.
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A significant number of New Hampshire loyalists, in addition to
those already mentioned, had served prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, or were at the time on active duty in the British military.
George Sproule was a soldier, "surveyor general of lands for the
province of New Hampshire." He had intended to retire just prior to
the beginning of hostilities and rejoined the army in Boston leaving
all of his newly acquired property behind." Henry Mowat of the
Royal Navy was in Portsmouth in 1773 commanding HMS Canceaux
and "employed in the General Survey of Lands for the Northern
District of North America." Mowat petitioned Governor Wentworth
for a grant of land under the proclamation of 1763, apparently
desiring to retire to New Hampshire. Mowat was granted 4470 acres,
but was never able to take possession due to the outbreak of the
war.100
Like Mowat, who was still on active duty, m any New
Hampshire men found themselves serving in the regular service or in
units primarily recruited from different provinces. Michael Jose of
Portsmouth was master of a merchant ship and joined the Navy at
the outset of what he called both an "un-natural rebellion" and the
"unhappy Rebellion." He served on six different ships rising from
Mate to Master in the course of the war.ioi Donald McAlpine, a
resident of Exeter, was another demobilized veteran of the Seven
" N . H. Claims,, Simon Baxter, vol. Ip. 131.
" N . H. Claims, George Sproule, vol. IV p. 1588.
lOON. H. Claims, Henry Mowat, vol. Ill p. 1436.
H. Claims, Michael Jose, vol. II p. 991.
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Years War. After serving under Colonel Symon Fraser in the 78th
Highlanders, he had settled in New Hampshire and married Elizabeth
Beard the only child of John Beard. McAlpine served as a Captain in
the South Carolina Rangers.102 Eleazer Sanger of Keene left his
property in April of 1777 and joined under Colonel Ludlow in
DeLancy's 2nd Battalion.103 Peter Young, of Bennington, a small
farmer, joined Burgoyne and was captured. Young escaped and
subsequently served in "Sir John's 2nd Battalion"104
Of many other memorialists' services, little is known. John
Stark joined the battalion raised and commanded by his father,
William Stark.105 Enos Stevens, a farmer from Charlestown joined the
royal army in 1777,100 as did Benjamin Whiting of Hollis, formerly
Sheriff of Hillsborough County. Whiting died in Long Island in
November 1779.107 Thomas Cumings of Hollis, the undersheriff of
Hillsborough County and a lawyer108 was "with the Royal Army for

102N. H. Claims, Donald McAlpine, vol. Ill p. 1140-50.
103N. H. Claims, Eleazer Sanger, vol. IV p. 1582.
104N. H. Claims, Peter Young, vol. V p. 2614. The area Young resided in before
the outbreak of hostilities was in dispute between New Hampshire and New
York, and even during the Revolution remained a sore spot between the two
as well as the emerging "state" of Vermont. Stevens chose to include Young
in the NH claims as do I.
105N. H. Claims, John Stark, vol. IV p. 1632-39.
100N. H. Claims, Enos Stevens, vol. IV p. 1736.
107N. H. Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V p. 2536.
108N. H. Claims,, Thomas Cumings, vol. I p. 363.
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more than eight years."109 Thomas Crane simply "joined His Majesty's
troops." Simple words written by a simple farmer from Richmond.110
Not all of New Hampshire's men found such glorious service.
Many as we have already seen served primarily as spies. A John
Stinson of Dunbarton, the nephew of the Rebel General Stark, became
a spy in Rhode Island and accom plished twenty-eight such
missions.111 Perhaps spying was a better occupation than the service
Samuel Mallows found. Mallows of Portsmouth was ap p aren tly
involved in the teamster trade. Having fled to New York in 1776, he
became a waggoner in General Howe's baggage train. He must not
have been a very good teamster, as he was dismissed. He then
served with Major Ward in New Jersey, though in what capacity is
unknown.112 At least one New Hampshire loyalist served as a horse
thief. George Glen fled the province in 1778 with his wife and three
children and joined the British in Rhode Island. There he became a
forager, "bringing off a number of the continental horse."113
Most of the loyalists who served and survived received grants
of land in Nova Scotia at the close of the war, regardless of whether

109N. H. Claims,, Thomas Cumings, vol. I p. 361.
110N. H. Claims,, Thomas Crane, vol. I p. 353
111N. H. Claims, John Stinson (#1816), vol. IV p. 1744.
1121V. H. Claims, Samuel Mallows, vol. Ill p. 1278.
1131V. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706. Forager was the polite term for
those colonial units used to pillage the produce of local farms and
storekeepers. The British disdained to dirty their hands with the task of
victualling an army of occupation and often left that to their loyalist troops,
thereby increasing the degree of hatred between loyal and rebel
countrymen.
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or not they filed claims under the Parliamentary Act of 1783. But
some despite their attachment to the King, finally despaired at
leaving their homes forever. The other John Stinson of Dunbarton
joined the King's army in New York, raised troops for several
commanders, was captured and imprisoned, released, and served
until the end of the war. Like all who took up arms in support of
royal authority, Stinson was banished from New Hampshire, his
property confiscated. After the war ended, Stinson returned in
defiance of his proscription, in an attempt to regain his property. He
was captured and imprisoned. Stinson's memorial was written on his
behalf by Stephen Holland, as he was at the time of its writing in
prison in New Hampshire under a sentence of death.114
As mentioned previously, Stephen Holland, even more than
John Wentworth, typifies the loyalist of New Hampshire. His career
provides us with a useful synopsis of the acts which together or
separately categorize or define a loyalist. Holland used his personal
influence to persuade others. Certainly all the influential loyalists did
the same on one level, as other men might have done on a personal
one. Beyond the passive acts of example and persuasion, Holland
acted overtly by aiding an enemy prisoner, passing information to
the British, and perhaps counterfeiting. Besides acts of commission,
he steadfastly refused to serve the usurping powers or to swear

114N. H. Claims, John Stinson (#2160), vol. IV p. 1752-53. I call him the
"other" John Stinson because there were two men of the same name asking
for compensation. Both had come from Dunbarton, and they may have been
related, though neither mentions the other in his claim. In the
transcriptions there is confusion and ambiguity over which is which,
though finally one discovers that they have separate claim numbers
assigned by the Claims Commission.
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allegiance to those he considered to be rebels. By these acts of
omission he clearly denied the lawful and natural authority of the
new provincial government and refused to share in their initiation
ritual. Finally, when driven to an extreme position of danger, Holland
departed the province and like so many of his loyalist countrymen,
served in a military fashion.
Holland and his fellow loyalists acted in these ways with the
full knowledge that there must be consequences for their actions.
The physical penalties as well as the legal problems encountered by
the loyalists of New Hampshire are the subjects of subsequent
chapters. It is with another kind of consequence which we must now
be concerned. Each and every act perpetrated by a loyalist was at
once an act of self-definition and an act of identification with others
of like persuasion. Each time Stephen Holland visited Archibald
Campbell in his prison in Reading, Holland was identifying himself as
what he conceived of as a Loyalist. Each act of commission or
omission further identified each participant as a loyalist in their own
minds. Further, each public act of either kind perform ed two
functions in the home community. First the act publicly proclaimed
the identity of the performer. Second, the act formed and reformed a
definition in the minds of those witnesses for the community of what
a loyalist was. The community at that point of course was still the
rebel dominated province of New Hampshire, where to be defined as
Loyalist was to be "obnoxious" in both senses. Eventually, as the new
loyalist community formed over a vast geographic area during and
after the war, public acts viewed cumulatively provided a basis by
which each loyalist could judge him or herself as a loyalist. Acts
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could also identify the others of like inclination as members of the
new group. The definition of the loyalists as a group set them apart
from the communities to which they once belonged. Previously they
had been members of local communities, and whether they ever
acknowledged the fact or not, they had also been members of a
larger community at the provincial level. That membership in turn
had made them a part of the Atlantic community and one that
encompassed the entire British Empire. On the levels most important
on a daily basis, their relationships with the local community and
provincial one, had been reshaped. The definition of a personal
loyalist identity had forced each loyalist to become "other" than what
he was before. Taken as a whole, the loyalists became the "other"
against which the rebel community was measured.
To the casual observer the acts of one loyalist might be
mistaken as aberrant behaviour. To the average member of a local
community in the midst of a rebellion such acts became a means for
determining who was a friend to the cause and who was an enemy.
Thus an act that a loyalist might describe as supporting government
would to a rebel be considered inimical to the country. An act which
was for a loyalist a positive effort toward self-identification to a
cause and a community, was to a rebel a negative action, a denial of
community standards, and a rejection of the accepted norms of
behaviour.
Must an act have been observed by the enemy to be an act of
definition by a loyalist? The case of Robert Calder might serve as an
example. According to his deposition sworn on June 18 1785, Calder
was a former chief servant to Governor John Wentworth. Calder had
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left Wentworth's service after the mansion in Wolfeborough was
built. John Wentworth gave Calder a piece of land about two miles
distant from the estate. Calder saw the governor at Fort William and
Mary while Wentworth was living there in a modified exile and just
before his departure for Boston. According to Calder, W entworth
asked him (Calder) to go to the Wolfeborough house, and there to
find a certain trunk. Calder was to carry it off before the rebels could
find it. Then he was to hide the trunk against Wentworth's need for
it. Calder did as he was asked in secret, and buried the trunk
beneath a huge oak tree on his land.
In 1777 or 1778, James Cochran came to Calder and told him
that John Wentworth desired him to retrieve the trunk and destroy
it and its contents. Acting immediately, in the dead of winter, Calder
went out and dug the trunk up going to "much trouble and labour to
thaw the ground." He pretended to be cutting the tree, "as it was a
time of general suspicion of all persons who had been usually about
the governor."115 The trunk was destroyed, and no witness beyond
James Cochran knew of the incident until Calder's deposition was
sworn to in 1785. Was Calder a loyalist? Which of his acts defined
him as such? In all likelihood, Robert Calder grew old and died on his

115N. H. Claims, Deposition of Robert Calder, John Wentworth vol. V, p. 216063. James Cochran, mentioned by Calder as the messenger from John
Wentworth was residing in St John, New Brunswick in 1785. Calder
apparently was unclear 7-8 years later on the question of which year
Cochran came to him with instructions to destroy the trunk. Wentworth went
to England in 1777. It seems more likely that he would have ordered the
trunk's destruction before he left the continent. Also unclear is the question
of Cochran's identity. He may have been, or been related to, the John
Cochran who had been commander of Fort William and Mary until August of
1775 when he departed the castle with Wentworth for Boston.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

farm not far from his former employer's estate. Had he been
apprehended in the act of taking the trunk, or burying it, or in
digging up and destroying it, he would have been accused of an act
inimical to the country. In such a time of division, even the simple
act of obeying the request of an old employer was suspect. Calder
knew what he was doing. By obeying Wentworth's instructions he
might have become a loyalist or proven to be a loyal friend. Only
Robert Calder knew the significance of the acts he performed. Only
his intention defined his identity in the situation. Had he been
observed, others might have imposed upon him an identity he did
not seek, an identity he might not have recognized. Actions, as a
criterion for the fashioning of identity, speak louder and clearer to
observers than to the actor's themselves. Because of that, the actions
of loyalists brought about far more dire consequences than mere
words ever could.
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Chapter Three
The Rebel Response:
Physical Repercussions to Self-proclaimed Loyalists
A spirit of violent resentment was excited against all who
were suspected of a disposition inimical to the American
cause. Some persons were taken up on suspicion and
imprisoned; some fled to Nova-Scotia, or to England, or
joined the British army in Boston
The passions of
jealousy, hatred and revenge were freely indulged, and
the tongue of slander was under no restraint. Wise and
good men secretly lamented these excesses but no
effectual remedy could be administered.1
This chapter deals with the physical penalties exacted upon
those who remained steadfast in support of British rule in America.
The physical consequences of loyalism became a large part of the
trauma experienced by the loyalists of New Hampshire, in effect
helping to mold them into a conscious group, a new community apart
from their former neighbors. Endurance and survival of the physical
trauma, or even the threat of physical violence, reaffirm ed the
loyalist identity. Violence or the threat of violence became one of the
marks of honor memorialists displayed before the Parliam entary
commissioners as a means of identifying themselves as "loyalist
sufferers." This was not only an important device of identification for
the purpose of securing redress for lost property; it was a new way
Jerem y Belknap, History o f New Hampshire. 2 vol. Dover, NH: 1813. vol 2. p
302
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of viewing their own identity as distinct from their former
identification with a land and people now so terribly transfigured by
rebellion.2
The degree of harshness or the physical dangers experienced
by loyalists in New Hampshire was directly related to the near total
absence of military activity in the province. Had there been a British
presence, had there been skirmishes or battles pitting once neighbors
and friends against each other in direct combat in or near their
homes as was the case in New York, New Jersey, and most of the
southern provinces, the abuse of both sides might have been far
worse. At times when the British threat seemed nearer to reality, the
attem pt to root out loyalists increased. After 1777, the rebel
government of New Hampshire relaxed its pursuit of loyalists, secure
in the success of Saratoga. However, as we shall see later, the focus of
the rebel government shifted to a new arena, the construction of a
new mythology. In Massachusetts where some fighting took place
early in the rebellion, the toll on the bodies of loyalists was
somewhat harsher, as the Boston mob practiced some tar and
feathering in addition to simple mobbing.3
An examination of the memorials of the New Hampshire
loyalists, as well as other sources, reveals that those most likely to
2This is the sort of experience Strauss referred to: "certain critical incidents
that occur to force a person to recognize that 'I am not the same as I was, as I
used to be.' These critical incidents constitute turning points in the onward
movement of personal careers." Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 95.
3See for instance the case of Edward Stow of Boston who claimed to "have been
mobbed and libeled ever since the stamp act." Stow claimed his house had
been repeatedly "bedaubed with excrement and feathers." Loyalist Claims,
Edward Stow, vol. XIV, p. 209-222.
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encounter physical danger were those whose pre-war status made
them community leaders. None of the claimants who might not be
considered prominent were the victims of physical abuse. Indeed
only men of wealth or men connected to the military found
themselves or their families threatened.4 Most physical abuse took
place in the east, nearer the coast, and early in the period of the
rebellion. With the exception of the handling of Simon Baxter by his
neighbors (see below) all of the abuse suffered by loyalists in New
Hampshire took place in or near Exeter or Portsmouth, and all of it
took place before the end of 1778.
The reasons why most violence against loyalists came before
1778 are fairly straightforward. The revolutionary government
solidified its position between 1775 and 1778. By the end of 1778 it
was clear there was no longer any realistic British military threat to
northern New England, and too, many of the loyalists had left to join
Burgoyne or fled to the British lines in New York or Rhode Island. As
the revolutionary government became stronger and more deeply
entrenched, more accepted by the general populace, it was no longer
necessary to demonstrate its strength and righteousness with public
displays such as the mob actions which had threatened prominent

4This was not the case elsewhere. In other provinces covered in the Loyalists
Claims, many men of modest circumstances were assailed and even more had
had their families threatened. This was particularly true in New Jersey.
There a considerable number of modest farmers and competent artisans left
their farms and shops to join the British army in 1776. The army was moving
through the province at the time and it attracted a crowd of adherents. Many
reported harassment by their neighbors prior to joining and many more
reported the eviction of their families under threat of force soon after their
departure. See for instance, Loyalist Claims, Benjamin Millekin, vol. XIV, p.
377-388; Samuel Moore, vol. XV, p.125-130.
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loyalists in 1775 and 1776. With their targets generally removed to
safety, and a network of local committees of safety to ensure
doctrinal orthodoxy, New Hampshire's rebels settled into a period of
consolidation and the slow division of the spoils.
There were three levels of physical action perpetrated on the
loyalists by their rebel neighbors: mob action, housebreaking, and
physical assault and/or imprisonment. These levels often overlapped
or became somewhat obscured by their very nature. Thus what
might have begun as a mob action may eventually have led to official
arrest and commitment to jail as in the case of James McMaster.5
Arrest and imprisonment was not by any means a safe or reasonable
condition for the loyalist. As will be seen below in the case of
Stephen Holland, imprisonment could be interpreted in more
enlightened times as a form of torture. Though Holland did not report
any overt physical abuse, such as beatings or inflicted torture at the
hands of his captors, Simon Baxter told of being "very ill-used."
Precisely what that might have meant is not clear though it may be
fair to infer that he was beaten by the Boston authorities who
arrested and jailed him in 1778. Housebreaking was essentially a
form of mob action, though with a different meaning to its
practitioners and victims than the usual mere mobbing.6
SNH Claims, James McMaster, vol. Ill, p. 1269.
6For our purposes, the words "mob" and "crowd" are used interchangeably. The
term crowd generally refers to any large public gathering, and might be
also interchanged with audience. However it seems that a gathering which
takes action, that is, becomes mobilized fro some reason and by some means,
then becomes a mob. The word mob is derived from the latin, mobile vulgus,
which appeared in England in 1600. The term was shortened to mobile in
1676, and simplified to mob in 1688. See Tim Harris, London Crowds in the
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At the outbreak of revolution, the rebels exhibited their might
symbolically as well as physically through the use of the mob.7 Even
before the withdrawal of Wentworth from Portsmouth, royal
government had effectively collapsed as the militia refused its call
and became instead the mob. Wielded with near surgical precision,
the Portsmouth mob became the means by which the rebels toppled
civil government, seized the military supplies at Fort William and
Mary,8 and terrorized and drove out the prominent men and officials
of the crown. For many New Hampshire notables, mobbing was a
sufficient incentive to pack what they could and flee.9
But the mob did not appear mysteriously, borne on angel's
wings to do the will of a few members of the rebel faction. The mob
Reign o f Charles II Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration until the
Exclusion Crisis. Cambridge: 1987. p. 3, note 16.
7There is a considerable body of work in the area of mobs and crowds which
informs the following discussion. The basic works of modem scholarship
include George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution. Oxford: 1959; EJ.
Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms o f Social Movement in
the 19th and 20th Centuries. New York: 1965; and EP. Thompson, The Making
o f the English Working Class. New York: 1963. The number of studies which
rely on these groundbreaking works and apply the principles therein to
18 th century crowd action and particularly to the American Revolutionary
period is too large to list here, however a full and able discussion of them and
indeed a pivotal study in itself is Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in
Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780. New York: 1977.
8That particular mob or crowd has been ably analyzed in John Derhak, "The
Portsmouth Uprising." Also of interest on the question of the mob involved
in the raid on the fort are: Theodore Crackel and Martin Andresen, "Fort
William and Mary: A Case Study in Crowd Behavior," Douglas H. Sweet, "New
Hampshire on the Road to Revolution: Fort William and Mary, A Decisive
Step," and Darryl I. Cathers, "Powder to the People: The Revolutionary
Structure Behind the Attacks on Fort William and Mary, 1774," all in
Historical New Hampshire, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1974.
9The same was true for prominent men in other provinces. See for example
Loyalist Claims, Thomas Gumersall, vol. XVI, p. 299-332; and Nicholas Bickle,
vol. XVI. p. 332-338.
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consisted of men and perhaps women who saw the faction as the
leading edge of a movement to preserve their own rights and
property. "Nothing so converts an improved condition into a
'traditional right' as continued access to it; few things outrage a
people so much as a decline in what they can expect - particularly if
those expectations attach to a cherished tradition."10 The mob and
those who manipulated it saw those cherished traditions as a sort of
home rule. The people of New Hampshire, indeed all of New England,
had experienced a considerable measure of independence for the
better part of their existence. This was particularly true in New
Hampshire and especially so during the long and prosperous tenure
of Governor Benning Wentworth. The previous governor had been a
master of treading the precarious balance line between maintaining a
contented majority at home while at the same time satisfying at least
the perceptions of those in government in England that all was as
they expected it should be. Local participation in the process of
government, the formulation of policy and its execution, were the
expected norm. The very forms of government in the province, the
town government by meeting were expressions of perhaps the most
liberally democratic and inclusive means of social interaction in the
history of the western world.
But in 1765 and after, it seemed to some that the Ministry and
Parliament were threatening the very existence of those cherished
forms. It was clear to at least one loyalist where the problem lay:
"the people of those provinces seeing and feeling their connection
10Cynthia A. Bouton, The Flour War Gender, Class and Community in Late
Ancien Regime French Society. University Park, PA: 1993 p. xviii.
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with their own provincial legislatures must from their habits and
prejudices be attached to them. They saw and felt the energy and
spirit of the laws arising from their own consent, given in their own
local Assemblies while the laws of Parliament acted partially, were
feebly executed, and were not at all perceived and felt by the great
body of the people."11
Crowd action resulted from the inability of the royal
government to acquiesce to the demands of the radical faction, to
defy instructions from England and support the continual escalation
of protests against British policy. Whether based on a popular
majority or on the outspoken energy of the radicals, traditional
means of expression and channels of political action were unavailable
to the populace. Thus the mob formed and carried out the agenda of
the rebel faction.
The idea of mob action was not unknown. "Past experiences
and strategies - many dating from the Middle Ages - accumulated in
the collective memory, were then transmitted via oral traditions and
networks of sociability and thus served as a fund or 'mobilizing
myth' from which the common people could draw and adapt to

11M / Claims,, Samuel Hale, vol. II, p. 733. Hale, a Portsmouth lawyer, came
across in his memorial as a self-serving weasel. But his judgment of the
situation was probably as close to the minds of his neighbors as we can
expect to get. Men like Hale certainly understood the goals of their
contemporaries. After all, they had shared for the most part in the protest
against British policy from 1765 to the point where they diverged over the
question of the proper course of resistance in 1775. Of course the
Parliamentary Commissioners might not have liked to hear this diagnosis of
the failure of British policy from a provincial at that, but the measure of
their feelings was unrevealed as Hale died in May 1787, before his claim was
decided.
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respond to present crises."12 The mob in Portsmouth and throughout
the province had ample precedent upon which to draw. Within
recent memory, crowd action had prevented the execution of the
Stamp Act in 1765, and the experience of the Boston mob was
familiar in the near northern port. Indeed the earliest expression of
the New Hampshire mob took place in the infancy of the settlement
as armed crowds clashed over the appointment of a minister in
Dover, then Northam, in 1645.13
In its earliest form, in terms of time, the New Hampshire mob
was a protest group. It gathered in 1765 and forced George Meserve
to relinquish the lucrative but extremely unpopular office of Stamp
Collector even before he could begin his duties. By 1774 however,
the crowd had become an arm of political action. A mob attempted to
disrupt the county court in Grafton County as mentioned previously
and was dispersed by Simon Baxter. The mob in Portsmouth in 1775
and 1776 was not so easily dispensed with. By that time the radicals
had seized control of the Assembly, and their number m ust have
included the leadership of the militia. In effect the mob had become
the enforcement arm of the increasingly powerful Committee of
Correspondence and Safety. The roles of both sides in the
controversy were clearly defined either as constituents of the mob or
its victims.

12Bouton, Flour War, p. 3. The quoted words "mobilizing myth" were borrowed
by Bouton from Terence Ranger, "Peasant Consciousness: Culture and
Conflict in Zimbabwe," in T. Shanin, ed., Peasants and Peasant Societies:
Selected Readings, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 1987) p. 313.
13Walsh, "Law and Society on the Piscataqua."
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What we know about the makeup of the mobs of New
Hampshire is incomplete. We do not know what part was played by
women, or the proportions of property owners as opposed to the
numbers of laborers and sailors for example, who provided a
significant part of the mobs in larger cities such as Boston, New York,
and Philadelphia.14 Yet it is safe to generalize from the sources that
a considerable number of the middling sort participated in crowd
actions in Portsmouth and Exeter. "The changes underway in the late
eighteenth century had strengthened some traditional groups,
weakened others, and fertilized embryonic clusters whose primacy
lay yet in the future."15 The Portsmouth mob in particular must have
consisted of men who should have turned out when the governor
called upon the militia in December of 1774 or mid-1775. The crowd
consisted of large numbers (for the area) but numbers not so large
that many faces would not go unrecognized. And that indeed may
have contributed to its efficacy. It would be difficult if not impossible
to stand firm in the face of crowd pressure, knowing the members of
the crowd as neighbors, knowing that from that source one would
face daily condemnation and opposition if one chose to rem ain
steadfast to the unpopular stance of a loyalist. The choice mob rule
offered was clear: convert or flee.

14For a discussion of the urban seaport crowds see Nash, The Urban Crucible.
Nash argued that the growth of urban crowd action was in some ways a
catalyst for the coming of the revolution, but that line of reasoning may not
hold true for the less sophisticated port of Portsmouth. Mob action in New
Hampshire was on a considerably smaller scale, and not nearly as
anonymous as the acts of mobs in the larger seaports to southward.
l s Bouton, Flour War, p. xxii.
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The mob became an arm of political action in New Hampshire
at the same time royal government effectively ceased to exist. With
the rise of mob action in Portsmouth, the governor and his core of
supporters had no means of carrying out the day to day tasks of
government, let alone attem pt to suppress the mob. Edward G.
Lutwyche of Merrimack was obliged to flee to Portsmouth in April of
1775 when he refused to lead his regiment to Massachusetts after
Lexington. Lutwyche chose Portsmouth as his destination because of
his belief that "at that time the disaffection was not so general as in
the c o u n t r y . " Y e t the mob had ended governmental control in
Portsmouth in December of 1774 with the storming of Fort William
and Mary. The failure of the militia to answer the Governor's
summons at that time implies at the least that the leaders of the
militia were the leaders of the mob. Lutwyche was probably correct
that his safety was more assured in Portsmouth. The rebel leadership
was efficient. The mob was controlled and for the m ost p art
quiescent until June and the taking of John Fenton. Indeed the only
mindless act the mob seemed to have taken was the destruction of
the sugar house, an installation that might have proven economically
useful to the province.
The mob was controlled and moved through a variety of
means. On one hand it was summoned simply by the sounding of the
drum which would normally have called forth the militia. On the
other we are left with the question of how people knew how to
respond to that drum, what secret significance was attached to the

16N.H. Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. Ill, p. 1048.
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drumming and how the members of what at first glimpse may have
resembled a spontaneous eruption of popular discontent knew that
the summons was indeed for them. Tim Harris suggested "how
people become informed about the political controversies of their
age, whether through exposure to propaganda deliberately aimed at
politicizing the masses, or through everyday religious, social, and
economic experiences."17 The mobs of New Hampshire were

certa in ly

subject to considerable political propaganda in th eir own
newspapers, as well as those of Boston, and they were not outside
the circulation area of the vast numbers of political pamphlets then
in circulation. Too, they would have been subjected to the frequent
sermons of the clergy, the large part of which in New Hampshire
supported the rebel faction. The fact that the militia and the mob
were in all probability quite similar in identity,18 the likelihood is
that training day meetings had provided a perfect opportunity for
the rebel leadership to lay plans for the eventual use of popular
protest as a political weapon. "The crowd was not the 'rabble' or
society's dregs, but was comprised of respectable (if often lowly)
types, who were informed, disciplined, and in possession of broad
notions of the necessity and legitimacy of their actions."19 Yet we are
reminded of the danger of using the mob as evidence of public

17Tim Harris, London Crowds, p. 6.
18Hoerder, Crowd Action, p. 43. Though he is here discussing Massachusetts,
the concept of a self-organized militia either following the direction of its
rebel officers or ignoring the commands of loyalist officers is certainly
transferrable to the situation in Portsmouth.
19Harris, London Crowds, p. 7.
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opinion in general. Thus the actions of the Portsmouth or Exeter
mobs might not correspond to the will or beliefs of the populace in
general.20 The loyalists identified those who mobbed them as tools of
"the faction," as an "armed banditti," but never accorded them the
distinction of being named. The crowds of revolutionary America
were representative of a large popular movement, though n o t
necessarily of the will and belief of the majority. As Samuel Hale
pointed out in his memorial to the Commissioners, "nearly one third
of the inhabitants for a long time retained their loyalty."21
Nevertheless, the mob represented what was the real political power
in New Hampshire after December of 1774.
The exact activities of the mob from day to day can no longer
be reconstructed with any degree of surety. But by extracting
information from memorialist testimony we can suggest a few
generalizations. The mob clearly acted as a sort of roving militia, or
perhaps in modem terms, a police force.22 Men formed ad hoc groups
analogous to a posse to perform specific tasks such as the arrest of
specific loyalists, bringing the suspects before local committees of
safety for trial and disposition. At least in Portsmouth, a group
remained in some semblance of assembly almost constantly.23 Larger
groups assembled quickly to terrorize known loyalists on the street,
often resulting in the detention of the victim, and once again carrying
20Harris, London Crowds, p. 9
21M / Claims,, Samuel Hale, vol. II, p. 749.
22For more on goal-oriented crowds see Hoerder, Crowd Action, p. 40-42.
23New Hampshire Gazette, December 30, 1774.
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him before one of the committees. These actions were not carried
out randomly, but were designed for a specific purpose, the
intimidation of individuals known to be or suspected of being
loyalists. The mob and those by whom they were controlled had two
direct aims, either to force ideological conformity on their targets or
to isolate them from the community as a whole, with the inevitable
outcome of driving them from the community altogether. In essence
the New Hampshire mob was performing the age-old task of
waming-out the unwanted elements of society.24
Crowd action based upon the experience of festive gatherings
provided a way in which the lower sorts were able to express
themselves when the traditional channels of authority were blocked
to them. Having experienced in a small way the power of th eir
betters during such commemorative events as Pope’s Day, the crowd
found mob action an accessible and acceptable means toward an end.
And many ends were found. Crowds took to the streets to protest
food prices, to prevent engrossing during times of shortage and to
express their fears during a variety of controversies from the small
pox vaccination battle to the Land Bank dispute. Though these
actions all took place in Boston, they could not help but be known
and remembered in the streets of Portsmouth as well.
When simple mobbing failed to drive the unwanted members
of the enemy away, housebreaking was the next level of terror

24Mob action was consistent elsewhere. In May of 1775 at Savannah, GA, a
"mob met and chose a committee who immediately resolved that a number of
persons well known for their loyalty and attachment to government should
leave the province in six days or abide the consequences." Loyalist Claims,
Thomas Gumersall, vol. XVI, p. 299-332.
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employed. As Dirk Hoerder pointed out, "If the person against whose
property the riot was directed was so obnoxious to the rioters or to
the whole community that they were unwilling to tolerate his
presence in the town, his house would be pulled down. These
methods were also adapted to partisan politics during the
revolutionary period."25 It was bad enough to experience the rough
hands and insults of the mob alone on the streets of town, or in the
company of fellow victims, but to have one's house attacked and to
have one's wife and children threatened was much worse. Daniel
Rindge related a harrowing tale: Taken by a crowd with two other
loyalists around September of 1775, Rindge had his arm broken as
he blocked the stroke of a large stick. He was imprisoned and then
examined by the town committee. After his release he was "from this
time subjected to new and continual insults from my enemies and
shunned and deserted by some of my former friends."26 Rindge's
choice of words is interesting. The community often acted in concert
to show its disapproval of a member's actions, and one of the oldest
traditional forms of communal disapproval was shunning, the turning
away of the communal face to the alleged malefactor.27
But the community was not satisfied simply with shunning
Daniel Rindge, and at least some of the community's members
disposed to armed assembly carried the attack on Rindge a step
25Hoerder, Crowd Action, p. 69.
^ N H Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV, p. 1571.
27Cases such as the following were not uncommon. Loyalist Claims, Amos
Botsford, vol. XII, p. 77-90. Botsford, an attorney in Hartford, CT, refused to
sign an oath and was "secluded from professional practice."
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further. "Soon after this a large body of men from the country,
searching for powder, with pieces loaded, surrounded my house. A
loaded gun levelled at my wife was turned aside by a friend to
humanity, and to me, pleading for the defenseless sex."28 Rindge
elaborated further, saying that he had just returned from a friend
and neighbor's house where he had helped to defend the "women
and children" from a similar attack. Rindge discriminated in his
account by calling the mob which assailed his house "men from the
country." The first impression might be that these were neighbors
from nearby, that "from the country" was not a distinction of country
versus town in nature. But further on as he continues the story of the
attack on his family and house, Rindge enlarges upon that distinction.
The mob was apparently there to search Rindge's house for powder
and weapons. He had already been ordered disarmed, so this
instance may have been a direct consequence to that administrative
action. But fearing for his family, Rindge attempted to obstruct the
entry of the strangers, and then attempted to limit their access with
conditions. A quarrel erupted between the parties and violence
seemed unavoidable until the arrival of "some humane and moderate
townsmen" who somehow exerted control over the situation and the
search was completed without further violence. Rindge's choice of
words and their meaning was significant. Rindge was a close
associate of the governor and related to Wentworth by marriage. He
was wealthy and influential, and his choice of words reveal that he
resented the effrontery of the country rabble which attempted to

28NH Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV, p. 1571-72.
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enter his domicile. He was unsure that his prominence would be any
protection to him or his family, and that uncertainty probably
produced stubborn anger which could have led to a more serious
confrontation. Thanks to the arrival of the "townsmen" he suffered
little more than a fright and an inconvenience at that point, though
he would feel the need to flee the country altogether in November
1775.
Real differences may well have existed between the seacoast
towns and those of the interior. Jack P. Greene contended that the
development of provinces on the periphery of the empire was
dramatically affected by the conscious emulation of the metropolis,
London, or more generally, England.29 Greene's theory of the mimetic
relationship between province and metropolis, if correct, could
account for differences in the formulation of communal identity on
the provincial level. It could be said that sub-communities formed
their own identities as well, especially in areas isolated from the
central core of the colony. Thus just as the provinces of the periphery
formed identities distinct from but in emulation of the metropolis, so
too would interior communities have evolved distinctly from the
longer established seaboard towns. This would help to explain the
political differences which often arose between western settlements
and the seaboard.

29Jack P. Greene, "Search for Identity: An Interpretation of the Meaning of
Selected Patterns of Social Response in Eighteenth-Century America" in
Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in Early American Cultural
History. Charlottesville, VA: 1992. infra.
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Bartholomew Stavers did not share the immunity of station
with Daniel Rindge. Stavers was a stage driver and innkeeper who
ran a public house "under the sign of the Earl of

H a lif a x ."30

His

loyalism was so pronounced and so obnoxious to his neighbors that
he felt himself threatened to the extent that he fled the province in
November of 1774 carrying a case of dispatches from Governor
Wentworth and the customs collectors to England. But leaving was
not enough to preserve Stavers' property from the wrath of the mob.
Shortly after his departure "a mob or body of licentious people went
to his house and threatened destruction of the same if his wife
allowed the friends of government to meet there as usual."31 Martha,
his wife, apparently did just that, because a short while later Stavers
received word "of a mob's assembling at Portsmouth who entered his
house by force and destroyed his furniture and did him other
damages to a considerable amount, giving for a reason th at the
owner of the goods was a tory, and his house was a tory house,
because he kept a house of entertainment for the King's officers and
the friends to government at which they used to meet."32
Once again the mob was not content that the primary object of
their disapproval had already departed. John Cochran, commander of
Fort William and Mary, had departed Portsmouth bound for Boston
with John Wentworth. But two months later, his wife Sarah "was

30Sabine, Sketches, vol. II, p. 327.
31NH Claims, Bartholomew Stavers,
1713.

Certificate of Robert Traill, vol. IV, p.

32NH Claims, Bartholomew Stavers,

vol. IV, p. 1712.
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ordered to quit the premises which she did and was moving her
goods on which a mob rose and took away everything she had,
calling them the goods of a tory."33
In some cases, at least, the mind of the mob was bifurcated. It
was at once a political creature, bent on persecuting its enemies,
determined to root out those who by their allegiance had violated
communal norms, and at the same time its greed drove it to take the
spoils of a vanquished enemy, stooping to loot the possessions of an
evicted woman whose husband was long out of their reach. The
message was clear. Property was seen as a sign of wealth and status.
The mob determined to reduce the hated "tory" to the lowest
possible social level by taking or destroying his or her property, and
driving them from the community by destroying the safety and
sanctity of the home.34
The victims of mobbing and housebreaking were generally
prominent or at least connected to government. All legal authority
had collapsed, the last session of the assembly was a sham as the
rebels consolidated their control over the masses they pretended to
answer the call of the governor. Thus by the summer of 1775 New
Hampshire was as much in rebellion as Massachusetts. Traditional
civil authority was replaced by the rebel leaders meeting in Exeter as
a committee of safety, and soon augmented by an assembly elected
illegally and without the king's writ. Following W entworth's
33NH Claims, John Cochran, vol. I, p. 328.
34The rebel tactics were consistent throughout the provinces. See Loyalist
Claims, Northurp Marple, vol. XVI, p. 481-488; Elias Homes, vol. XVI, p. 547-550;
Samuel Moore, vol. XVI, p. 125-130;
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departure in August and that of most of his core of support, a
struggle began for the hearts and minds of the majority of the people
of the province.
The records of the assembly themselves dem onstrate the
precarious nature of the rebellion in 1775 and even into 1776. The
rebel legislature and the Committee of Safety wherein lay the true
power could not reach far into the interior until a network of local
committees of safety was instituted. Thereafter it was possible to
snatch potential loyalists from their homes and force them to recant
their false faith. Even before the Committees of Safety began their
work, the Committees of Correspondence had set the precedent for
intimidation and public humiliation. In October of 1774 Governor
Wentworth began the chain of events which would lead to the fall of
his government. He hired Nicholas Austin as agent for the
procurement of carpenters for General Gage's barracks in Boston.
When the Committees got wind of his actions, the Rochester group
swept down on the unfortunate Austin, and forced him to make a
public confession of his guilt on his knees. Then they forced him to
swear an oath stating that "I do affirm, that for the future, I never
will be aiding or assisting in anywise whatever, in act or deed,
contrary to the Constitution of the country...."35
The obviously religious nature of these forced confessions or
professions of faith cannot be disguised or disregarded. Mere tacit
acquiescence to the state of affairs was not enough. In a place and

35Richard Francis Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, An Account o f the
Social and Political Forces Underlying the Transition from Royal Province to
American Commonwealth. Reprint. New York: 1971
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time when a whispered charge to the right ear could have a man
hauled in front of a tribunal of his neighbors in the middle of the
night and accused of treason, suspicion and fear become the
overshadowing emotions of the average citizen. The only way to
prevent the wrath of the rebel inquisition from descending like an
avenging angel, was to profess publicly one's faith in the rebellion.
In retrospect we might marvel at the stubbornness of those
who refused to sign the test oath, at the arrogance or conservatism of
those who remained loyal to king and country, but perhaps we
should marvel equally at the temerity of those who threw away a
lifetime of allegiance, who turned their backs on the country which
spawned them or their ancestors, who rejected the people from
whom they learned their language, their religion and their political
thought.36 Few probably considered the decision in those terms. A
year after Lexington, and a month after the British evacuation of
Boston, the position of the rebels in New Hampshire was fairly
secure. Though there was a considerable threat looming across the
wilderness in Canada, one which played a major part in the lives of
many in New Hampshire, the feared invasion of Portsmouth seemed
far less imminent. Certainly the idea of declaring independence from
Great Britain was prevalent. But the support of all of the people of
the province could not be assured. Indeed many towns sent petitions
to the assembly complaining of the method by which it was elected,
and repeatedly denying the need for a declaration of independence.

36For a brief though effective discussion of this new way of perceiving the
controversy see Norton, The British-Americans. p. 3-9.
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Yet it might seem that a certain wave of excitement, a fever of
change, had swept through the province. Perhaps the withdrawal of
the enemy from Boston provided a boost of confidence in the cause,
or perhaps it was merely the coming of spring which lifted spirits
and prompted men to cleave to the new cause of supposed liberty.
Not everyone supported the rebellion with life and property
and no care for the outcome. The assembly received numerous
complaints from officers trying to enlist regiments, decrying the lack
of funds and supplies without which men refused to enlist. Men from
outside the province as highly placed as George Washington
wondered in letters at the slowness of New Hampshire men to
answer the call to arms, while the assembly hurried to appropriate
money to pay the enlistees in advance. The rebel leaders may well
have wondered just how many of their countrymen were willing to
support an armed rebellion and how far they might be willing to go
in their support. Some means of determining rebel strength and the
identity of malcontents was needed, and the means was supplied by
the resolution in the Continental Congress dated March 14, 1776 in
which all provincial authorities were directed "immediately to cause
all persons to be disarmed, within their respective colonies, who are
notoriously disaffected to the cause of America, or who have not
associated, and refuse to associate, to defend by arms, the United
Colonies, against the hostile attempts of the British fleets and
armies."37 The "notoriously disaffected" had to be identified and
dealt with. At that point in time, however, it was difficult to tell a

37NHPP Vol. 8, p. 204.
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staunch loyalist from a wavering citizen. Though royal government
had been removed seven months previously, it was not yet clear
what form the new government would or ought to take, nor was it
entirely clear on what authority it could rest. Four months remained
until Thomas Jefferson would rationalize the basis of a civil
government based upon natural rights, not a concept unknown, but
nevertheless not one which had been articulated as yet. Instead the
rebels relied on the negative basis of resisting aggression and still
cited the English constitution as the basis for the legality of their
acts.38 Whatever the compulsion or inspiration, over 90% of New
Hampshire's men signed the test oath between April and September
of 1776. Of those who refused, a considerable number apparently did
so because of religious objections, since many were Quakers.
The months between the flight of John Wentworth in August
1775 and the establishment of a temporary government in Exeter in
January of 1776 saw the departure of most of New Hampshire's
prominent loyalists. Older men like Mark Hunking Wentworth, the
governor's father, and Theodore Atkinson, the former Chief Justice,
remained, and were for the most part left unmolested. The pattern of
deference died hard in Portsmouth, and men of such wealth and
standing within the community were fairly immune to attack while
they exhibited no threat. Farther inland men like Stephen Holland
and Simon Baxter retained a considerable amount of authority and
support in their communities. Thus they were able to work

38M/PP Vol. 8, p. 182.
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continuously on behalf of British authority, quietly or not so quietly
resisting the rebel government until 1777.
The most outspoken loyalists were harassed as long as they
remained in the province. Simon Baxter, among others, told of being
"frequently taken up and carried before their committees....thirteen
different times, [and] finally put in jail in Charlestown No. 4."39 We
can only imagine the feeling of insecurity experienced by those
whose lives were constantly overthrown by such tactics. At any hour
a m an could be taken from his home, carried forcibly to

an

unforeseen location, and there be examined by a tribunal of men.
These form er neighbors, perhaps well-known to the accused, or
perhaps formerly social inferiors, held the prisoner's fate in their
hands. How long Baxter endured this is not certain, nor is the length
of time he stayed in jail. Baxter escaped from his imprisonment in
July of 1777 and joined Burgoyne's army at Skeensborough. But
Baxter's physical peril was far from over.
The surrender at Saratoga left Baxter a prisoner of war. The
American officers serving with Burgoyne were offered their freedom
in return for their oath of allegiance to the new government, or at
least their parole that they would not in the future take up arms
against the American government. All but Baxter agreed and were
released. Baxter was imprisoned at Rutland Barracks with the British
officers of Burgoyne's command.40 After some time he was given a
39NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 134.
40MT Claims, Simon Baxter, Letter of Francis Fraser, vol. I, p. 158. Fraser was a
captain in the King's Rangers and a fellow prisoner of war with Baxter at
Rutland. The letter was in support of Baxter’s claim to loyalism.
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pass to return home and visit his family. After only two days a t
home, Baxter's former neighbors got word of his presence and a mob
formed. Taken forcibly from his house, "his old neighbors gathered
round him tied him to a tree [and] gave him several prick[s] with
bayonets in the breast and whipped him 'til they left his back worse
than I ever saw a soldier's back."41
The mob took Baxter's pass and threw him into the jail at
Keene. He was released by the High Sheriff there and made his way
to Vermont. According to his story he was there given protection by
Governor Whittington, but nevertheless a party came from New
Hampshire and took him by force back to Rutland Barracks. There a
court of three officers ordered Baxter removed to Worcester Jail.
Why precisely this was done is unclear. Baxter gave us no clue, but
perhaps Francis Fraser did. Fraser was a British officer captured with
Baxter at Saratoga. It may be that the sight of the mistreatment of
their loyalist fellow had incensed the British prisoners still held at
Rutland and caused some concern to the authorities there. They may
have desired to remove the potential cause of unrest from the prison
camp, precluding any further discontent or ill-feeling Baxter's
treatment might have engendered. At any rate the move proved
auspicious for Baxter. During the process of his transfer, Baxter was
able to escape from his guards and journey to Penobscot. From there

41JVff Claims, Simon Baxter, Letter of Francis Fraser, vol. I, p. 158. This must
have been a severe whipping indeed. Fraser reports that he saw Baxter's
back when he returned to Rutland Barracks after this incident. For an
officer in the British army, Fraser must have seen some quite severe
whippings administered, as that was the primary form of routine
punishment for most offenses.
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he made his way to England.42 Baxter endured the worst physical
abuse of any New Hampshire loyalist we know of, though by no
means the worst suffered by loyalists in general. As near as Boston
the a rt of tarring and feathering

was practiced, a form of

punishment thought to have ben brought back to Europe by the
Crusaders and usually reserved for the most heinous of offenders
against community norms. In America before and during the
rebellion, that punishment was allotted to Crown officials and
loyalists alike. Such an abuse could easily lead to the death of the
victim from suffocation or bums.
Stephen Holland asserted his position from the beginning by
apprehending British deserters in 1774 and sending them back to
Boston to their regiment.43 On April 19, 1775 Holland resigned from
all of his civil offices as well as from his militia post. He was offered a
commission by the new rebel government as a Brigadier General but
"turned up his nose in contempt to them and went off without so
much as returning them thanks."44 According to Vance, Holland was
42NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 135.
43NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol.

n, Deposition of William Vance, Esq. p. 945.

44NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of William Vance, Esq. p. 945.
According to Sabine, Holland asserted bis support for the cause of his
country's liberty at a town meeting in Londonderry in 1775. See Sabine,
Sketches, p. 536. Such an assertion is not unlikely as it might have allowed
Holland another two years to act surreptitiously on behalf of the Crown in
his home town. However Sabine devotes only a brief paragraph to Holland.
Sabine's sources were obviously incomplete and based primarily on
American documents. He ignored Holland's earlier military service in the
Royal Army as a captain in the Prince of Wales' American Volunteers, and
his subsequent career in New York. It might be fair to say that much of
Sabine's information was based on sketchy public records such as lists of
those proscribed and or banished, as well as the sort of antiquarian lore from
which many fine stories might be made but which resist the scrupulous
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harassed continually during the latter half of 1775 and all of 1776.
Holland and some friends were forced to mount a continual guard at
his home, and had on occasion to fend off concerted attacks by bands
of rebels. Nevertheless Holland had the freedom and prominence to
carry on a relationship with Colonel Archibald Campbell who was a
prisoner of the rebel authorities held at Reading, Massachusetts.
Holland was able to visit Campbell frequently, arranged a courier to
carry letters secretly to the British army in New York, and assisted
Campbell monetarily.45
By February of 1777 Holland knew that his days of free action
were numbered. Holland advised Campbell on the occasion of his last
visit that he would be leaving the area and taking a contingent to
join the army in New York.46 Shortly after that visit Holland was
arrested and taken to Exeter jail charged with treason. He was able to
escape at that time and fled southward as far as Boston.
An eyewitness described Holland's treatm ent by rebel
authorities in Boston. Between June 6th and June 10th Holland was
brought into the jail as a prisoner. He was "put in irons and confined
four nights and three days in a dark dungeon scarce six feet long and
four wide, [and] he had neither straw, bread or water allowed him."47
scrutiny of m odem researchers who prefer sources that are verifiable in
some way.
45Prisoners were required to support themselves while confined. This held
true for loyalists as well as British POWs. See NHPP vol VII & VIII. See also
NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Certificate of Archibald Campbell, Maj.
Gen., p. 968-970.
46NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Certificate of Archibald Campbell, Maj.
Gen., p. 968-970.
47NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of John Hill, p. 960.
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Other prisoners there gave Holland water through a pipe or "he must
have perished." When Holland emerged "he was so weak and low
that two men were required to support him." Holland was put in
another room for a few more days and then taken ou t to be
transported back to New Hampshire "under a strong guard with hand
cuffs on, and a chain under the horse's belly from leg to leg to
prevent him making his escape."
There is little doubt that Holland was considered a dangerous
and important prisoner. No report remains to allege th at he was
beaten during this time, though Hill added that he overheard
conversations between the jail officials and members of the Council
to the effect that "it was their intention to starve the said Stephen
Holland to death."48
William Vance was a prisoner in Exeter jail when Holland was
brought in on June 20, 1777. Vance told of Holland's arrival "loaded
with irons, that he appeared very unwell and the irons were so
heavy that he [Holland] could not move froward w ithout the
assistance of two men to support him. Holland was placed in a room
Vance described as a dungeon with a guard at the door. The jailer
told Vance that he was going to the General Court for permission to
chain Holland to the floor. The jailer further told Vance th at there
were many who would not be satisfied until Holland was hanged for
treason. Around six days later Holland became ill and asked for a
doctor. The jailers refused his request but prisoners who had the
liberty of the jailyard approached a Colonel Ward who ordered
48NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of John Hill. p. 961.
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another prisoner, Doctor Gove, to be allowed in to see to Holland.
Gove reported to Vance that after three days with Holland he "had
never suffered so much before as he did while he was in the
dungeon...on account of the stench" and that "Holland had begged him
to go out of it as it could be of no service to him to stay and die with
him."49
Neither Holland nor any of his supporting deponents gave
further details of his captivity except to say that when news reached
Exeter that Burgoyne had captured Ticonderoga, the chains were
removed from the prisoner. Holland was incarcerated for about nine
months during which time he was tried and convicted of treason and
sentenced to death. Before the sentence could be carried out he
managed to escape to Rhode Island where he joined the British.
Stephen Holland was mistreated due to the magnitude of his
crimes. Vance was told by a jailer that the primary offense Holland
was accused of was the recruitment of a hundred men to join the
British just after the battle of Bunker Hill. But if that were the case,
why allow him so much freedom between May of 1775 and his
arrest in early 1777? The rebel authority had not solidified in 1775
or indeed in 1776. Despite the pretensions of the Provincial Congress
in Exeter, solid support did not obtain throughout the province either
for their rule or for the cause of independence. As mentioned above,
frequent petitions from numbers of towns testify to the fact that
support for the rebel government was neither universal nor
altogether firm. Many yet questioned the wisdom of armed rebellion

49NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., p. 949.
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even though they agreed in principle to the idea of resisting British
authority.
A minority were ideologically sanguine. The rebel leadership
had close ties to the patriot faction of Massachusetts, as did many
others in the province. Many of the events of 1775 could be
attributed to a sort of mimicry of the events that took place in the
neighboring province. The acts of the rebel government in 1776 were
closely tied to the example and advice of their southern confederates,
as well as to the directives of the Continental Congress. Yet some
ambivalence remained in the towns. That ambivalence was
reinforced by a sense of insecurity.
There existed throughout 1775 and 1776 an air of fear, a
feeling of impending doom predicated on the supposition that an
impending invasion of New England from Canada would most likely
come through New Hampshire. Added to th at was an equally
pervasive concern that a seaborne invasion could materialize off the
coast of Portsmouth at any time. That fear would fuel the suspicion
aimed at Asa Porter, a case to be taken up in a subsequent chapter,
as well as informing the general state of insecurity felt elsewhere,
but especially by the leaders of the rebellion as they carried on
activities in Exeter which would be adduced as treasonous should the
rebellion fail.
Either because the feared invasion failed to materialize by
early 1777, or because it was learned that it soon would, it was felt
that it was time to pursue the notorious Londonderry leader, and
thus came the arrest of Holland. That Holland still commanded a
great deal of influence was attested to by the petition of 133
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residents of Londonderry who pledged their estates as surety for
Holland's release. Their offer was rejected and they were all held up
to public scorn for their support of so odious a character. But despite
a certain relaxation of the climate of fear, the rebel authorities were
reluctant to carry out their eventual goal, the death of Stephen
Holland.
The authorities in Exeter must have desired Holland's demise.
They tried the prisoner for treason and sentenced him to be hanged,
yet it was some months later that he escaped. The successes of
Burgoyne's invasion spared Holland for a time. The rebel government
feared to kill him outright, not only because of the consequences to
them should the British prevail, but also because they feared to
create a m artyr as a rallying point for the loyalists who

r e m a in e d

in

the province and who they feared would rally to Burgoyne. As many
memorials prove, a considerable number of quiet loyalists did join
Burgoyne's advancing army, but what prevented the victorious and
reassured rebels from executing Holland after the debacle o f
Saratoga in October of 1777?
Holland's survival can probably be attributed to the very
nature of the rebellion in New Hampshire. As will be discussed
below, the rebellion in New Hampshire never really reached the level
of ferocity that was attained by New Yorkers or those combatants in
many of the southern provinces. Aside from the aberrant atrocities
surrounding the Battle of Bennington and a few isolated frontier
episodes, the rebellion in New Hampshire was rather bloodless.
Lacking any true desire to kill their neighbors, even the leaders of
the rebel government lacked the ruthlessness to execute Stephen
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Holland. Indeed it may be that Holland's life was preserved by the
cupidity of his captors. It was only shortly after his escape that die
rebel government found the courage to seize all loyalist property in
the province. Though the suggestion had come from the Continental
Congress as a means of raising revenue, it is likely that once again
the capture of Burgoyne's army had catalyzed that action. Had
Holland died, his considerable estate would have passed to his widow
and children who could not be dispossessed of the estate based on
the husband's crimes.
After the war Holland went to England where he became a
leader in the New Hampshire loyalist community. More than any
single expatriate from that province, Holland became the spokesman
for his countrymen. While indeed John Wentworth wrote brief notes
on behalf of a privileged few, Holland deposed on behalf of many
ordinary men and wrote memorials for several absentees, including
the heirs of others who perished during the conflict.50 As advisor,
contributor, and author, Stephen Holland influenced the exposition of
the loyalist perspective. It is in the memorials that we find the
effects of Holland's cruel treatment reflected in the words of his
countrymen.
Pervasive throughout is the notion of suffering loyalists.
Holland described himself as "a lame invalid" as a result of his

50Among others, Holland authored a memorial on behalf of John Stinson of
Dunbarton who was at the time of writing (March 1784) imprisoned in New
Hampshire. Stinson had been apprehended while seeking to secure some o f
his property and was being tried for returning to the state despite his
banishment. NH Claims, John Stinson, Memorial of Stephen Holland on
Behalf of John Stinson, vol. IV, p. 1752-1779.
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sufferings. Robert Fowle, allegedly Holland's accomplice in a
counterfeiting scheme, found himself and others in a "wretched
situation."51 Other memorialists echoed similar sentiments. They saw
themselves as victims of circumstance. The loss of the conflict had
left the majority of them in difficult financial straits. Only a few had
professions or prospects. Most relied on pensions for their survival.
Significantly, most of the New Hampshire petitioners had gone to
England. Of New Hampshire's loyalists, many those who petitioned
for redress of their losses did not migrate to Canada and claim the
awards of land given freely to the thousands who did. But both
groups of loyalists suffered the losses of property and community
equally. Both the thousands who eventually found a new land in
Canada and became the self-styled United Empire Loyalists, and the
significantly fewer who migrated to England and elsewhere, wore the
sobriquet "loyalist" for the remainder of their lives. By doing so they
identified themselves as distinct from their former countrymen and
as members of a new community.52

51 NH Claims, Robert Fowle, vol. II, p 690.
52It is extremely significant that a considerable number of claimants from
other provinces, though notably none from New Hampshire, referred to
their former neighbors as "the Americans." That usage was especially
noticeable in New Jersey and New York claimants' language. The cause of
such a radical shift of identification is unclear, but may be attributed to the
intensity of the struggle in those provinces. Those who wrote o f their
opponents as "Americans" were choosing to differentiate themselves from
their former habitation. The first conclusion might be that those who used
that term in that way were immigrants lately arrived just prior to the
rebellion, yet an examination of the claims reveals that few if any of those
referring to the rebels as "the Americans" were in fact recent immigrants to
the colonies. Most were native bom Americans themselves. See for example
Loyalist Claims, Thomas Barclay, vol. XVII, p. 25-42; John Francis Ryerson,
vol. XVI p. 131-146; Elisha Laurence, vol. XV, p. 29-36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

Physical trauma, mobbing, housebreaking, and imprisonment
among them, had a significant role in shaping the loyalist community
identity, and the personal identities of individual loyalists. The
mem orialists referred to themselves repeatedly as "loyalist
sufferers" and all those who underwent physical trials felt that their
duty to King and country had been fulfilled.
Equally im portant was the role of physical trauma in the
formation of a loyalist identity in the minds of their enemies. The
proponents of the rebel faction used physical sanctions against the
loyalists as a means of warning out those whom they had identified
as enemies of the country. Failing to warn out such violators of the
community norm, some rebel crowds turned to housebreaking as a
more final way of driving the loyalist outcasts from their midst. At
the last, reluctant misfits such as Stephen Holland were confined,
mistreated, and condemned to die. There are no records of loyalists
executed in New Hampshire, though several were convicted of
treason.53
Whether they actually suffered physically or not, the loyalist
memorialists carried the identity of a suffering minority with them
to their new places in exile. And those who went to England and

53Loyalists were, however, executed elsewhere. Loyalist Claims, Alpheus
Palmer, vol. XVTII, p. 129-144. Writing on behalf of his father, Palmer stated
that his eldest brother "was in the year 1777 executed by the King's enemies
for his loyalty to his Sovereign." A New Jersey man from Middletown told of
how his father had been at sea on behalf of the British and when he came
home for a visit in September of 1779, "a scouting party laid in wait for him
and shot him." George Mount, vol. XVI, p. 171-182. Emotions ran deeper in the
other provinces where the war was a reality, not merely a newspaper
account.
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eventually hoped to find redress for their losses found themselves
again suffering in other ways, especially from the neglect of the
government they had sacrificed everything to support.
The loyalists created their own identities first by choosing to
act as loyalists. As a result of those acts, the rebel faction at both the
provincial and town community levels responded with sanctions. The
primary response came in the form of physical harassment by mobs,
housebreaking, and in some cases imprisonment. In addition,
loyalists were shunned by their neighbors, confined to their homes
or farms, or removed to other towns far removed from the coastal
areas considered by the rebels to be in danger of invasion. Nearly all
of these developments took place in the early part of the rebellion,
from 1774 through 1777 after the defeat of the British at Saratoga,
an event personally witnessed and endured by m any New
Hampshire loyalists who had left their homes to join the King's
standard as it moved southward.
Following that debacle, the majority of overt loyalists departed
the province and began the odyssey to some future home. The rebel
faction, triumphantly ensconced as the de facto power in Exeter and
unchallenged in the province, altered its strategy and began to
employ legal weapons in earnest against present and absent loyalists
alike. Legal weapons had been deployed to some extent from the
beginning of 1776, bu t only after the assurance of Saratoga were
those the primary weapons of choice in dealing with the remnants of
those whose allegiance lay still with the crown and country of their
fathers. The legal battles of the revolution depended heavily on
identity, both self-conceptions of personal and communal identity,
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and perhaps even more, the identity of individuals and community
as created for them by others. To those legal battles we turn in the
next chapter.
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Chapter Four

Civiliter Mortuos:
The Imposition of Identity Through Law.
....the Absentees were proceeded against as civiliter m ortuos,
without the form of a complaint or information by the attorney
general1
Part of our inheritance from England has been and continues to
be a reverence for "the Law," as well as a certain proclivity for using
it, sometimes beyond the bounds of sense. We were, and remain a
most litigious people. To a degree, law and the interpretation of the
British constitution were at the center of the controversy which led
to the American Rebellion. It should come as no surprise then that
law and its use or misuse holds a central place in a discussion of
loyalism during the period from 1774 through 1784. This chapter
examines the effects of law on the loyalist community: how law was
used by the rebels to impose an identity on the loyalists from the
outside, and how law was used to deprive them of their rights and
property. We have already seen how the loyalists created their own
identity as demonstrated in the language shared among them in their
memorials to the Parliamentary Commission. The loyalists created for
themselves the identity of suffering friends of government, steadfast
1NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 100. From, John Anstey, "On the Subject
of Confiscation" a report to the Parliamentary Commission on Loyalist Claims.
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and active in the service of the mother country. They demonstrated
this constructed identity with passive and active behaviors, the
commission of which defined them publicly as well as personally as
loyalists. They also saw themselves as victims of oppression and
persecution, by mobs at first, and then by the armed might of the
rebel faction. Once the tumultuous situation of 1774 and 1775
subsided and the rebels seemed securely entrenched, their technique
in dealing with the loyalist remnant changed. They began to rely on
law or the semblance of law to identify their enemies. Both sides in
this conflict were deeply influenced by the Glorious Revolution of
1689. Few if any seriously retained the idea of the divine right of
kings. The constitutional monarchy which replaced James n had
altered the fundamental locus of authority, the fountainhead of
sovereignty, from the concept of divinely decreed kingship to the
’’modem" idea of sovereignty derived from the consent of the
governed, or at least from their representatives in parliament.2 For
loyalists, the law emanated from the government appointed by the
King and legislated by Parliament. For the rebel faction, it became
necessary to obfuscate the source of legitimate law and create a new
basis for sovereignty. The success of the leaders of the American
rebellion lay in large part in their ability to shift the locus of
sovereignty away from that of government based on the traditional
sovereignty of the "King in Parliament" and transferring it wholesale

2Morgan, Inventing the People:.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

into the idea of the "sovereignty of the people." That accomplishment
was perhaps the greatest feat of political legerdemain of all time.3
Of course the theoretical underpinnings of governm ent
according to a contemporary source, were of little concern to the
average resident of the province of New Hampshire before, during, or
after the rebellion.4 The real concerns of most men and w om en
revolved around their prosperity and security, not only their own,
but th a t of the community in which they lived. W hatever
government provided for their security from criminals and intruders
was sufficient. Questions of sovereignty and the philosophical origins
of law were as foreign to them at the time, as quantum physics is to
most modern Americans. Thus our concern here lies not with the
evolution of the theory of government and law, but with the utility
of law in the struggle for the minds of the people.
The utility of law is based primarily upon its acceptance by the
community which it purports to protect. The loyalists contended that
the rebel government had no legitimate right to govern. The question
of legitimacy was raised repeatedly by some of the loyalist
memorialists, especially those who had held responsible positions in
the royal government. One of the central arguments they employed
in resisting the rebel takeover of the assembly in 1775 was the
legitimacy of royal authority. Based soundly on constitutional and
3For a lucid and quite inspirational discussion of the transition of the locus of
sovereignty and its transcendent importance, see Wood, The Creation o f the
American Republic, esp. pp. 344-389.
4James Moody, Lieutenant James Moody’s Narrative o f His Exertions and
Sufferings in the Cause o f Government, Since the Year 1776. London: 1783.
Reprint. New York: 1968. p. 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138

statute law, the governor's authority to prorogue the assembly, or
call it using the King's Writ, was central to the stable nature of
provincial government. Therefore, argued the loyalists such as
Thomas McDonough, the acts of an assembly meeting without the
aegis of the crown or the King's representative, the royal governor,
could not have the legitimacy of real law. This was especially true of
the so-called "committees of correspondence" or "committees of
safety." Rebel government was usurped, un-natural, and, the loyalists
hoped, temporary.5
The loyalists were not alone in their concerns about the
legitimacy of the rebel government. Petitions from various towns to
the assembly show a concern on the part of a considerable number of
inhabitants. On January 5, 1776, the Assembly at Exeter voted to
create a new civil government, and by January 10 a protest petition
was entered and read to the assembly. The document, signed by
residents of twelve towns, was written by men who had represented
their towns in the congress sitting at Exeter the previous month. The
nine reasons they set forth for their protest range from the sublime
to the ludicrous. Point seven acknowledged the troubling idea that
the Congress, meaning that which met in Exeter in December 1775,
and which they had attended as delegates, was in itself adequate to
act as a provisional government, and that it had no legitimate basis
for acting to enlarge its own power.6 At the same time point five
5 NH Claims, Thomas McDonough, vol. HI, pp. 1165-1166. McDonough was not
the only loyalist to question the legitimacy of the rebel government. For
more on this see Chapter One.
^NHPP Vol. 8, p. 14.
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offered that New Hampshire was too small and insignificant to lead
where other colonies had failed to set a like example as yet. Perhaps
closer to the real problem were articles eight and nine, wherein the
protestors complained that a new government would cost too much,
and seemed frighteningly close to "setting up an Independency on
the Mother Country."7
Eleven additional

petitions

were received by the new

government prior to the 18th of January. On that day the petitions
were read before both houses, and "fully argued by Mr. John
Pickering, counsel for the petitioners." The house then adjourned
without comment. The following morning the house voted to create a
committee to confer with a committee of the council about the idea of
referring the question of what form the provincial

government

ought to take to the Continental Congress.
The January petitions had no effect on the course of the
rebellion. The feeling both in Exeter and in Philadelphia was that the
petitions were the feeble attempts of loyalists or fence-sitters to slow
or stop the consolidation of the rebel government, and that anyone
who questioned the propriety of the actions of the new governments
must be an enemy of the country.
Of much greater concern to rebels and loyalists alike, as well as
to those who had yet to adhere to one side or the other, was the fact
that the civil courts had been closed. From the beginnings of the
settlement of the province, the courts had provided social stability
through the adjudication of offenses and the arbitration of disputes.
7NHPP Vol. 8, p. 15.
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Without functioning courts a sense of insecurity and concern added
to the tension of the times. As early as 1774, rebels had attempted to
close the court in Grafton County, and only the intercession of Simon
Baxter and some of his supporters had kept the session open. By May
of 1775 the courts were no longer functioning. We know this from
the records of the Assembly and more particularly from the
memorial of John Durand.
Durand held a contract from the Royal Navy to provide timber
and masts. He had engaged one Edward Parry as his agent to secure
the quantities of timber called for in his contract. In a letter dated
May 17, 1775, John Wentworth informed Durand of the seizure of his
cargo and the imprisonment of Edward Parry. Wentworth's letter
reflected the situation in the province at that time. Wentworth
assured Durand that he would do all he could to secure Parry’s
release (and that of John Bernard, the eldest son of Sir Francis
Bernard, former governor of Massachusetts) and the safety of the
goods taken, but he was unsure of how long it would take, "all
communication by land being entirely cut off or at least restrained to
committees of the people."8 It was impossible for Wentworth to do
anything himself "as the country is in the most deplorable state of
disorder without law or govemment....at present you are sensible all
power is wrested from magistrates, that little hope can be had from
law until Great Britain restores its efficacy on this continent"9
8NH Claims, John Durand, John Wentworth to John Durand, 5 /1 7 /7 5 . vol. I, p.
461.
9Mf Claims, John Durand, John Wentworth to John Durand, 5 /1 7 /7 5 . vol. I, p.
462.
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Parry was held in Sturbridge until June of 1776 when he was
paroled to Portsmouth in the care of the Committee of Safety there.
He had yet to have any sort of trial other than an examination by a
committee, probably in Kennebec where the timber was seized. In
August of 1776, Parry filed suit in a Maritime Court in Portsmouth,
perhaps the only one in operation, and that only to lend an air of
legitimacy to the seizure of English ships by privateers commissioned
by the Provincial Assembly. With Joshua Brackett presiding, the
maritime court rendered judgement against the plaintiff and
awarded the ship, the Bochacheco, and its cargo to the state to be
sold at public auction.10
Durand later contended that according to the government
contract he held "the value thereof is to be refunded when captured
or destroyed by the enemy....this business was undertaken and
carried on and finally would have been effected if government could
have kept the said territories in subjugation."11
The civil courts meanwhile remained closed throughout 1775
and into 1776. The reasons, though nowhere boldly stated, seem
obvious. First, justices of the peace could not function under the
provisional government. The commission of a justice of the peace was
a royal one, and magistrates whose right to hear cases rested on
royal authority were of little use to a rebel government. But the
rebels had a darker reason for closing and keeping the courts closed.

10M / Claims, John Durand, vol. I, pp. 463-473.
11NH Claims, John Durand, vol. I, p. 420. Durand was eventually awarded £2700
on his claim of £3802. p. 491-92.
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The success of the rebellion required the efficacy of the committees
of safety and of correspondence, especially their powers of arrest,
detention, and judgement without trial. When it was possible for
committeemen or their friends to arrest a man or woman on the
mere suspicion of uttering a phrase on behalf of the King, it was
possible to subjugate the populace, or at least intimidate the majority
into inaction. With the courts closed the only recourse the accused
had was to petition the rebel-controlled assembly for a hearing.
Through 1774, 1775, and well into 1776, the rebel faction was a
minority in the province. Their hold on power remained precarious
as long as the vast majority of the people had not chosen sides and
the loyalists remained in the midst of the colony. The departure of
Governor Wentworth in August 1775 removed one impediment to
their success, but the resumption of normal legal procedures was
unthinkable. To allow the courts to reopen, even with members of
the rebel faction in the magistracy, was impossible without some
credible basis for the power of the court to rest upon. That was
clearly absent. The rebels recognized that for courts to operate they
must be grounded in the legitimate government of the polity. No
such government yet existed.
The government created by the "constitution" of January 1776,
however, found its own claim to legitimacy based on the idea that it
was a popular government existing only during the current crisis of
war. Its language rife with references to impending invasion, the
new rebel government, when not concerned with the nuts and bolts
affairs of mounting a rebellion, took the time to install its own list of
magistrates for all the levels of the ante bellum judiciary just days
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after assuming control of the province.12 The list languished in limbo
though until March when a committee was formed to recommend the
actions the legislature ought to undertake as soon as possible. One of
the committee's recommendations, reported on March 7, 1776, was
the immediate restoration of the law courts.13 Complaints had been
received, and the tenuous nature of the government with its narrow
base of popular support required action of some sort. On the 11th of
March the House voted to form yet another committee to find "some
method respecting opening the civil courts and what restrictions they
shall be laid under.14
The committee's report, though missing from the journal of the
House, apparently form ed the basis for a t least p a rt of a
proclamation issued on Tuesday, March 19. The pertinent passage
read: "the council and assembly have chosen and appointed the
proper officers for the administration of justice in the several
counties, who are to be sworn to the faithful discharge of th eir
several trusts."15 The proclamation then revealed the concern of the
rebels, that their network of ultra-legal committees continue to have
free rein: "this proclamation is intended not to interfere with the
power of the necessary committees of safety chosen in the several
towns through the colony."16 A brief note under March 23rd refers to

12NHPP Vol. 8, pp. 61-64.
13NHPP Vol. 8, p. 81.
14NHPP Vol. 8, p. 83.
15NHPP Vol. 8, p. 103.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144

the opening of the courts "to try criminal cases and trespasses
only."17 Thus the rebel government acted to assuage the fear of the
general population that criminals and trespassers were going
unpunished, while maintaining their system of political drumhead
courts to insure the acquiescence of the populace. At the same time,
the absence of civil courts precluded citizens from filing suits in cases
of defamation or false arrest, harassment or property loss, when
confronted by the sometimes armed operatives of the committees of
safety.
On Friday the 22nd of March the rebel government took one
final step to secure its newly won control of the province. On that
day the house and council voted to form a Committee of Safety to
exercise executive powers while the legislature was in adjournment.
Men like Meshech Weare and Nathaniel Folsom, men of prominence
and wealth, would act as an executive committee, as a governor
might act had the new government possessed one.18
The inhabitants of the entire colony were not yet pleased with
the actions of the faction now in control of the assembly. As late as
November of 1776 petitions continued to arrive in Exeter protesting
the "unconstitutional formation and procedures of the present
Assembly of this State."19

ItNHPP Vol. 8, p. 103.
17NHPP Vol. 8, p. 112.
18NHPP Vol. 8, pp. 111-112.
19NHPP Vol. 8, pp. 421-426.
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The rebel government realized that the success of the rebellion
rested on a firm control of the countryside. During the recess, the
Committee of Safety devised a means of rooting out opposition and
committing the mass of men to their cause. In April of 1776 the
Association Test was sent out to each of the various towns. There the
local committees of safety were to require every male over the age
of 21 (except "lunatics, idiots, and Negroes") to sign the statement.
The text read: "We the subscribers, do hereby solemnly engage, and
promise, that we will, to the utmost of our power, at the risk of our
lives and fortunes, with arms, oppose the hostile proceedings of the
British fleets and armies against the United American

C o l o n i e s . "20

While die association test (administered in all the rebellious colonies)
was designed to expose those who opposed the revolution and make
them known to the committees of safety, thereby making it easier to
keep an eye on their activities, the test also served what was an even
more im portant function; it bound the populace to the rebellious
government in an oath of solemn importance. The effect was to put
all those who signed such a declaration clearly in rebellion against
British authority. There could be no mistake. The Association Test
dem anded of every adult male his complete obedience and
complicity in an armed rebellion against duly constituted authority,
it was in essence a declaration not only of independence but one of
treason as well. Should the rebellion fail, each and every signer
would be as guilty of treason as the leaders in Exeter. Rituals, such as
the Association Test oath signings, were the means for the rebel
20NHPP Vol. 8, p. 205.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146

communities to identify themselves.21 The public signing and
making of oaths not only identified for persecution the luke-warm
and the potential subversive, they identified those whose own
identity had evolved away from th at of British-American, and
become simply American, at least in the political sense. The
identifying nature of the ritual thus had a dual sense, forcing
members on both sides of those bi-polar communities around the
province to view themselves and each other in an "us and them"
manner, as insiders and outsiders, as good and e v il .22
By the beginning of June, 1776 the returns of the Association
Test began to arrive in Exeter, while at the same time the assembly
reconvened for a new session. Those results were heartening to the
rebels. Only seven hundred seventy-three refused to sign, while
8,199 men signed the oath. Of the former number, a portion were
Quakers. Those men generally refused to sign out of pacifist
sympathies and not because they did not support the aims of the
rebellion, only the means.23
At that point, the loyalists of New Hampshire ceased to be a
real threat to the rebel government. Their numbers were never
large, and the traditional leaders, the governor and his coterie of
21Daniel de Coppet, ed. Understanding Rituals. London: 1992. "Rituals are at the
core of the social identity of any community."
22For another discussion of ritual in society especially as part of the political
process of dissent and rebellion see EJ. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Studies
in Archaic Forms o f Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. New
York: 1963. pp. 150-153.
23NHPP vol. 8, pp. 204-296. See also Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire
and the Loyalist Experience." pp. 77-84 for an interesting analysis of the
returns.
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associates, had departed some time ago. Isolated resisters remained,
but the loyalist threat was really an imaginary one from June of
1776. Yet the idea of a loyalist threat performed a function still. By
continuing to ferret out so-called loyalists, the rebel government
kept the attention of the average citizen focused on the business at
hand. The rebels, through the constant vigilance of the local
committees of safety, maintained an iron grip on the speech and
assemblies of men in the countryside. The committees watched and
listened and acted on the whispered innuendos of anyone whose
grievance might or might not have been personally motivated.
Endemic from colony to colony and throughout the years of the
revolution, shortages of money affected all the rebel governments.
The rebels in New Hampshire spent an enormous amount of time in
their assembly deciding how much money to spend, how to spend it,
and who would keep track of the spending.24 Somewhat less time
was spent trying to figure out how to raise the money. The usual
means was an emission of paper bills based on the credit of the
government. But a government could only emit so much money
before public confidence would be shaken.
Added to the difficulties implicit in the issuance of a paper
currency at a time when there was little public faith in the very idea
of paper money, was the problem of counterfeiting. Before the era of
engraved printing plates with detailed etchings difficult to
reproduce, nearly any printer could replicate the currency of the

240pen volume eight of the NHPP series at almost any page concerned with
the Journal of the House and one or more examples will be immediately
apparent.
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time with relative ease. Added to that was the fact that much of
what appeared on the face of printed currency was hand written.
Well-worn bills could be altered by hand and passed, sometimes
more than once. With hard money in short supply and expenses
running very high for the recruitment and equipage of several
regiments requested by the Continental Congress, the rebel
government had every reason to fear and loathe counterfeiters.
Counterfeiting accusations were at the center of the trials of Robert
Fowle and Stephen Holland as well. Counterfeiting was an attack on
the entire society, was construed as treasonous, and was roundly and
publicly condemned as an act inimical to the people of a free colony.
By definition, most crimes became crimes not against particular
people, but against society.25 They were acts of an implacable enemy;
they were acts of loyalists.
But counterfeiting, like most other crimes against property,
could be quite lucrative, even on a small scale. It is more than likely
that most crimes attributed to loyalists, especially in the case of
counterfeiting, were actually the crimes of venal men attempting to
profit from the upheaval of the times. That was certainly true, as the
committee of safety of Hanover discovered, in the convoluted case of
Bezaleel Phelps. In March of 1776, Phelps was arrested on a warrant
issued by the committee on a charge of holding a bill altered from 3

25NHPP, vol. 8, p. 117. "persons not disposed to good order taking advantage of
our broken State, have already begun to commit outrages on the property of
others" Letter of the Committee of Safety of Hanover to the Assembly in
Exeter, asking for guidance as to their powers and bounds in the treatment of
criminal matters.
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shillings to 40 shillings. Someone must have reported that he had
such a note in his possession, and when asked for it, Phelps refused
to produce it. When brought in to trial before the committee, Phelps
pleaded not guilty.
After "a full hearing of evidences in said case, said Phelps
confessed." But Phelps confessed only to burning the note, not to
altering it o r even attempting to pass it himself. Phelps threw
himself on the mercy of the "court," and offered to name the author
of the altered note and tell where more could be found. Smelling a
conspiracy, the committee agreed to excuse Phelps from any penalty
except the payment of costs incurred to that point which came to 40
shillings.
Phelps asked that Lemuel Paine of Hanover, who was
apparently present at the hearing, produce a note which Paine had
obtained from Andrew Wheatley of Lebanon, another 40 shilling
note, which after examination turned out to have been altered also.
Paine swore he had received the note in good faith from Wheatley
the week before. On that note, the committee adjourned for the night
Before the committee could resume its examination of the
affair of the previous day, Charles Hill, an innkeeper from Lebanon,
was brought in, charged with passing an altered note in the amount
of 40 shillings. His accuser, Solomon Cushman of Norwich, alleged
that Hill had given him the note in payment for a silk handkerchief.
The committee determined that the bill had indeed been altered, but
Hill swore he knew nothing of the alteration and could not remember
from whom he had acquired the note himself. The committee decided
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that he was telling the truth, but ordered him to pay Cushman the
value of the bill, 40 shillings, and his costs.
Hill was then sworn as a witness in the previous d a y 's
investigation, and under oath testified that he had seen Andrew
Wheatley receive a bill from one Joseph Skinner, a soldier in Colonel
Bedel's regiment Both had been at Hill's inn on the night of the 15 th,
and Skinner had asked Wheatley for change in return for the 40
shilling note.
Bezaleel Phelps then resumed his story under oath and offered
that he had seen Andrew Wheatley give a 40 shilling bill to Lemuel
Paine, again to be changed. Phelps must have been acquainted with
Skinner, as he then added that he and Skinner then proceeded that
night to Dr Eager's, and that on the way Skinner told him (Phelps)
that the note which Wheatley had paid to Paine was his (Skinner's)
and that he "made it myself, and I have altered a good many bills
from three shillings to forty shillings

and a person may make his

fortune by it in a little time."
Phelps added details such as the fact that Skinner used a
certain book to cut pieces from to make the alterations and used
paste to secure them. He also testified that both he and Dr. Eager had
seen Skinner perform an alteration just that past Sunday.26
At that point the document ends, but we may surmise at least
part of the denouement. Phelps, and probably Dr. Eager, were
accomplices to some extent with Skinner. If Skinner was
apprehended, he would most likely have been sent to the assembly
26NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 115-116.
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for further trial, but no record of that seems available. Skinner
probably escaped, without his book which had been presented as
evidence, and perhaps Eager did as well. Phelps, by virtue of his
public confession, a most satisfying ritual, was probably reinstated
into the good graces of the community upon payment of some surety
for his continued good behavior, and the whole was re p o rte d
dutifully to the government in Exeter as another example of loyalist
attempts to subvert the liberties of a free people.
All of which points up the glaring deficit suffered by the colony
in the middle months of 1776. The dilemma is reported succinctly by
the Hanover committee: "we have seen no resolves of the Congress
relative to such cases, but imagined the necessity that immediate
measures should be taken to suppress such a disorder...."27 Caught as
they had been in the logistics of rebellion, the assembly had failed to
provide anything like laws for their new colony. Though early on the
assembly had passed a resolve to the effect that the existing laws of
the province should continue as before the rebellion had begun, such
a resolution was vague and fairly useless with the usual mechanics of
enforcement, the local magistracy, absent. The letter of the
committee of Hanover provokes an interesting question. As the
titular government of the town, should not its members have known
what to do and what was expected of them in such a situation?
Unless the committee was made up of men who, prior to the
rebellion, had not achieved the status and power in the community

27NHPP, vol. 8, p. 117.
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of those who had been serving in the magistracy. That is, the
committee must have been made up of new men, men who had not
previously served in office. The others, the office-holders of prerebellion days, must not have supported the committee system, and
therefore retired to the anonymity of their homes, or perhaps
departed for the British lines once the rebel faction had seized
control through the new apparatus of the committees of safety.
As it was, the assembly must have seen the Hanover situation
as one requiring some response. On June 12, only a week after the
new session began, the assembly assigned a committee to draft a set
of laws for the colony. The second of the fourteen suggested laws was
to be an act for the opening of the courts, while the fourth was to be
an act concerning counterfeiting.28 Adding to the need at hand, a
resolve of the Continental Congress arrived shortly thereafter,
strongly suggesting that each colony should pass a law providing for
the punishment of treason, and describing treason as the taking up of
arms against any colony, adhering to the King, or giving any sort of
aid and comfort to any such enemy. Counterfeiting was also to be
considered treason.29
The New Hampshire legislature spent the next twelve months
struggling to keep its soldiers paid and dealing with the problem of
internal dissent. The various town committees of safety continued to
arrest and examine a variety of suspects, many to be passed on to

28MZPP, vol. 8, pp. 142-43.
29NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 165-166.
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the assembly or the provincial committee of safety.30 The primary
motive for this continued vigilance was the suspicion of an imminent
invasion. Since the departure of Wentworth in August of 1775, the
rebels had expected an assault from the sea. But late in 1776 and
early in 1777 their concerned gaze shifted to the north. The first
inkling that anything was amiss from that quarter was the Asa
Porter affair.
In June of 1776 the rebel army was in retreat from Canada,
and as the authorities awaited some word from General Sullivan,
anxiety rose. The expectation was that an army of ravenous savages
would come pouring down out of Canada in hot pursuit of Sullivan.31
Even Ira Allen's letter of July 10, assuring the government at Exeter
that Sullivan was well and that his troops were still an effective
defense of the northern frontier, did little to assuage the fears of
those in Exeter.32 Then came the news of the alleged duplicity of
Colonel Asa Porter. Porter, prominent in the Coos district, was
accused of passing intelligence to the enemy in Canada. Further it
was alleged that he and some few accomplices planned to turn the
district over to the control of the British. A plan was laid to send a
party to Canada, and to request protection for the area from General
30Many more were dealt with at the local level. The usual procedure called for
the arrest and examination of the suspect, followed by the determination of
whether or not the accused was "unfriendly to the liberties of this country."
Upon being so pronounced the accused was generally made to pay a surety or
bond, often as high as £500, and usually confined to a specific locale, such as
his place of residence. See, for example, NHPP, vol. 8, p. 308, also p. 195.
31AfflPP, vol 8, pp. 298-299. Letter from John Hurd, Esq. 7 July, 1776. & Petition
from Conway, for assistance.
32NHPP, vol 8, p 300.
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Burgoyne. This seems to have been a direct result of a plan proposed
publicly by Jonathan Hale as reported by Colonel John Hurd. The
district was at the time full of rumors concerning a potential Indian
attack. There were no troops in the area, the only defenses being
hastily erected breastworks manned by the armed citizenry. Some
inhabitants, such as Hale, suggested that if the assembly in Exeter, or
the Massachusetts government, refused to send troops to defend the
sparsely settled frontier, perhaps a plea could be made to Burgoyne
to protect the district from marauding Indians. Hurd denied that
Indians had even been sighted in the region, but strongly urged the
assembly to send what troops it could and those with alacrity.33
Porter and his fellow conspirators were betrayed by Daniel
Hall, a husbandm an from Newbury. Hall testified th at he was
approached to join the conspiracy by David Weeks early in July. Hall
claimed that Weeks had taken him aside and said that he wished he
knew how Hall felt about the situation, and that he, Hall, had assured
Weeks of his sentiments toward Government. Hall then explained the
plan of sending a party to Burgoyne, and said that Hall would be a
member of the group. But over the course of the next few weeks, the
departure time was delayed repeatedly, waiting for news either from
Canada or New York. Hall further named Colonel Porter as a primary
mover of the plan, as well as Colonel Taplin. He also named others
involved.34 As a result of Hall's testimony, the whole band of plotters
was arrested by the committees of safety in Newbury and Haverhill,
33NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 306-307. Letter from Col. John Hurd.
34NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 329-330.
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and adjudged inimical to the country. The committees felt th at
Porter and his associates were too dangerous to remain in the Coos
district, and since the committees also felt they had no power to
punish men they considered to be traitors, had sentenced them all to
be conveyed to Exeter for further trial at the hands of the Provincial
Committee of Safety.35
Porter vehemently resisted being sent to Exeter. He filed a
nine-point objection to the legality of such a course. Porter argued
that it was inconsistent with the rights of a free people for the body
which makes the laws to "have the power of executing the laws, or
determining the cases of individuals. In the second point he stated
that "jurisdiction implies superiority of power" but that it was
"absurd" to construe that a legislative body could set itself up to try
the case or determine the punishment of "the persons of their
constituents whose servants they are, and to whom they are
accountable for their conduct." Porter also allowed that since courts
were at that point open for civil and criminal cases, he should be
tried in a normal court and with a jury, but that this change of venue
was being proposed in his case out of "personal prejudice." Porter
continued to argue that the legislature had not been delegated either
judicial or executive powers by the people, that the Coos was not
represented in Exeter, and that it would be a terrible hardship on
witnesses to journey to Exeter in such uncertain times, making his
defense impossible and the whole proceeding "equally oppressive
and burdensome with that adopted by the British Parliament so
35NHEP, vol. 8, pp. 325-327.
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much complained of in the late admiralty courts." Porter wrapped
up his argument by reminding the Assembly that there was at the
time no provincial law concerning the crime o r punishm ent of
treason. He further argued that the committee's insistence that he
could not be tried in a criminal court before a jury because of that
defect in the law was ludicrous since the committee's prescription to
right that wrong was to have him tried by the legislature which itself
ought to have made such a law. If it had, there would need be no
attem pt to deprive him of his right to a jury trial. As a final
statement, Porter offered to be "tried by the country, and if found by
the judgement of my peers to have done any act against this state,
which having been done against the former government would have
been determined treason by the municipal laws thereof, I am content
to incur the like penalty."36
The assembly chose to ignore Porter's objections and finally
heard his case themselves in early December. On the afternoon of
Tuesday December 10, the house voted that "the said Asa Porter
appears to be an enemy to the liberties of the United States of
America, and that as such, he ought to be confined."37 Two days later,
on December 12th a committee reported back to the full house the
design of Porter's confinement: Porter was to "be immediately taken
into custody & confined in the jail in Exeter, with liberty of the yard
of said jail, he giving bonds with two sufficient sureties to the
36NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 327-328. Objections to the Jurisdiction of the Assembly of
New Hampshire in his case. Porter was wagering his life on the wisdom of a
jury. The penalty for treason was a rather horrible death under English law.
37NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 413-414.
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Speaker of the House of Representatives in the sum of five hundred
pounds lawful money for the use of this state, that he abide and
remain a true prisoner, within the limits of said yard until further
order of the General Court or Committee of Safety of this state."38 By
December 23 Porter had escaped, if he had ever actually been
incarcerated.39 The House responded by offering a considerable
reward for his capture. That he was captured is certain, though when
is unsure. But at some point prior to June of 1777, Porter was
imprisoned for his alleged disaffection. On June 14, 1777 the house
considered a petition from Porter, requesting his freedom to depart
the state, and to reside with his father on his farm in Boxford,
Massachusetts. The House agreed, provided that Porter pay y et
another £500 bond and an additional sum for the expenses of
"apprehending and securing him the said Porter from the first to this
time."40 Porter was back in Haverhill by 1780, and at some point
returned to the good graces of his neighbors, enough so that he
served as one of the Justices for the Court of Common Pleas. He died
there in 1818 at the age of seventy-six.41
About the time Porter was finally disposed of, a letter was
intercepted, sent from Canada to Captain Benjamin Brooks o f
38NHPP, vol. 8, p. 416.
39NHPP, vol. 8, p. 436.
40MHPP, vol. 8, p. 585.
41Sabine, Sketches, vol. 2, p. 198. See also NH Claims, John Fisher, vol II, p. 593.
Porter deposed on behalf of the claim of John Fisher. By the time of the
claim, the war was over, and Porter deposed in such a way as to sound as if he
were a citizen of another country deposing for the benefit of a former
enemy.
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Claremont. The gist of the letter was that preparations were
underway for the long awaited invasion, and that the friends of
government (as the loyalists styled themselves) in New Hampshire
should be ready very soon since "I hope in six weeks we shall be
able to clear all our friends from bonds and imprisonment: for God's
sake let everything be carried on with secrecy and I doubt not
through the justness of our cause we shall overcome the damned
rebels."42
While its origin was in doubt, the import of the letter was not
lost on the rebel government. An invasion was imminent, and then,
more so than ever, the disaffected must be identified and dealt with
quickly. The process of identifying the enemy within had begun the
previous year with the Association Test. But simply signing the paper
would not command the allegiance of so devious and disingenuous an
enemy as a tory. The government was sure that many persons
remained uncommitted to the cause, so many that the house passed a
resolve in January of 1777 concerning "some inhabitants of this
state disaffected to the government thereof," and giving them leave
"to depart out of this state with their families and effects." The
resolve went a step further, allowing those who were leaving to sell
off their property, an action which was, by a previous act of the
house, forbidden to suspected loyalists. The only req u irem en t
imposed on those desiring to leave was that they inform the
selectmen of their town at least thirty days prior to their departure,

42JVHPP, vol. 8, p. 589.
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and that the information of their intent "be published three weeks
successively in the public newspapers of this state."43
To deal with those who chose not to depart and yet remained
unconverted, the house passed a law empowering any and all local
committees of safely to issue warrants for the arrest and detention
with or without trial, anyone suspected of loyalist sympathies.44 At
that point, a misspoken word could find an individual arrested,
detained, examined and sentenced by a local committee. Mere
suspicion of an act was enough to accomplish this, as in the case of
Robert Fowle. In April of 1777, Fowle was detained on suspicion of
counterfeiting. He agreed to testify not only in New Hampshire but in
neighboring states against everyone he knew of engaged in that
activity, in return for his own immunity from prosecution.45 Dozens
of others were rounded up on the flimsiest of evidence, and nearly
always found guilty of some degree of disaffection. Most of these
dissenters were confined to their farms or to their towns of
residence, and ordered to provide considerable sums for surety of
their good behavior. Some were sentenced to close imprisonment at
the various jails.46 The local committees were not infallible and on
occasion it appeared as though they may have erred. One such
occasion was the subject of a petition to the general court by one

43NHPP, vol. 8, p. 468. The last measure was designed to prevent departing
loyalists from absconding on their creditors.
**NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 592-593.
45NHPP, vol. 8, p. 545.
46NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 593-598.
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Hugh Tallant who was imprisoned by an order of the Committee of
Inspection of Nottingham West and Pelham. Believing him innocent
of the charges, the legislature ordered Tallant's release after
reviewing the evidence in the case, adding that "it appears to this
house that although the said committees in some measure exceeded
their power, yet what they did was with a good intent to preserve
the peace and good order of the state."47 Tallant was however
ordered to pay a bond of £200.
The policy of deputing enormous judicial and executive powers
to the local committees of safety had a dual motive. First, as
mentioned above, the level of invasion hysteria in the province was
rising steadily. There seemed little time remaining before Burgoyne
would descend upon the painfully unprotected northern frontier and
bring with him the iron hand of British despotism.
At the same time the rebel government was struggling with an
ever increasing dem and for funds. Aside from the constant
expenditures on the salaries and expenses of government (the
members of the revolutionary government did not work for free but
were compensated six shillings per day each and reimbursed for
travel and lodging expenses), an army had to be raised and paid, the
recruits demanding an ever-increasing inducement to enlist and go
off to fight.48 On October 16, 1776, the House received a resolution
47NHPP, vol. 8, p. 332.
48NHPP, vol. 8, infra, and esp. p. 550. New Hampshire paid its troops on a
monthly basis ranging from £2 per month to privates up to £6 per month for
a captain, and travel money at 2 pence per mile from their homes to the
headquarters of their unit. The members of the legislature received £9 per
month while in session plus expenses. The Committee of Safety, consisting of
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from the Continental Congress requiring the recruitment of another
three battalions for the continental service. Include in the resolve
was the promise of a twenty dollar enlistment bonus for each non
commissioned officer and enlisted man, as well as the offer of land
for each man who served until the end of the war or until discharged
by the Congress. The land would be provided by the United States,
but the expenses involved borne by the states.49
To meet the expenses of the war it was difficult if not
impossible to rely on taxes. Of the less than 900050 men in New
Hampshire between the ages of 16 and 60, a considerable number
were involved in the military on one level or another, and on one
side or the other. Farms were not as productive, business such as
importation and sale of goods was nearly non-existent,51 and most of
members of both houses, received their pay even when the legislature was
in adjournment and it was increased to seven shillings per day.
49JVHPP, vol. 8, pp. 349-350. The land grants offered were as follows:
colonel.................... 500 acres
It. colonel............... 450 acres
major...................... 400 acres
captain................... 300 acres
lieutenant.............. 200 acres
ensign.....................160 acres
non-commissioned officers
& soldiers............... 100 acres
S^Based on the number of signers and non-signers of the Association Test in
June 1776. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 204.
51NHPP, vol. 8, p.420.Letter of Meshech Weare to New Hampshire delegates in
Congress. The exception to the dearth of trade and trade goods was, according
to Weare, carried on by men who bought up "prize cargoes and
monopolizing them at any price seems to be the attention of the mercantile
part who have the money in their hands." The implications in Weare's letter
were ominous. The treasury of New Hampshire was quite empty and he was
reminding the delegates that the Congress owed money back to the state. But
he was also alluding to a class of men who were profiting handsomely from
the war and the conditions created by it, yet who seemed little concerned by
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the newly growing manufacturing capacity of the state was devoted
to war materials. The rebel government had to turn to alternative
means to finance its continued existence and ultimate success.
Toward that end the house repeatedly commissioned privateers to
search the waters round about for stray vessels belonging to the
enemy. But privateering was at best perilous and an unsure source of
income.52
Better, and by the first half of 1777, steadier, was the influx of
money derived from the arrest and judgement of suspected loyalists.
The sureties demanded by both local and state Committees of Safety
provided a considerable amount of money to the government’s
coffers. These sureties were required "for the use of the state" and no
appeal was available. But in the early spring another source of
income first entered the thoughts of the rebel government, and
before too long they would begin to exploit it with a vengeance.
Since the latter part of 1775 when the lumber ship Bochacheco
was condemned and sold with its cargo (see above), the rebels had
resisted the temptation of seizing the property of suspected loyalists.
On March 27, 1777 the legislature ordered an investigation into the
presence of goods in Dover belonging to James McMaster & Company.
McMaster, one of four brothers from Scotland engaged in th e
merchant business in New Hampshire and Boston since the 1760s,
was chased out of the province by a mob back in 1775. Nearly two
the fact that the government under which they were enriching themselves
desperately needed at least the use of the money they were making.
52NHPP, vol. 8, p. 346. To expedite the process of confiscation and division of
the spoils, the House created a Maritime Court in a resolution passed on
September 5, 1776.
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years later, the rebel government felt it was safe to move against the
goods left behind and ordered them sold off, the proceeds to be paid
into the state treasury.53 Because the problem of counterfeiting
showed no likelihood of abating, the House passed another law in
June of 1777 to prevent the conveyance of the property of anyone so
much as accused of the crime. The intent was that anyone whose
actions may have led to the harm of the economy or the credit of the
country should not be able to sell or otherwise convey their property
to avoid its loss should they be attainted.
At the same time the mood of the state was one of grave
concern. By early July reports of Burgoyne's advance from Canada
began to trouble the councils of the Exeter government, soon to be
followed by news of the fall of Ticonderoga. That and the reports of
the frantic retreat of the army from that neighborhood produced a
crisis of faith: could the rebels hold the northern frontier with only
militia? Letters poured from Exeter to the militia commanders of the
province, ordering the mustering of the militia and searches for
provisions, blankets, weapons, and especially kettles, as all cookware
had been abandoned to the enemy at Ticonderoga. By all
appearances, the British were moving southward and headed for the
Connecticut River. The supposition was that they would cross the
river near Hanover and then proceed down through New Hampshire
toward Boston. It was indeed Burgoyne's intention that the New
Hampshire men believe that such was the case. In his instructions to
Colonel Baum, Burgoyne outlined his plan of sending the diversionary

53NHPP, vol. 8, p. 524.
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column under that Hessian officer toward New Hampshire for two
purposes. First, Baum was to make it appear that the entire British
army was headed in that direction, causing the commanders of the
rebel forces in New York to relax their vigilance and to draw off
potential re in fo r ce m e n ts from New England. His second objective was
the accumulation of horses, cattle and wagons, with as much of a food
supply as could be had. Baum's orders were quite explicit, however,
that looting was to be avoided, and that receipts be issued for any
and all goods or livestock requisitioned.54 Baum's force consisted of a
regiment of Hessian dragoons, several detachments of provincials,
some force of regulars, and a body of Indians. On August 16, 1777
General John Stark with his regiment and a num ber of militia
companies from New Hampshire and New York found Baum and his
men encamped at Bennington well to the west of the Connecticut.
After a day long battle, those British not killed or fled were captured
as many as seven hundred prisoners were taken. The fighting was
especially fierce as the British breastworks were taken, since they
were

m an n e d

in part by loyalist troops who expected that death on

the field might be a better fate than that which they could expect
from their former neighbors.55
54NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 664-666. The copy of Baum's instructions was captured at the
battle of Bennington 8 /1 6 /7 7 .
55NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 670-671. Stark's victory at Bennington was significant. The
capture of Baum's instructions relieved the pressure on the rebels at Exeter,
armed with the knowledge that Burgoyne and the main British army were
pushing more directly south toward New York. The rebel victory was
disheartening for loyalists or others who might have been near to casting
their lots with the British, while it boosted morale considerably in the rebel
ranks following as it did the disastrous retreat from Ticonderoga. The Battle
of Bennington was also the only action fought during the war on what could
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Once the immediate concern of outright invasion was abated,
and reinforcements dispatched, the rebel government turned its
attention back to finances. One particularly distressing development
in the state was the tendency for certain men to purchase large
quantities of catde and sheep and then drive them out of the state.
The government was unsure where the livestock were going, but
they suspected strongly that much of the trade was being carried on
outside the state and with the enemy, who were paying hard
currency for cattle. To prevent the practice from continuing, the
legislature passed an act on September 26th forbidding the export of
cattle or sheep without written proof that the livestock in question
were destined either for the Continental forces or for a proper
consignee in some other neighboring state. The local committees and
magistrates were empowered by this act to stop and question anyone
observed driving a quantity of livestock into or through any town,
and if satisfactory proof was unavailable in a reasonable period of
time, the questionable animals were to be forfeited and sold. The
profits of the sale of such seized animals were to be paid in to the
state, less expenses of the locals involved.56 The house also acted to
end another disturbing practice. Public confidence was shaken in the
value of paper money. Inflation was becoming a severe problem due
as much to a crisis in public confidence as to the enormous quantities
even vaguely claimed to be New Hampshire soil, the controversy over the
New Hampshire Grants not yet having been settled. See also Clarence E.
Bennett, Advance and Retreat to Saratoga in the American Revolution.
reprint Boston: 1972. pp. 35-37, and Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels,
The American Revolution Through British Eyes. New York: 1990. pp. 143-147.
56NHPP, vol. 8, p. 696.
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of state and continental paper in circulation. Added to that of course
was the concern that some bills at least were surely counterfeit, and
it was no wonder that many merchants refused to accept payment in
paper, but rather demanded hard money. The act of September 26,
1777, forbade that practice and also forbade "exchanging a larger
sum of paper money for a lesser sum in gold or silver."57
Just under three weeks later, on October 16, 1777, Burgoyne
surrendered to General Gates at Saratoga, New York. Taken prisoner
with Burgoyne were a number of loyalists, among them Simon Baxter
of Alstead. Though the rebels at Exeter had no way of knowing it
then, the war in the north was effectively over, and the
repercussions of the British loss that fateful day would reverberate
until the final loss of Cornwallis' command at Yorktown.
The rebel government was encouraged by the defeat of
Burgoyne. The legislature proclaimed a day of thanksgiving, just as
they had proclaimed a day of fasting, prayer, and humiliation prior
to the fateful battle when it seemed the survival of the state was
doubtful. The ritual observance of such days was a survival of earlier
times, a way of involving the entire community in the effort and a
way of asking the intercession of the Supreme Being, in whom most
of the population believed and trusted. A new confidence infused the
rebel leadership as the threat of invasion receded and the possibility
of success in the endeavor of independence seemed real.58 The
57NHPP, vo l 8, p. 696.
580ne sign of this new confidence came in March 1778 when the House voted
to dismiss the cadre of guards it had assigned to the jail at Exeter. The summer
before, the government had appointed an officer, Colonel David Gilman, and
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confidence they felt was translated into action by the passage of a
new act to punish those who had broken faith with the new order. On
November 28, 1777, the House passed an act which prevented the
"transfer or conveyance of the estates and property of all such
persons who have been apprehended upon suspicion of being guilty
of treason, misprision of treason, or other inimical practices,

and

also for securing all lands within this state as well as of such persons
as have traitorously deserted or may have gone over to or in any
way or manner joined our enemies, as of those who belong to or
reside in Great Britain."59 The intent of the act was to freeze the
assets of any and all loyalists, whether still residing within the state
or not. Such an act prevented the absent loyalists from selling their
own property in absentia, or conveying it to relatives who might still
remain in residence. The majority of the prominent loyalists having
left the province by this point in the war, could no longer predict a
British victory with anything resembling confidence. As Saratoga had
breathed new life into the rebel cause, it had dashed the hopes of the
loyalists of New England that they might again enjoy their homes and
property in peace again. Consequently, they might have moved to
reap what little they could of the profits from their lands and goods
still in the state or at least transfer the property to relatives who
remained there. Even at that date the leaders of the triumphant

sixteen men to guard the jail around the clock. The jail at that time was full of
suspected loyalists and other miscreants, and the government feared their
escape to do mischief in the town or to join the forces of the invading enemy.
59NHPP, vol. 8, p. 721.
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faction had already conceived of the next major step they would
take, the wholesale confiscation of loyalist land and property.
Despite the resounding success of Saratoga, the fact re m a in e d
that the rebels of the American continent still faced the might of
what many have called the most powerful nation in the world of that
time. The losses of Burgoyne at Saratoga amounted to very little
compared to the numbers Great Britain could field. The expense of
running a war continued unabated after October 1777 while the
difficulties of raising sufficient funds remained equally consistent.
Nevertheless it was considered possible for the rebel leaders to vote
for a significant increase in their pay, doubling their per diem from 6
to 12 shillings, and their travel expenses from 2 to 4 pence per mile.
The members of the Committee of Safety gained 2 more shillings per
day, rising to 14 shillings.
At the same time the legislature received a resolution from the
Continental Congress informing them of the need for a new tax, the
raising of five million dollars in the coming year of 1778. New
Hampshire's portion was to be $ 200,000, to be raise by taxing the
inhabitants who had until then not been asked to contribute in that
way to the continental effort.60 To ameliorate the effects of this tax,
the Congress recommended a number of measures designed to
improve the economy of the country and the prosperity of its people.
Congress suggested the implementation of laws regulating the costs
of goods and wages, as well as laws to prevent usury, forestalling,
engrossing, and other activities pernicious to the welfare of the

6°NHPP, vol 8, pp. 728-734.
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people. Finally at the end of the document Congress "earnestly
recommended to the several states as soon as may be to confiscate
and make sale of all the real and personal estate therein, of such of
their inhabitants and other persons, who have forfeited the same, and
the right to the protection of their respective states."
The Exeter government spent much of 1778 on internal
matters of extreme political significance. Their first priority was the
calling of a convention of representatives from any and every town
and village which desired to participate. The purpose of the
convention was the creation of a new and permanent form for the
government of the state. The immediate cause for such a move was
not necessarily the sudden belief that independence was at hand, but
rather the fact that a considerable segment in the state was refusing
to participate within the existing framework of government.
Beginning in November of 1776, a number of towns in the northern
region centered around Hanover protested the form of the
government, calling it unconstitutional because it did not afford
every incorporated town representation and that it required a
considerable property qualification for election. Twenty-two towns in
the northern district bound together and refused to reply to the
assembly by sending representatives or even holding the elections
under the current laws.61 In January of 1777 the legislature
authorized the printing of a description of the form of government as
it existed, and its dissemination around the state, but especially to

61NHPP, vol 8, pp. 421-426. The majority of those towns continued to refuse
their participation by sending no representative to Exeter at least until the
fourth session of 1778.
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the people of Grafton County where the majority of the disaffection
resided. Additionally, a committee was appointed to deliver the
printed documents to assemblies in the recalcitrant towns and to
explain the governmental plan as well as the fact that the structure
was temporary, to last only until the war cooled down and more time
could be spared to create a better plan. In February of 1778, it
seemed that the time was at hand and the legislature voted to call a
convention for June toward the creation of a new and permanent
plan of government.62 At the same time the existing government
chose to vote its ratification of the Articles of Confederation
submitted by the Continental Congress for ratification some weeks
earlier. With such weighty matters to consume its time it should be
no wonder that it took until November for the assembly to conceive
of and pass the laws recommended by the Continental Congress the
year before.
The Act of Proscription and Banishment came first. Passed on
November 19, 1778, that act listed seventy-six specific men by name
"and all other persons who have left or shall leave this state or any
other of the United States of America as aforesaid, and have joined or
shall join the enemies thereof." Those nam ed and those left
purposely anonymous63 were forbidden to return to the state for any
reason without the express permission of the government. Were they
to do so, the entire apparatus of government was deputed to arrest
62The convention was apparently not held since in 1781 another vote
authorized the calling of another convention for June of that year.
63The act also attainted anyone who took up arms against the country, or in
any way aided the enemy, without naming individuals.
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and confine them, and to see that they were immediately removed
from the territory of the state. Anyone who persisted and returned
again, was liable to be executed. Anyone who conveyed such a
person to the state or who harbored one of the proscribed
individuals was liable to be fined £500, half to the state and half to
the diligent individual who discovered the crime and sued to bring it
to light. The act further decreed that the list for the state of New
Hampshire was to be circulated among the other states, and that lists
of a similar nature were to be solicited from the other states as well.
On November 28 another act was passed confiscating the real and
personal property of twenty-eight men by name. Committees were
established in each of the counties whose role it was to secure and
amass an inventory of all of that property, and then to sell the
personal property at public auction and account for the money to the
state.64
In April 1781 another act was passed for the confiscation and
sale of all property belonging to any absentee from the state. By that
time too, the estates of John Wentworth and Stephen Holland, at
least, were sold.65 The material ties which bound the loyalists to
their homes were severed by these acts. None of the men of
substance was able to return to New Hampshire and few of the
64M£PP, vol. 8, pp. 810-814. Both acts appear in their entirety.
65The sale of Wentworth's personal property began on March 18, 1779. It
would seem that the real estate and the remainder of his personal goods were
still being sold as of June 1780. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 861. Stephen Holland's entire
estate including land was sold as of April 1781. ibid. p. 899. The journals of the
General Assembly and Council as printed in the state papers series begin to
be a bit sketchy after 1778. The amount of detail found after that year is
considerably less.
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loyalists listed in the Act of Proscription tried. Of those, only Robert
Fowle, listed as Fowler in the act, returned to live out his life in
America. Few of the men listed were able to regain anything like
their previous level of wealth and influence. John Wentworth
eventually became governor of Nova Scotia, but lost hundreds of
thousands of acres of property in New Hampshire, the value of which
he could not recover, even considering the claims process. Under the
terms of the claims commission, unimproved land was not eligible for
compensation. John Fisher, Wentworth's brother-in-law, became
under Secretary of State in 1781. Few others fared anywhere near as
well.
The acts of the rebel government banishing the loyalists and
then confiscating all that they had worked for prior to the war, acted
also to dissolve the bonds between the exiles and their homeland.
Gone were the fields they had walked and worked. Gone were the
homes where they had raised their children or planned to do so.
Their businesses, livestock, furniture, household goods, every
personal item left behind was now sold to strangers for the
aggrandizement of a government the absentees held in contempt as
base usurpers of rightful power and legitimate government.66
Nearly as hurtful as the loss of their property was the feeling
endemic among the loyalist claimants that the property was sold not
only to their detriment but also to the good of a few among the
66In an act of kindness the House voted in April 1780 to allow Captain Samuel
Gilman, the trustee appointed to dispose of Wentworth's estate, to deliver
John Wentworth's furniture from his Portsmouth residence and the family
pictures from the Wolfeborough estate to the former governor's father, Mark
Hunking Wentworth. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 857.
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rebels who were in a position to profit greatly from acquisition of
condemned estates. Stephen Holland, for example, contended in his
memorial that "the sale of part of the memorialists' estates made in
pursuance of the act of confiscation was only by way of form for the
purpose of conveying them as a reward to persons who were active
in the American cause, as nobody would bid upon them when they
offered to become purchasers."67 Holland's wife had been evicted
from his home by a party of armed men in May of 1779. He further
argued that Robert Smith who was the trustee for the most part of
his confiscated estate had sold a great deal of property to Smith's
relations for far less than the market value of the property in
question, and then absconded without making a proper return to the
state.68
Edward Goldstone Lutwyche added that the trustees charged
with selling his confiscated property in 1778 "appear to act like a
parcel of robbers dividing their booty, in which each endeavors to
keep the appearance of fairness and get as large a share as possible."
Much of Lutwyche's property was distributed prior to sale to an
enormous num ber of claimants who claimed that he owed them
debts prior. Lutwyche argued that those debts had already been

67NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, p. 782. Holland's contention may well be
true. According to a letter to the Assembly dated April 16, 1781, the entire
estate of land in Londonderry was sold to Colonel George Reed for $46,500.00.
While the value of the land was estimated at $35,933.00, and it would seem
Reed overpaid for the price, he also held notes from the state which more
than equalled the consideration he was giving for the property. In effect he
was offering to pay the state for the land with its own more or less worthless
paper. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 899.
68NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, pp. 931-932.
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handled, that the claims were spurious, and added, "this kind of
conduct in taking advantage of the absent loyalist is he presumes
nothing new to the Commissioners, as in the course of their
investigation many instances must have occurred."69
Certainly the commissioners suspected that some fraud was
attendant upon the sales of confiscated property. After the peace was
signed in 1783 one of the commissioners, John Anstey, toured the
former colonies in an effort to assess the actual losses of the
memorialists. One of his goals was to procure a copy of the laws of
the state for the use of the commission in determining the impact on
the loyalist claims. This he could not accomplish, much to his
surprise, "although there are not less than four several printing
offices in the state of New Hampshire." The only complete set of laws
was in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court, and that Anstey
was allowed to read. Based on his investigations, Anstey concluded
that "the laws such as they may be, are reported to have been most
shamefully executed, and to have served the purposes of fraud and
peculation."70
Firmly in control of the province after 1778, the rebel
government created the identity of "tory" and imposed it on the
absent loyalists as well as those who remained behind striving to five
out the storm quietly. In response to circumstances, particularly a
69Nff Claims, Edward Lutwyche, vol. HI, pp. 1066-1068. A considerable number
of other loyalists contended in similar terms that their property had been
conveyed in such a way as to benefit a only few members of the rebel elite.
70NH Claims, John Anstey, "Upon the Subject of Confiscation" Unpublished
report to the Commission, from the introductory portion of the loyalist claims
Vol. I, pp. 99-102.
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shortage of funds, the government determined that all absentees
were traitors and no longer entitled to the protection of the law. By
extension, anyone who refused to join the rebellion was suspect, and
the Continental Congress extended the reach of that suspicion to the
pacifist minority, particularly Quakers.71 Once absentees had been
labelled traitors, it took no great leap of imagination or logic to arrive
at the conclusion that they never again ought to enjoy the property
they had abandoned, and that the monies derived from the
confiscation and sale of the property of traitors could be used to
further insure that the liberties of the people would be protected.
The confiscation and sale of loyalist property became, in the minds of
the rebel faction and the population in general, the just reward for
traitors. In the minds of the exiles, the loss of their property acted to
exacerbate the sense of loss they already experienced, by being
forced to leave their homes and sometimes families by their support
of what they viewed as the legitimate government of the province.
Thus law in New Hampshire transform ed those who viewed
themselves as "loyalist sufferers" into "enemies of the liberties of the
people" in the eyes of their former neighbors.
A few loyalists attempted to reclaim their property through
legal channels after the war ended. In October 1785 George Meserve
filed a petition which argued that he had been banished and his
property confiscated "without trial," and that he had been
"condemned unheard." Meserve had left in 1775, and so he alleged

71NHPP, vol. 8, p. 673. There is little evidence of persecution of Quakers in New
Hampshire itself, beyond the intrusion of committee members into the
archives of the society.
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that he had departed while New Hampshire was still a province,
"while she acknowledged her dependence on Great Britain and
consequently prior to the existence of the United States....He
conceives his departure at that period could be no offence to the
United States, and that he could not justly incur any forfeiture of his
estate on that account." Despite the ingenuity of his petition,
Meserve's action was read and summarily dismissed.72 John Stinson
of Dunbarton was not as creative. After the war he returned to New
Hampshire to personally recover his property if he could. But
pursuant to the Act of 1778 he found himself arrested and held for
trial as a traitor. His memorial, written in his absence by Stephen
Holland leaves no clue as to his fate, though he was awarded £190 in
compensation, the exact amount he had requested.73
The laws enacted by the rebel government were designed to
ostracize the loyalists, to put them outside the law, to exclude them
from the community to which they had belonged. The loyalists
themselves rarely expressed similar sentiments. The absentees
retained for a long time as many ties with their former communities
as distance and the situation allowed. They responded to their exile
by holding to a belief that their former estate might be restored
almost to the bitter end when they began to feel to some degree
betrayed even by the government of Great Britain, for which they
had sacrificed their all. By the end of the war, the rebels had
characterized the loyalists as traitors, put them outside the law, and
72NH Claims, George Meserve, Vol. Ill, pp. 1365-1366.
73M/ Claims, John Stinson, Vol. IV, pp. 1753-1778.
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wiped away the physical and material traces of their very existence
by seizing and selling their real and personal property. Those who
had remained in the province quiet and unobtrusive were allowed to
do so only on their good behavior, and often with heavy bonds paid
to the committees or the legislature. In a sense those loyalists paid
heavily for the privilege of watching their former situation die and
change from within.
A community tom asunder by civil war experiences many
difficulties. Once the loyalists had proclaimed their identities
publicly, their participation in the normal routine of provincial life
became impossible. This was especially true for men of prominence,
and even more so for those who chose to depart the community early
in the war. To compound the problem of a self-proclaimed loyalist,
the rebel faction acted to create its own definition of the loyalist and
promulgate that identity to the populace as a whole. The result was a
period in which conflicting identities, conflicting realities, vied for
popular acceptance. Eventually the rebel conception of the loyalist
identity won out and became the truth accepted by most Americans
to the present time. With the Act of Proscription, the rebel
government attempted to identify specific individuals named in the
act as loyalist traitors. They further tried to encompass any number
of others within that definition by association, if those unnamed
individuals could be shown to have somehow aided or abetted the
enemy. The Act of Confiscation deprived the specifically identified
loyalists of their property for the use of the state. It seemed to the
government, and to the people, that such an act was justified.
Traitors had no right to expect the state which they had betrayed
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owed them the protection of their rights to property, and besides the
need was great. But during the war, even after the threat of military
action was lifted from the minds of the people of New Hampshire,
they were forced to grapple with the question of the loyalist identity.
There could be no question: John Wentworth was a loyalist by
any definition imaginable; Wentworth had adhered to the
government of which he was a representative as the royal governor
of a crown province. Upon leaving his post he had immediately taken
up arms against the land of his nativity and before the end of the
conflict he had assumed a new position in Nova Scotia. Wentworth
had the distinction of the preeminent place in both of the Acts of
1778, and his enormous estate was indeed confiscated and sold. It
would seem from that there could be no mystery, no doubt regarding
the disposition of such loyalist property. But in 1780 the court and to
some extent the people were forced to confront again the idea of the
loyalist as a member of their community and to grapple with
questions concerning evidence, justice, and the rights of testators
dead long before politics could interfere with the devising of their
wills. The following story illustrates such questions well, and asks the
reader to consider questions of evidence, both in the juridical sense
and in the historical sense. I have provided as much detail as
possible to allow readers to reach their own conclusions.
In 1771 Thomas Packer, Sr. died leaving a widow and a son
and a will. The widow was the aunt of the then governor, John
Wentworth, and Packer provided for her quite adequately. The son,
Thomas Packer, Jr., was by all accounts (save his own) somewhat
estranged from his father. The senior Packer was a man of the most
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strict moral character and integrity, while Thomas Jr. was known for
his reckless, if not licentious, behavior. The senior Packer left his son
life estate in a farm of sufficient income to support himself and a
family in reasonable comfort, though the property was to revert to
the estate at the younger Packer's death. The bulk of Packer's
considerable fortune was left to his nephew on his wife's side, John
Wentworth. The will was probated, and proven in July of 1771.
Wentworth, as executor, disposed of the estate in the manner of the
will's instructions, and that was the end of the matter. At the time,
no questions were raised by any party to the affair.
In 1775, John Wentworth departed from New Hampshire for
the last time, though he probably did not think so when he left. But
as the rebellion progressed and the tide began to turn badly for the
British side, it certainly seemed as though Wentworth would not be
back. In 1778 Wentworth's entire estate was confiscated and he was
attainted a traitor, barred from ever returning to the state. Seven
years had passed since Thomas Packer's will had been proven, and
three had elapsed since the governor had left. Still, no question was
raised concerning the legality of Packer's will. Late in 1779, a year
after the property in question had been consigned to a trustee for
the state, Samuel Gilman, Thomas Packer, Jr. decided to contest his
father's will. But the law did not provide for the appeal of a dead
probate judge's ruling eight years later. The appeal should have been
made at the time the will was proven, or immediately thereafter, but
as Packer suggested, such an appeal would have been to the then
governor and his council, the executor of the will in question, and its
major beneficiary.
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To facilitate his appeal, Packer needed a resolution of the
legislature allowing him to appeal the decision of the probate judge
under these extraordinary circumstances and to determine a venue
for that appeal. Packer approached John Langdon, then the speaker
of the house, and sold Langdon a parcel of land.74 A short time later,
the bill Packer needed was proposed and passed through both houses
of the legislature. Packer would be allowed to appeal, and his venue
would be the Superior Court of Judicature. That court's decision
would be final.75 Subsequently, on the first Tuesday of March, 1780,
the trial began. Over the ensuing court sessions spanning the next
thirteen months, an engrossing story emerges.
On a spring day in 1771, Jacob Sheafe stood in the doorway of
his shop in Portsmouth. Perhaps he was sweeping his entryway, or
perhaps it was one of those invigorating spring days when the wind
still carries just a bit of the crispness of winter, but the sun promises
the warmth of the coming summer and it is just so difficult to stay

74JVH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2199. John Wentworth, Jr. wrote a
supplemental memorial while his uncle was serving in Nova Scotia. In it he
claims specifically that John Langdon was acting in collusion with Packer,
Jr. Wentworth has no real proof but he argues that a land transaction
between Packer and Langdon took place prior to Packer's bill being
introduced, and that Langdon used his interest as a leading light of the rebel
faction and as speaker of the assembly, to slide Packer's bill through both
houses. This whole question seems to have been raised because the
Commission thought that Wentworth was not entitled to compensation for
land that was not his. The Wentworths were arguing in this supplemental
memorial that the land was indeed his, that it was confiscated like all the rest
of his property, and that he was not the defendant in that trial which took
place in 1780. By virtue of his attainder, Wentworth was precluded from
defending himself, even by attorney. Indeed the only minimal defense
which took place was mounted by the state's trustee, Samuel Gilman, and his
attorney John Pickering.
75NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2195-2246.
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inside a stuffy, dark store. So Sheafe happened to be standing there
in his doorway when along walked Doctor Hall Jackson. Hall Jackson
was the son of the aging Doctor Clement Jackson, and with his father
was in attendance on Thomas Packer, Sr. Sheafe did not mention how
he knew Hall Jackson, or for that matter how he knew Thomas
Packer, Sr., but Portsmouth was not a large city and it seems likely
that many inhabitants traded at Mr Sheafe's store and thereby he
would become familiar with them and their doings. Some nine years
later, Jacob Sheafe remembered that it was just a day or two before
the senior Packer's death that Hall Jackson had walked up to him on
that fine spring day and told him that "Packer was almost gone and
had almost lost his reason, that he had made no will, neither was
capable of it."76 Those were interesting comments coming from a
man who would swear as a witness to the legality of a will in just a
few weeks.
A day or so later, a group of friends were gathered at the home
of the dying Thomas Packer, Sr. Packer's friend and physician, Dr.
Clement Jackson was there, as was Jackson's son, Hall, also acting as
one of Packer's doctors. Packer's close old friend Clement March was
also present. On hand too were William Parker, the sick man's
attorney, and surprisingly, Thomas Packer, Jr. That the son should be
in attendance at the deathbed of his father is surprising because they
had not gotten along for some years past. Witnesses would recall that

76JVHClaims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2234. Deposition of Jacob Sheafe.
Wentworth was able to acquire copies of the entire case, eleven documents in
all. He also obtained a copy of the act of the legislature allowing the case to
be brought.
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Packer had not visited his father for nearly eight years, nor had the
father visited him. As a deponent would state, the younger Packer
was "a man of most dissolute life and morals, reputed always a
drunken, worthless man, with three sometimes four women of bad
fame living with him."77
According to witnesses, the dying Packer had asked William
Parker to attend him that day in order that he might write a new
will. Packer and his attorney were closeted for some hours, alone,
and then Parker left for the evening, saying "that Mr. Packer had cut
him out a large job, which would take him all night, and that he must
write the will at home."78 Early the next morning Packer Sr. was
agitated because his attorney had failed so far to return with his new
will. Packer asked his friend and physician Clement Hall to go to
Parker and ascertain the status of that document. Hall did so and
found that Parker "had not wrote the will or any part of it." Parker
had been told of the urgency the night before as he left the dying
man's house, but apparently had disregarded the doctor's warning
that "if he did not finish the will that night it was probable Mr
Packer would be incapable of making one in the morning."79

77M f Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2202. Deposition of Stephen little, May
28, 1789. little was deposing on behalf of Wentworth's claim to the land as
compensable. He was at Packer's house the day the old man died, probably in
company of the governor who had gone to visit his uncle. little was a close
associate of Wentworth's, and a physician as well.
78NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2210. Testimony of Dr. Clement
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
79M f Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2211. Testimony of Dr. Clement
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
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Parker arrived at his client's house in the middle of the
morning and went straight in to see Packer. At around noon, Clement
Jackson, Hall Jackson, and Clement March were asked into the room
to witness the making of the will. It was on this crucial moment that
the case brought by Thomas Packer to break his father's will turned.
Thomas Packer, Sr. was hours from death. All of the witnesses could
agree that he seemed weak and out of breath. When asked, Clement
Jackson recalled that in the middle of that afternoon, three hours or
so after making his will, the old man died. The attorney for the
appellant asked: "From the time Mr. Parker last came to the time of
Mr. Packer's death, do you apprehend his strength of body and mind
were such as would enable him to direct how to make a will?"
Jackson answered: "His strength was exhausted and his breath so
short that he certainly could not give directions how to make a long
will." The attorney pressed his point and asked if Packer in his
current state could have remembered all the details of his estate and
Jackson replied that he was out of the room for some time but at the
moment at which the will was executed, no, Packer did not have the
faculties to do so. Then Jackson was asked if the will had been read
to the deceased, and Jackson replied that he did not know. If it had
been read to him, the attorney continued, could he have understood
it? Jackson replied "No, not at the time it was executed."
John Pickering then took up the questioning on behalf of
Samuel Gilman, trustee for the state. "When you saw Mr. Packer the
day before he died, do you think he was then capable of making a
will?" Jackson: "I think he was, I saw nothing to the contrary."
Pickering: "Do you think at any time on the day of his death he was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

capable of making such a will as Mr. Parker said he had directions to
write the night before?" Jackson: "I do not think he had strength to
do it, I did not see that his understanding was impaired." Pickering:
"Had Mr. Parker wrote such a will as you understood he was
directed, and read it to Mr. Packer the morning of his death when
Mr. Parker came, was he capable of understanding it?" Jackson: "I
believe he was, I saw nothing to the contrary."
The other attorney spoke up: "Had Mr. Packer strength to sign
his name?" Jackson: "No, not so as for any person to read it." "How
was his utterance?" Jackson: "A litde stammering, owing to shortness
of breath." "How did his name appear after he attempted to sign it?"
"Not legible by any means." "Did Mr. Parker tell Mr. Packer to make
his mark to the will instead of writing his name?" "Yes, Mr. Parker
said Mr. Packer's mark would be sufficient." "What did you hear Mr.
Packer then say? "Mr. Packer said 'I had begun and I will finish.'"
"Did you hear Mr. Packer declare the writing he signed and you
witnessed to be his last will and testament?" "Yes." "Did Mr. Packer
appear to have his senses when he signed the will?" "He had not lost
his senses but his strength was impaired and he was in great
measure incapable of reasoning upon anything in my opinion." "Did
Mr. Packer appear to know people when he signed the will?" "For
anything I know he did." Jackson then admitted that after he swore
the oath before the probate judge attesting to Packer's being of
sound mind at the time the will was executed "but when I heard the
form and afterwards reflected on it, it made me shudder, and had
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any person interrogated me I should have explained myself as I now
have done."80
The next witness was Hall Jackson, son of the previous witness,
and a close personal friend of Thomas Packer, Jr. He too attended the
dying Packer and his recollection of the events of those two days was
similar to that of his father up to the point of the execution of the
will. There the accounts diverged, Hall Jackson adding that "He found
Mr. Packer's strength so far exhausted, and his speech had so much
failed him that it was impossible for him to make such a will as he
purposed the night before, that he therefore h ad advised him
[Parker] to sum up all in one general head and leave it to his
executor who he said no doubt knew his mind and would do the
same things Mr. Packer would direct was he capable of doing it."
Jackson gave the same account of the signing of the wiU as had his
father, but continued his tale: "At this time Mr. Packer was perfectly
sensible so far as it related to objects that immediately presented
before him: he knew his friends, he knew he was dying, he knew he
was signing and publishing a will, but that he was capable of
dictating a sentence or of comprehending the sense or reason of a
sentence if read to him, or of scrutinizing into the propriety of any
matter that be done in a will he [Jackson] solemnly declares that it is
his opinion that he [Packer] was not." Jackson here introduced the
idea that perhaps the will was not written as Packer had intended it
to be, and that the dying man could not have known it if it were not

&°NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2214-2216. Testimony of Dr. Clement
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
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as he wished. The younger Dr. Jackson also added that he had
avoided attending the proving of the will for as long as possible, and
that when the oath was administered, that he had taken down his
hand and not sworn to the condition of the testator. Neither, did he
think, had the other witnesses.81
Jackson was asked about a Mr. Peirce who had come to him in
Packer's garden after the execution of the will, and alleges that he
related the entire story to Peirce. Peirce apparently testified that
Jackson had told him that all of the witnesses were agreed that
Packer was of sound mind when disposing his will, but Jackson did
"not particularly recollect it."82 Jackson also related the arrival of
John Wentworth at Packer's deathbed, and admitted that Packer was
very happy to see his nephew. The two were left alone a short while
and then Wentworth called the rest of the company into the room,
where they waited, and shortly afterward Packer had died.
The two Doctors Jackson were the only witnesses

r em a in in g

to

the execution of Packer's will. William Parker had died in the
meantime, as had Clement March. One of Packer Jr.'s witnesses, a
Noah Emery of Exeter, claimed to have been at Mr. Parker's the
morning of Packer's death, and testified to the comments of Dr.
Clement Jackson as to the extremely poor state of Packer's health and
faculties. But Emery was most damaging when he claimed to have
been taken aside by Clement March just before he [March] died, and
81Mf Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2217-2222. Testimony of Dr. Hall
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
82Peirce's testimony was not included in the papers that the clerk of the court
supplied to Wentworth.
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told that March too had doubted the capacity of his old friend Packer
to make his will, and that he too had taken down his hand when the
oath was sworn before the probate judge.83
The appellant obtained another deposition from Josiah Gilman
of Exeter, who claimed to have been at Clement March's house one
day in 1774 and to have discussed the will with March at that time.
Gilman deposed that March told him "that he was a witness to it, but
said he thought him [Packer] in no capacity to make a will, for they
could hardly keep him awake to sign it, and further said it was not
Mr. Packer's will and he did not think Mr. Packer knew what was in
it."84 Adding to that line of argument was Henry Dearborn. Dearborn
deposed that he had been living with Hall Jackson at the time of
Packer's death, and that he had heard Jackson say again and again
that "he did not think Mr Packer knew what the will was that he
signed a short time before he died, adding that he [Jackson] thought
Mr. Packer was struck by death before he signed said will, and was
too far gone to be in a proper capacity to execute a will. Said
Jackson," concluded Dearborn, "often intimated that he thought said
will was rather a will of some other person or persons than of Mr.
Packer."85

83NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2227-2229. Deposition of Noah
Emery, 5 April, 1781.
84Nff Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2230. Deposition of Josiah Gilman, 5
April, 1781.
85NETClaims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2232. Deposition of Henry Dearborn, 5
April, 1781.
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Dearborn, Gilman, and Emery were all close friends of the
appellant, and all related having heard things from men who were no
longer alive to testify themselves. For good measure Packer, Jr. called
upon Elizabeth Salter, the daughter of Clement March, and Mary
Jackson, the wife of Hall Jackson for further evidence. In her
deposition Salter could only say that Thomas Packer, Jr. had visited
her father shortly before her father's death, and that after Packer
had left, her father had said that Packer could have his father's will
broken before he [March] and Clement Jackson died. But then Salter
added "or words to that effect." Perhaps Elizabeth Salter was
mistaken, perhaps she could not remember her father's exact words,
perhaps he said that Packer could not break the will until after
March and Clement Jackson died.86 Mary Jackson corroborated her
husband's story but embellished it just a bit saying "I heard my
husband say unto his father the said Clement Jackson, do you think
that if Mr. Parker had been bad enough to have made an instrument
to have conveyed all Colonel Packer's estate to him the said Parker,
whether the said Packer would not have as readily signed it as the
other, he answered, Yes."87
Thomas Packer, Jr.'s strategy should be apparent. He first called
as witnesses the two remaining eye-witnesses to the execution of the
will. Hall Jackson was his intimate friend, according to Stephen Little
who was also a physician in Portsmouth at the time of Packer's
86NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2234-2235. Deposition of Elizabeth
Salter.
87M f Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2235-2236. Deposition of Mary
Jackson, August 17, 1780.
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death. Little was also Jackson's brother-in-law, and deposed that
Jackson was a man of "very doubtful character" and that one should
"have little dependance on his word at any time." Clement Jackson,
also according to Little, was a good man but also "was a very infirm,
old man, and not a little influenced by supporting the character of his
son from any imputation on his son's veracity in this instance."88
The rest of Packer's witnesses, all by deposition, purported to have
heard the words of a man who could no longer speak for himself.
And their claims diverge wildly from the testimony of Clement
Jackson. Each of the depositions was calculated to cast some doubt on
the will of Thomas Packer, Sr. Either the man was too sick to
understand or sign the will, or perhaps the will he signed was not
what he had intended. The evidence presented nearly accused
William Parker of concocting the will out of air, or worse yet, out of
the mind of some other shadowy figure who stood to gain the most
from such chicanery. No one came forward to claim that he had
heard William Parker say anything questioning the will, though he,
too, had been dead for some time. Indeed, of all of those who visited
Packer on the day of his death, only Parker knew what was in the
will that the old man signed just hours before his death. But Packer's
aim was not to besmirch the reputation of his father's lawyer as
much as it was to infer that John Wentworth had engineered the
whole dastardly affair. Packer was relying on the prevailing attitude
in the state, a feeling of strong dislike if not outright hatred for

88M / Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2202. Deposition of Stephen little, May
28, 1789. Little's deposition was not made for the trial in 1781, but for the
Claims Commission in 1789.
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loyalists in general and of the leading loyalist of the area, the former
governor, in particular.
The defense put on by Gilman and Pickering was perfunctory.
They could not resurrect the other potential witnesses, both dead,
nor could they call anyone else who was certainly present or
material to the case, men like Wentworth or little, since both were
attainted traitors. They were able to obtain a deposition from the
widow of the probate judge, John Wentworth, who was also,
conveniently for Packer, deceased. Sarah Wentworth deposed that
when the four witnesses entered the room with the judge, she had
left, but remained in the open doorway, eavesdropping out of simple
curiosity. Sarah Wentworth stated that she "heard the judge inquire
not only of the witnesses together but each of them separately
whether the said testator was of a sound disposing mind at the time
the said will was executed. They answered separately that he was.
The said Clement Jackson," she added, "was at that time as capable of
making his will as he had been for some time before." Mrs.
Wentworth also recalled a conversation between h er late husband
and the late Clement March at a dinner some time after the will was
proven in which March said that Packer, at the time his will had
been executed, "as capable of it as he had been for some time."89
The only other evidence presented by the "defense" was the
deposition of Hunking Wentworth who offered that he had had many
conversations with Thomas Packer, Sr. before his death, and that in

89NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2238-2239. Testimony of Sarah
Wentworth, July 17, 1780.
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all cases the elder Packer had vehemently argued that he would give
no part of his estate to his son, except perhaps one farm for the term
of his life, and that he would leave nothing to his son's children
either, all because he disapproved of his son's conduct.90 At that
point the evidence was concluded, and some thirteen months after
the trial had begun, the case went to the jury 91
With the hindsight of better than two hundred years it might
be possible to chuckle at the flimsy fabric of lies and innuendo which
passed for evidence in the appeal of Packer's will. It might also be
possible to bristle at the thought that a sinister figure, the loyalist
governor, had conspired to rob a grieving son of his inheritance. Just
as we cannot with certainty discern the absolute truth in this case,
neither could the jury in 1781. Those men who heard the evidence
might just as easily have seen the aged Clement Jackson equivocate
slightly so as not to contradict his son's testimony and perhaps
perjure him. They could not see the lesser witnesses squirm or shake

90NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2240. Deposition of Hunking
Wentworth, July 17, 1 7 8 0 .1 cannot be sure if Hunking Wentworth was a
relative o f the governor or not. It seems likely he was in some way, and if so
his testimony would be of little value given the feeling towards the loyalist
branch of the family.
91Or perhaps the jury had had the case since long before it had begun, even
before the bill had been passed allowing Packer's appeal. A nearly full
column advertisement was placed in the New Hampshire Gazette on April 13,
1779. Placed and paid for by the clerk of the assembly, the advertisement
informed the public that a petition had been received by the house
requesting an appeal to the will proved in 1771. The advertisement gave
specific details of Packer, Jr.'s allegations, that the will was false, that the
probate judge was uncle to Governor John Wentworth, and "that the said
petitioner had always demeaned himself as a true friend to the states of
America, their union and their cause; that he has paid taxes for the support
of the war- assessed on those very lands which would otherwise have been
sold."
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in the witness chair because the testimony of Dearborn, Emery, and
Gilman was given by written deposition. The witnesses for the other
side both bore the name Wentworth and thus could be discounted
regardless of the degree of relationship to the former governor, if
any. The jury in this case was left with two questions: was Thomas
Packer, Sr. capable of making and attesting a will just a few hours
before he died? and, whether or not he was, was the will h e
attempted to sign really his will, or was it the product of an evil plot
masterminded by the thrice-damned loyalist who was the only one
to gain from depriving Thomas Packer, Jr. of his father's legacy?
In late April of 1781, the jury arrived at a verdict: "The jury
find[s] the paper in the case purporting to be the last will and
testament of Thomas Packer, Esq., deceased, is not his last will and
testament." John Wentworth, Jr. and Stephen Little both argued in
papers submitted to the Claims Commission that the jury's decision
was based solely on the loyalism of Governor Wentworth.92
The success of Thomas Packer, Jr.'s appeal was a tribute to the
success of the rebel government in creating a new identity for the
loyalist portion of the provincial community. The rebels created a
"them" to juxtapose against the newly formed "us" of the community
which came to be called the State of New Hampshire, and in an even
larger sense, the "us" which became the United States of America.

92Further evidence of the jury's condemnation of loyalism and the loyalist
defendant lies in the fact that they chose to deprive the state of needed
revenue by their decision. The award to Thomas Packer, Jr. delivered the
land from being sold at public auction for the benefit of the treasury. In a
sense the jurors took from their own pockets and gave to Packer, only to
deliver a message to Wentworth and the other loyalists.
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The transition from "we" to "us and them" was aided by the loyalists
themselves. As we have seen, the loyalists proclaimed their own
identities individually and collectively through the actions which
labelled them publicly as loyalists. The loyalists were further
individuated by the external forces to which they were exposed, the
physical sufferings, the trauma of which acted to reaffirm the selfidentification of each as a loyalist sufferer, and to produce a
collective, communal sense of shared experience necessary to the
creation of a self-conscious community of loyalists. Finally, as we
have seen in this chapter, the rebel government acted to formalize
the identification of loyalists through law, and to subvert th e
traditional forms of law and order to the needs of an usurping power,
creating extraordinary ways of searching out, penalizing a n d
outlawing dissenters from the community. John W entw orth's
loyalism identified him in the minds of his former neighbors as an
outsider, no longer the well-liked governor of a prosperous comer of
British North America, but a "damned tory" capable of subverting the
will of a dying man and ruthlessly appropriating a young man's
inheritance.93 The jury which found for Thomas Packer, Jr. was not

93The assembly was not clearly convinced that Packer's claim was completely
legitimate, or at least that it was so legitimate that he should have the entire
estate returned to him as it had been constituted at his father's death. In the
act which permitted the appeal, the widow's portion was upheld as devised,
regardless of the outcome of the appeal. That much was natural. But
Wentworth had sold portions of Packer's estate to a number of individuals
prior to the rebellion, and had deeded other parcels for a variety of
charitable reasons at the behest of the testator. As executor, Wentworth was
charged to endow schools and other publicly beneficial institutions with
portions of the estate. The assembly further added in the resolve that even if
the appeal went against Wentworth, all of the lands that he had received
through the will and which he had conveyed prior to the rebellion were to
remain in the hands of those who had so acquired them. Several were named
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giving its approval to his mode of living, or even really announcing
its belief in the scenario his witnesses presented in a m o st
circumstantial way. That jury was condemning John Wentworth for
his desertion of his homeland and his adherence to a way of
governm ent an d a way of life that they had by then been
conditioned to find most reprehensible. The verdict was not so much
for Thomas Packer, cheated heir, but against John Wentworth,
loyalist

specifically and others were left deliberately ambiguous in order that the
owners could produce their titles and have them confirmed. Neither in the
act of the assembly empowering Packer to appeal the proving of the will, or
in the course of the trial itself, was Wentworth accused of mishandling the
estate as its executor. NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2206-2209.
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Chapter Five
Who Will Rule at Home:
Identity and the Battle for Cultural Supremacy
To the Tories.
Wanted for his Majesties Service, as
an Assistant to his Excellency General
Howe and Hugh Gaine, Printers and Pub
lishers of the New York Gazette, a Gen
tleman who can lie with Ingenuity.
Enquire of Peter Numskull, Composer and
Collector of lies for their Excellencies, at
New York.
NB. A good Hand will
receive the honour of Knighthood.1
The struggle within New Hampshire during the period of the
successful rebellion which we now name the American Revolution
was a struggle over personal and communal identity. We have
already seen in chapter one the results of the conscious and
unconscious attempt of the loyalists to create a community identity
for themselves primarily through their own words in the claims
submitted to the Parliamentary commission and relevant ancillary
documents. The loyalists who filed claims for compensation told a
coherent tale using a shared vocabulary. The story of their actions
and resultant sufferings demonstrates the community of loyalists
born amid the trauma of a rebellion which drove them from family
lNew Hampshire Gazette or Exeter Morning Chronicle. June 24, 1777. This
advertisement appeared in Robert Fowle's 58th issue. Only three numbers
were published subsequently before his arrest on charges of treason by
counterfeiting.
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and home, and cost many of them the accumulated wealth of a
lifetime. The fact that the loyalist claims documents were written
based upon self-interest has no real relevance when that objection is
raised to question their usefulness as a means of deriving a narrative
based on their perspectives. After all, the accepted narrative of the
American Revolution, based as it is on the relevant writings of
members of the rebel faction, was as driven by self-interest as that
of the losing side.
In chapter two we explored the self-identification of loyalists
through the actions they undertook in support of government. Each
action or omission perpetrated by a self-avowed loyalist served to
identify him to the community in which he lived. Moreover, those
actions served as a means of self-affirmation, a way of reminding the
individual of who and what he was even in the face of the increasing
isolation and persecution he may have suffered as the rebellion
progressed. The actions detailed by the loyalists who filed claims
after the war serve as examples of the similar actions taken by many
thousands of loyalists throughout the colonies. Indeed the exploits of
New Hampshire's loyalists were tame compared to the adventures of
many who hailed from provinces where actual military activity took
place. Though many New Hampshire loyalists left their province to
serve in the British army or in provincial units, none of them saw
action near to home the way the loyalists of New York or
Pennsylvania did. The rebellion in New Hampshire was a peaceful
one, which made the experience of New Hampshire's loyalists unique.
In chapter three the rebel faction's response to selfidentification was demonstrated in the many forms of physical
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retaliation employed against known loyalists and their families. The
very idea of a "known" loyalist proves that the actions of the friends
of government defined their identities within the community. The
rebels responded to the outspoken loyalists by physical reprisals:
mobbing, housebreaking, and imprisonment, the latter sometimes in
conjunction with what might today be described by human rights
advocates as torture.
But the rebel faction carried the identification process further
into the realm of formal inquiry through several devices described in
chapter four. The rebels successfully derailed the effectiveness of
royal government beginning in December of 1774, and within a year
had crafted a workable form of government suitable to their needs.
Even before Wentworth's departure in August of 1774, the rebel
congress sitting at Exeter had reached out into the towns with a
network of committees designed to control things at the local level
and identify potential opponents. The royal governor was powerless
as the militia refused his call during the attack on Fort William and
Mary in December 1774, and Wentworth was able only to maintain
the sham of actual government from that point on. Following his
departure, the rebel government sought the semblance of legal
methods to identify their enemies and rid the province of all those
who could not or would not support the new order. These included
the Association Test, the surveillance activities of the committees of
safety, ostracism and shunning, and inevitably the most form al
expressions of communal disapproval: actual banishment coupled
with the confiscation of real and personal property.
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But none of this took place in a vacuum. Around New
Hampshire a shooting war raged; men bled and died on both sides of
an armed conflict the aim of which was to

d e te r m in e

the political

destiny of a continent. Surrounding that war swirled another,
perhaps more im portant struggle, the battle th at spawned the
rebellion: a cultural conflict which split the residents of British North
America at the local, provincial, and later, national levels. This
chapter will place the rebellion in New Hampshire squarely within
the definition of a culture war: an ideological clash between two or
more opposing camps, both (or all) absolutely convinced of the
righteousness of their cause.2 The culture war is carried out publicly,
primarily through the available forms or media for public discourse,
but the struggle may extend into the realm of actual physical conflict,
as it did during the American Revolution. It was Carl Becker who
suggested that the revolution was as much about who would rule at
home as about home rule. In this he was entirely correct, though he
may not have gone far enough. The revolution was about not only
who would wield political power, but how the society would define
itself and ultimately how each individual would construct an identity
based upon the new independent community or the traditional
colonial one.
The eventual outcome of the struggle for independence was
determined by the activism of the rebel faction from 1763 on, and
the naive complacency not only of the British government but its

2James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: the Struggle to Define America. New
York: 1991. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Radicahsm o f the American
Revolution. New York: 1991.
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friends in America as well. Beginning with protests concerning the
Proclamation of 1763 and the Stamp Act crisis of 1765, the selfstyled "whigs" of British North America began a concerted effort to
win control of the provincial assemblies and the communications
media of the time, the newspapers. Their political struggles met with
varying success from colony to colony, but in New Hampshire at least
they were able to claim a majority soon after the ascendency of John
Wentworth to the governor's chair in 1767. There is little, if any,
evidence to suggest that even the most ard en t of whigs had
considered the road to independence prior to 1774. Most of those
whose occupation, station, or interest caused them to consider the
larger issues of the time could agree in principle that there were
problems with the relationship between the British government and
her colonies. Most could also agree that the source of those problems
was an intractable ministry and an unresponsive parliament.
In hindsight historians can now see the blunders of the
ministry in blindly assuming the innate inferiority of the residents of
the colonies and holding to the belief that the rustic provincials
would eventually accede to the measures proposed by their
superiors in England. While the authorities in London proceeded in
stubborn ignorance of the situation, ignoring the warnings of their
governors and sundry officials on the scene, the friends of
government in America began to recognize their peril. In response to
the assembly's creation of a standing committee of correspondence,
Wentworth suspended the session for seven months in 1773.3 The

3Wilderson, Wentworth, p. 221.
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assembly which reconvened in 1774 was quickly dissolved, and then
met illegally to empower the creation of a provincial congress to
meet in Exeter. When in 1774 a new election was called, Wentworth
attempted to stack the house in favor of government by

ex te n d in g

three new writs to towns in the interior he felt would re tu r n
members favorable to his position.4 That act, however, only
engendered more controversy and further exacerbated an already
precarious situation. Within days Wentworth was forced to flee to
Fort William and Mary for the protection the two nearby British
ships could offer himself and his family.
It was apparent to Wentworth at least by December of 1774
that all royal authority had departed the province. The N ew
Hampshire Gazette continued to print his official proclamations, but
Daniel Fowle, its printer, was consistent in his support of the radical
faction as demonstrated by the quantity of space he devoted to the
news of the provincial congress, the activities of the committees of
correspondence, and the volume of opinion pieces he included, many
of them copied from the more radical papers of Boston and
Philadelphia.5
The content of the New Hampshire Gazette during the early
years of the rebellion brings into stark relief the fact that the rebel
faction was deeply entrenched in the provincial infrastructure. The

4 Wilderson, Wentworth, p. 254.
5New Hampshire Gazette, May 13, 1774. Camillus, for example, penned an angry
diatribe protesting the concept of taxation without representation. The
opinion pieces of the previous few months had been devoted to the tea
controversy.
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rebellion was not a mass movement from the bottom up consisting
primarily of the poor, oppressed or the landless. The rebel faction
was led and for the most part constituted of wealthy merchants and
landowners, magistrates, militia officers, and assemblymen, some of
the best men in the colony.6 It would be easy, but unjust, to
minimize their commitment to a new order and attribute their status
as rebels to jealousy of the entrenched Portsmouth elite, those
Wentworth clansmen and associates who had monopolized power in
the province nearly from the accession of Benning Wentworth in
1741. Surely some may have admitted to that as their prim ary
motive, but certainly not all. And neither petty jealousy nor simple
greed could have moved such a number of men of substance to risk
their very lives in a cause in which they did not fully believe.
It was instead the belief that the time had come to redefine the
nature of the provincial community which impelled the rebels to
take control of the reins of government, haltingly at first, in the
latter part of 1774. As mentioned above, when Wentworth lost
control of the militia, which became clear during the attack on Fort
William and Mary in December of 1774, royal government became
for all intents and purposes merely a fiction. From that point and
beyond, Wentworth and the other loyalists clung tenaciously to the
false hope that order as they perceived it would be restored. Indeed
for some time they seem to have remained ignorant of the actual
state of affairs, badly misunderstanding the apparent strength of the

6Wilderson, Wentworth, p. 250, as well as various other references to the
makeup of the faction's leadership.
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rebels and underestimating the strength of the rebel appeal to the
broad masses of the population of the colony. Whether consciously or
not, the leaders of the rebel faction understood the need for popular
support in their cause. They recognized that a small minority could
not effectively control the province by coercion alone, even though
for the moment at least, the faction had a monopoly on the threat of
force. Both sides of the conflict were convinced at that point that it
would be only a m atter of time until that changed and a significant
force of British regulars would alter the balance of power. Gage's
refusal to send troops in response to Wentworth's appeal in the
spring of 1775 removed the governor as well as the im m ediate
threat to the rebels. It did not remove the th reat of imminent
invasion, however, or at least it did not remove that threat as a part
of the rebel faction's argument for the next two to three years. At
least in New Hampshire, argument replaced bullets as the means to
an effective revolution, discourse replaced the battlefield as the
arena in which the rebellion would be fought.
Wentworth's departure in August of 1775 marked a major shift
in the intensity and direction of the culture war in New Hampshire.
The division between rebels and loyalists had not been as clear when
the writings filling the newspapers were devoted to the
constitutional questions of taxation and representation or the other
issues which slowly divided the self-proclaimed whigs from the socalled tones. Those pieces continued to illuminate the thinking of the
reading public, but a considerable number of rebel7 writers began to
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construct a new reality for the reading public, a new reality designed
to draw the reader into the fold of the convinced rebels, and at the
same time to totally discredit the position of the ideological enemy,
the tories.8
The goal of the rebel campaign in New Hampshire was the
reform ation of provincial society into a new and significantly
different one than had existed prior to the middle of 1775. To
accomplish that end the rebels created a new government the
legitimacy of which rested on the relatively new and u n trie d
Enlightenment concept of popular sovereignty, the idea that the
power to rule was derived from the consent of the ruled. Once a new
government, however unstable at first, was in place, it became
possible for the rebels to utilize both of the possible methods of
political persuasion: discourse and force.9
7Throughout the struggle, the rebel writers referred to themselves
consistently as whigs. Even the word "patriot" is noticeably absent. Now to
suddenly shift our terms and refer to the rebel writers as whigs seemed to be
too confusing, but to continue to use the term rebel when referring to the
whig writers seemed less so, even should someone wish to delve further into
the original sources and find the word whig used almost exclusively when
referring to the rebel faction. For the purpose of clarity, then, I will
continue to use the term rebel when referring to the leaders of the radical
faction or the usurped government, and when referring to the writers who
adopted the appellation whig .
8This strategy is being replicated in modem America according to Hunter,
Culture Wars. Hunter describes the strategy of adversaries engaged in a
discursive struggle, arguing that two forms of argument are used: positive
and negative. "The positive face of moral conflict is expressed through
constructive moral reasoning and debate
the negative face of moral
conflict [is] the deliberate, systematic effort to discredit the opposition."
p. 136.
9Iincoln, Discourse and the Construction o f Society, p. 3. "Together, discourse
and force are the chief means whereby social borders, hierarchies,
institutional formations, and habituated patterns of behavior are both
maintained and modified." Force "is regularly employed by those who hold
official power to compel obedience and suppress deviance."
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We have already seen how the rebels employed force or the
threat of force to achieve their ends where the loyalists were
concerned. That threat of force overshadowed all of the residents of
the province, not only loyalists. The example of mobbed or beaten
loyalists must surely have had some effect on the majority of men
and women who were unsure which way the conflict would go and
thus had not committed to either side. But the rebels needed
commitment from the majority in order for the rebellion to succeed.
Money had to be raised, men had to be enlisted, and supplies had to
be gathered. The rebel writers who filled the friendly majority of
newspapers in the colonies were aware that a great deal of
convincing needed to be done.
Toward that end, the rebel writers began to create a new myth,
a myth which could be used simultaneously to paint the enemy both
foreign and domestic in a totally unfavorable light, and at the same
time elevate the patriotic whigs to nearly legendary status in the
minds of the readers. Bruce Lincoln defines this kind of myth as "a
form of meta-language in which preexisting signs are appropriated
and stripped of their original context, history, and signification only
to be infused with new and mystificatory conceptual content of
particular use to the bourgeoisie. Myth, Barthes argued, 'has the task
of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making
contingency appear eternal.'”10 In other words, the whig/rebels
created a new way of looking at the present by adopting a special
way of viewing the past. The whig view of history, prominent for
10Lincoln, Discourse, p. 5.
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decades in the co u rt/country controversy in England w as
rehabilitated and appropriated by American writers with an added
twist, the ministry and parliament were now so corrupt that they too
were subverting the ancient constitution and depriving the
Americans of their rights and liberties. The rebel writers also created
the myth of the legendary ancestors, the people who had originally
colonized the province and given for all posterity their example of
heroic stature to the present generation to follow; "Brothers! Let us
think of our heroic ancestors who fought and bled and died for this
country. Let us think of our aged fathers and mothers, think of our
wives and children, let us look forward to posterity ... in this great
day of conquest."11 The myths perpetuated by the rebel writers had
to be powerful constructs which provided a new reality agreeable
and persuasive to their audience.12
The positive discursive style of the rebels was full of language
designed to convey a sense of greatness to their cause. The phrase so
often used was "glorious cause" but the entire body of their work
was infused with descriptive phrases which stressed the
righteousness of the rebellion, the virtue of the rebels and the
historical continuity with the great heroes of the past from the Bible
to English champions of liberty and justice. No sacrifice was too great,
and everyone in the province must be in agreement, they alleged: "it

11New Hampshire Gazette, May 20, 1774. An American.
12Uncoln, Discourse, p. 24. According to Lincoln, myths are "that small class
o f stories that possess both credibility and authority
a narrative possessed
of authority is one for which successful claims are made not only to the
status of truth, but what is more to the status of paradigmatic truth."
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appears to be the general sentiment that the man is unworthy the
name of an English American who would hesitate one moment to
prefer death to the slavish subjection demanded by the ministry and
parliament of Great Britain."13 Already in 1774 the whig/rebels were
preparing their audience for the possibility of war.
The moderates and future loyalists were unprepared for what
would come their way.14 In August of 1774 Brutus would write to
the public urging caution, prudence, and unity. He also advised
careful constitutional means to solve the problems between the
colonies and great Britain.15 But the lonely voice of Brutus was
drowned in the sea of rebel writers which filled the pages of the New
Hampshire Gazette, the only newspaper in the province since its
founding in 1756. Throughout the latter half of 1774 and into 1775
Daniel Fowle, the printer, gathered articles from other colonies and
from English papers, the vast majority of which took the same
position.16 The ministry was bent on subjugating the colonies,
depriving the colonists of their rights as Englishmen, and bleeding
them dry of their property.

13New Hampshire Gazette, June 2, 1774. Anonymous.
14Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783.
Chapel Hill, NC: 1941. p. 249.
15New Hampshire Gazette, August 12, 1774. Brutus. Reprinted from a
Philadelphia newspaper.
16Fowle did print the series of letters by Daniel Leonard under the pseudonym
"Massachusettensis," as well as John Adams' replies as "Novanglus." As a
result of his seeming neutrality, Fowle was haled before the assembly and
admonished for his lack of patriotic zeal. See Bernard Bailyn and John B.
Hench, eds., The Press and the American Revolution. Boston: 1981. p. 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

207

The Gazette was also the source for news, and the type Fowle
chose to print was calculated to assist the rebel cause. He printed
detailed accounts of the doings of the provincial congress as well as
the news from the continental congress in Philadelphia. Fowle also
reported rumors of carpenters recruited from New Hampshire being
sent to Boston to build barracks for the occupation troops, a report
which led to the arrest and consequent ritual confession of Nicholas
Austin as discussed previously. In a letter to the paper the
Portsmouth committee stated "That it is our opinion these men who
have been so base to undertake as artificers (and thereby reflecting
not only on their respective town but the province in general) should
be considered as enemies to our liberties, and should not be received
at their return, as members worthy of society."17
Fowle also chose to print excerpts of letters received by private
individuals from overseas or from other colonies as sources of news
or inspiration. One, a letter from a man in New York to a friend in
Edinburgh, stated that America would resist the invasion of British
troops by converting them into free American landowners living like
princes.18 Another letter from London bolstered the American
argument concerning taxation, the correspondent admitting that "we
have no more right to tax the Americans, unless through the medium
of their representatives, than we have to tax the Irish." w It was
important that the general public be encouraged to resist the threat
17New Hampshire Gazette^ October 28, 1774.
18New Hampshire Gazette, October 21, 1774.
New Hampshire Gazette, October 28, 1774.
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of retaliation for their resistance to royal authority, and for the
people to believe that they were not alone in their struggle against
tyranny. At least in 1774 the rebel party line contended that the
people of Great Britain were sympathetic to the American cause.
Toward that end Daniel Fowle found a piece in the London
Public Ledger dated November 1774, an open letter addressed to
Lord North. In it, Gracchus stated "I would, my lord, I could my
countrymen from the state of inactivity and corruption in which they
are enthralled, could they be prevailed on to join vigorously in
opposition with their brethren in America, they would soon
overthrow their oppressors, send you to a scaffold, and restore the
almost forgotten liberties of their country. But this is not, alas, to be
expected, Englishmen seem to have lost all sense of p u b lic
virtue....our descendents shall gratefully acknowledge that the
liberties of England were preserved in America."20
Inspired as they were by words like those, the inhabitants of
Portsmouth and the province in general had to be exhorted to adopt
a new, more rigorous way of life. The Portsmouth town meeting, in
an attempt to exert civil control in December of 1774, created a
committee to assume executive powers and resolved "that the town
bear testimony against the common practice of playing at billiards
and cards and also that they disapprove of every other species of
gaming and dissipation, recommending industry and frugality to the
inhabitants as more becoming under the p resen t grievous

20New Hampshire Gazette, December 23,1774.
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oppressions and embarrassments of this town and continent."21 The
resolve was aimed at the governor and his friends, predominantly
Anglican, who saw no great sin in engaging in games and frivolity.
The rebels, however, consciously embraced the puritan heritage of
the founders of the New England colonies and their antipathy
towards such popish extravagances.
At the same time another incident occurred which bears some
consideration. On the face of it, the first letter from Stephen
Boardman seemed to be merely an attack on a loyalist. Hardly an
apology for his hand in the affair, Boardman wrote to explain a
situation which must have attracted some attention and aroused
concern among the people of Portsmouth and the region in general.
Boardman recounted that William Pottle of Stratham had entered the
town on business and that as he approached the state house, a group
of around one hundred men were gathered there. At th at point
someone had shouted "There is a Tory...there is an enemy to his
country....see how he looks...behold him, how he looks!" The writer,
Boardman must have been a member of the crowd, since he added
"Upon this, knowing the said Pottle had conducted in a manner
inimical to his country, and thinking this a suitable time to intimidate
and humble him, I said 'Gentlemen this villain has appeared an open
enemy of his country.'" The crowd then advanced on Pottle and
physically assaulted him. How badly Pottle was handled is nowhere
made clear. Boardman concluded his say by adding "though I abhor
all illegal mobs and assemblies and would have no man's person or
21 New Hampshire Gazette, December 16, 1774.
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property injured I think everyone who is a friend to America is in
duty bound to condemn such a man and have no connection or
dealings with him 'till repentance and reformation entitle him to
forgiveness."22
Boardman1s letter elicited a pair of responses within a couple of
weeks. The first was a lengthy letter

c o n d e m n in g

all mob actions of

the kind Boardman seemed so proud:
At a time when the reins of government are evidently
slackened, when the sacred name of liberty is so
villainously prostituted to the most licentious purposes,
when nothing more is wanting to pull down the
ungovernable rage of a furious mob on the head of an
honest and worthy citizen than for some malicious
disappointed wretch falsely to represent him as an
enemy to the constitutional rights of his country, I say, at
such a time as this the public ought to be exceedingly
cautious how they listen to any reports that may in the
least tend to inflame the minds of the people against any
person whatever, whether these reports and insinuations
come dressed up in the sly garb of a Horse Jockey, the
hypocritical cant of a Saint, or the still more detested
authority of a Trading Justice, they are equally despicable
and unworthy of notice. Every honest, well-disposed man
is to be respected especially such as have faithfully
served their country in public stations and employments
and even such of these as have been so unfortunate as
not to have had the advantages of education, are much
more to be honored and valued than some who with all
their boasted literature will remain stupid puppies to
their life's end.23

22New Hampshire Gazette, December 30, 1774.
22 New Hampshire Gazette, January 20, 1775.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211

The letter, signed "A Lover of Peace,” was from Greenland and
appeared in the same number of the Gazette as William Pottle's own
reply. Though some of "A Lover's" allusions might be difficult to
trace, his intent is clear, not so much to defend Pottle individually,
but to attack the rebel tendency to accuse individuals of inimical acts
without any clear or evidential basis, and without any pretence at
due process. The signs were dear to that writer that such continued
behavior would be terribly injurious, not only to real loyalists, but to
others, innocent of any political convictions, who could be publicly
attainted and attacked with potentially serious consequences. Pottle
himself began by asking, "See Reader, what lengths enthusiastical
zeal may lead a man under the the notion of duty." He then listed
and denied three charges that had been levelled against him,
including holding a mock meeting in competition with an important
local meeting. Pottle then suggested that Boardman was really
motivated by personal animosity, and asserted strongly that a
deacon (Pottle chose to ignore Boardman's identification of himself as
a member of the committee of inspection, and rather pointed out that
Boardman was a deacon of the church in Stratham) ought to behave
in a much more Christian manner toward others.
Boardman replied within a month, raving that Pottle was an
enemy to his country and that there was no truth to the idea that he
(Boardman) held some grudge concerning his seat as deacon.24
Pottle's response to this was a month in coming but to the point.
Boardman, he said, was unchristian and jealous. He lied when he
24New Hampshire Gazette, February 17, 1775.
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suggested that Pottle's father had attempted to oust him from the
deacon's place, and that the real root of his attack had

n o th in g

to do

with Pottle's own conduct, there being nothing there for which he
should be remonstrated, but that Boardman was seeking petty
vengeance because of a land dispute some time in the past which
Pottle had won through arbitration.25
Public disputes such as the Boardman-Pottle battle served a
purpose in the discursive arena of the cultural clash in New
Hampshire. From the rebel perspective, the tale of Pottle's fate at the
hands of the Portsmouth mob served as a warning to others to
amend their behavior or face a similar fate. Pottle's responses to
Boardman's accusations were the efforts of an individual to defend
himself personally. To the rebels those letters were nothing but the
squirming protestations of a traitor. To the loyalists they were the
reasonable explanations of a man falsely accused of a crime which
was no crime. The entire situation pointed up one of the principal
contentions of loyalist discourse, that the attacks on individuals as
enemies of liberty really had nothing to do with the current political
crisis, but rather emanated from personal enmity and petty grudges
that small and dangerous men could now air out by falsely accusing
any old foe and thereby reaping vengeance for old scores real or
imagined. This sort of public allegation also served another purpose
in the rebel strategy. By publishing attacks on loyalists, either
specific or general, they hoped to elicit responses which would

25New Hampshire Gazette, March 31, 1775.
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render the identity and counsels of the enemy open to public
scrutiny.
Not every attempt to bait a response was successful. Early in
February of 1775 another letter came to Fowle's hand which he
immediately printed. Addressed to "Master Printer...." it was the first
piece of rebel writing in the province to attack loyalists as a group.
The letter affected the style of a poor farmer:
A man of our town m s down to the Banke last week with
butter, when he got home we all crowded about him to
hear the news. He told us as how the great ones at the
Banke were almost frightened out of their wits and had
to get a great long paper to prevent their being killed and
having their throats cut. It seems that they are afeared
that the town folks are all run mad and going to kill them
because they aren't mad too. Master Printer, pray tell us
in your next news what there is in the paper. I think he
called it asushashun and that they promised to shoot
anybody that would not let them sell tea, play cards and
dice the devil's device, and do anything else they were a
mind to. The man said that one of them told him that it
was a story and a lie trumped up by the sons of liberty to
cast a slur on the tories and that was nothing more than
to keep them safe this winter and prevent their being
hanged in the spring as all the sons of liberty would be
when the King' forces came over. Now pray Mr. Printer,
do let the paper be published that we may know all
about it for we suspect it is all a lie told by our neighbor
us, for the man who brought the news is a comical fellow
and will make no bones to tell a fib to make fun or
mischief either.26

26New Hampshire Gazette, February 3, 1775. The text of the Association was
finally printed in the number for March 31, 1775 but no great issue was made
of it at that time.
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The letter, signed Plowgogger,

referred to the Oath of

Association taken by the prominent men of Wentworth's circle and
their chief supporters in the Portsmouth area. The signers even at
the time must have known the Association would have a n
inflammatory effect on the local mob, though no serious disruptions
accompanied this rebel attempt to stir up even more mob animosity
toward the loyalists. In February Wentworth was still governor, the
pretence of legitimacy still adhered to his acts and those of the
council, and his appointed officials and magistrates still in theory
constituted the only legitimate authority in the province. Of course
Wentworth had declared the province to be in rebellion in December,
and the fact of the m atter was that the militia was firmly in rebel
control. This control was so firm that the existing officers remained
in command of their men, and were apparently engaged in recruiting
even more men to stand ready in case the British should send troops
to the province. In Durham, Major John Sullivan was engaged in
weekly training exercises with a new militia company. In March he
wrote to the Gazette to respond to public criticism of those exercises
as being somehow illegal. Sullivan wrote that the group was merely a
training company and denied that any illegal assembly was taking
place. The following week a writer styling himself Monitor replied to
Sullivan's disingenuous letter flatly stating that militia officers must
be appointed by writ of the King through the royal governor. Monitor
also remarked that the exercises in Durham were extremely
wasteful, that the time expended by the men in such fruitless
training ought to be better spent in productive work. What if,
Monitor wondered, all of the towns began to follow Sullivan's model
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in Durham, and spent one day each week in such a wasteful fashion.
Imagine the cost to the economy of the province. Monitor concluded
with a warning that "this extraordinary spirit to acquire the use of
arms at a juncture when the noise of civil discord begins to roar in
our neighborhood marks strongly a disposition to employ our arms
against the power and authority we ought to support and defend,
every appearance of which should be avoided with the utmost
caution and circumspection."27
Monitor wrote in typical loyalist style and language. He spoke
in the plural, assuming that he and the other loyalists were and
would remain a part of the larger community. Monitor also assumed
that there remained a reverence for duly constituted authority and
law. This was the central mistake of loyalists throughout the
provinces at that point in the conflict. The loyalists believed that the
rebel faction was extremely small. They had no conception as yet
that so few men could sway the minds of the majority, and they
were only just beginning to realize just how much control the rebels
had acquired of the media of the time, newspapers and printed
matter in general. The loyalists also underestimated the efficiency of
mob action, especially when focused on specific loyalist targets such
as printers. Finally the loyalists misjudged the amount of effort that
the ministry was willing or able to expend in order to put down a
rebellion quickly. Much of the caution suggested in loyalist pieces at
the time stemmed from the belief that swift and sure reaction would
come from England in response to the actions of the rebel minority.

27New Hampshire Gazette, March 10, 1775 and March 17,1775.
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They were warning their neighbors not to get caught up in rebellious
activities, lest they give the appearance that they too were in
rebellion against the proper and legitimate government. The loyalist
discourse, especially that portion of it which appeared in public in
New Hampshire during this period relied almost exclusively on
reason and rational appeal to the public's good sense. The loyalist
writers based most of what they argued on the assumption that
everyone understood and accepted the English constitution as the
guiding document by which government gained its authority. The
idea did not occur to loyalist writers that the basis of legitimate
government could be changed. Thus all of their appeals were based
on the given principle that lawful authority rested with the governor,
council, and the magistrates appointed by that agency, and that any
interference with, or other denial of that legitimacy was de facto
illegal.
Sullivan replied by calling Monitor's letter the "production of a
distempered brain." He mocked Monitor's concerns over the cost of
training days by wondering if perhaps the cost of Sunday
observances ought to be kept track of as well. The derisive tone of
Sullivan's reply was typical of rebel rhetoric. What they could not
refute with fact, they ridiculed. The rebel writers relied on emotion
and abstract language to move their audiences. When attacked they
responded with emotional appeals to righteousness. Rare was the
attempt to display clever irony such as that which appeared in the
same number of the Gazette as the above mentioned Sullivan letter.
Daniel Fowle chose that last number in March to insert the text of the
loyalist association along with a commentary attributed to Spectator,
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a possible reference to the whig paper of th at name popular in
England earlier in the century but still widely read and reprinted in
the colonies. This was not Spectator's first appearance and he had
already seen the text prior to its publication. Yet he was responding
to the text as it appeared to the general public for the first time.28 He
wondered what laws the association referred to and asked its
subscribers whether they meant to support province laws or all laws,
specifically the acts of parliament which seemed to be the source of
the recent political struggle. If they m eant to support those
particular laws, then did they mean to do so by way of another mob,
one just as illegal as those which they alleged that they had formed
their association to defend against?29
No reply was forthcoming from loyalist pens until the column
by Candidus in the middle of April. This was not his first venture
into the rhetorical fray. In February he had taken up the loyalist
litany of caution. Candidus warned that the trade of the province
would be curtailed and the freedoms at hand would be diminished
with the arrival of troops in town. He added also that the people
seemed "too unconsiderate and precipitate, being hurried by the
violence of heated passions." Once again a loyalist writer attacked the
emotional basis of the rebellion, the haste in which it was embraced
by those who did not stop to think things through. Spectator

28Bther Spectator was Daniel Fowle himself, a close associate that Fowle could
rely on, or a rebel writer closely associated to the leadership of the faction,
entrusted with an advance copy of the text, and instructed to attack it with
tact and wit.
29New Hampshire Gazette, March 31, 1775.
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conduded by suggesting the shallow character of the devotion of the
mob, or of those who controlled it, alleging that the faction was
manipulating men for their own ends: "they too often leave the
subject in controversy and reek their vengeance for private injuries
under the false pretext of the cause of liberty, a cause too glorious,
too important to be sullied by such evasive, u n m a n ly principles."30
Once again in April Candidus worried about America's ability to
withstand an invasion. He fully agreed with the principal position of
the colonies: "for my own part I must own the idea of taxation
without representation appears to me incompatible with the British
Constitution." Yet he could not agree with the extraordinary acts of
resistance advocated by the rebel faction. And as if invasion were
not a great enough threat that should induce all reasonable men to
listen to the "advice and wisdom of the coolest and most considerate
men among us," Candidus introduced the idea that sectional
differences might have yet another serious impact on the province.
Candidus suggested that the southern colonies might see a rebellion
in New England as an opportunity to seize control of the m erchant
trade so important to the northern economy.31

30New Hampshire Gazette, February 17, 1775.
31 New Hampshire Gazette, April 14, 1775. At about the time this article by
Candidus was printed, a man named David Zubly, Jr. was a committeeman in
Savannah, Georgia. According to his own words he was at that time "inimical
to Great Britain" and a captain in the rebel militia. His ideas mirrored those
of Candidus, as he added "He thought that Great Britain had no right to tax
America, but he did not approve oif opposition by force o f arms, neither did
he wish for independence." The Georgia planter was eventually to confirm
his loyalism by departing his home and joining the refugees in Nova Scotia.
Loyalist Claims, David Zubly, Jr., vol. XIII, p. 113.
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But all of Candidus' caution and conspiracy theories were swept
away in the excitement which followed the news in the next number
of the Gazette. The exchange of fire between regulars and militiamen
in Lexington and Concord, and the subsequent hasty retreat under
fire by the British force, galvanized the rebel movement everywhere,
not least in New Hampshire. The time for lofty argument was over.
The letters of Daniel Leonard as M assachusettensis an d the
contrapuntal Novanglus letters by John Adams stopped running in
the Gazette. Michaiah wrote an open letter to George El cautioning
the king to show concern for his provinces, and suggesting that the
king was listening to evil counsellors who would convince him to sign
a death warrant for three million of his subjects. Michaiah warned
the king that his eternal soul was in grave danger.32
Despite the continued presence of the governor the Portsmouth
town meeting voted to give full discretionary power to "the
committee." In addition it decided that "any inhabitants of this town
who shall be obnoxious shall be only accountable to the committee
for their conduct." The courts were closed and the extra-legal organs
of a rebel junta were in control.
For several months the newspaper was dominated by news
from other cities. But the content of that news served the purposes of
the rebels just as well as continued propaganda. There were weekly
32New Hampshire Gazette, April 28, 1775. See also the Book of Micah in the Old
Testament. Micah the prophet was warning his readers of the errors of their
ways and suggesting the promise of a future state in which the righteous
would achieve great things. Micah the prophet was also concerned with
internal enemies: "For the son dishonoureth the father, the daughter riseth
up against her mother, the daughter in law against her mother in law; a
man's enemies are the men of his own house." Micah 7:6.
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accounts of the proceedings of the continental congress as well as
news from the rebel camp surrounding Boston. Parliamentary debate
over the situation in America was printed especially those portions
critical of ministerial policy. In the background the committee was
doing its job, hunting down suspected loyalists and forcing them to
publicly acknowledge their crimes. Like the public humiliation of
Nicholas Austin discussed above, these public recantations were an
attem pt by the rebel faction to incorporate common religious
symbols and ritual into the vernacular of rebellion. In May of 1775
the first three published apologies appeared in the New Hampshire
Gazette. Signed by P. Bailey, Thomas Auchincloss,33 and James Me
Master, the three pieces differed in precise wording but followed a
distinct pattern. First, an apology for past words or actions
(acknowledgment of a sinful nature), which transgressions had
"proved of great disadvantage to this town and the continent in
general." Then followed a profession of faith and fidelity in which
each convert pledged to "risk my life and interest in defense of the
constitutional privileges of this continent."34 Such public conversions
were more likely found transpiring at the request of the committees
while still in the inquiry phase. No further examples appeared in the
pages of the Gazette after that of Ebenezer Loverin in June. It may be
that enforcement procedures changed inside the committee, or that
the majority of loyalists were keeping a very low profile. At least
33Thomas Auchincloss died in a shipwreck during the passage from New York
to Halifax. His widow, Mary, was a claimant. The record of the outcome of her
memorial was lost. NH Claims, vol. I, p. 116.
34New Hampshire Gazette, May 26, 1775.
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two of the first three penitents became claims filers after the war. Or
the cost may have deprived the act of its ritual significance.
Immediately below the first three confessions appeared the
following: "As it is likely there will be a number of confessions,
recantations, etc. it is expected at least that one dollar accompany
each confession etc. as it will be an evidence of their sincerity." Fowle
saw an opportunity to augment his flagging revenues at the expense
of what the printer saw as a steady flow of penitents.35 He was
certainly convinced that a considerable number of confessions would
be forthcoming, though two weeks later he was announcing the
probable cessation of the paper due to a shortage of paper and the
poor payment habits of his subscribers.
The rebel mythmakers continued their attempt to create a
sense of righteousness among the people they hoped to count as
among their number. "An American" suggested that recent events
proved that God was on America's side and that ultimate victory was
at hand.36 The rebel writers also began to create another myth, a
counterweight to the glorious crusade of the liberty-loving
Americans. They began to attack the image of Great Britain, its
inhabitants, rulers, and supporters in America. The negative face of
discourse discussed by James Hunter included derision, ridicule, and
the attempt to totally discredit the opposition with personal attacks
and accusations of all sorts of crimes. The belief that anyone who was
35For more on the concept of printers accepting payment by the piece for the
printing of unusual or controversial topics see Charles E Clark, The Public
Prints. New York: 1994.
36New Hampshire Gazette, July 11,1775.
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not with us was against us (to paraphrase) became the operative
assumption. Americanus began the campaign by suggesting that
anyone who opposed the cause or did it any harm ought to "quit the
country and his personal estate seized for so much as may be
thought his proportion of the public debt, and if found insufficient
then his real estate to be incumbent for the same."37 This demand for
the confiscation of loyalist property came at a time when the royal
governor still awaited succor in Fort William and Mary, though also
at a time when the debate over inflation was just beginning.38 It was
also a time when any rash remark could accomplish two things
quickly, land its speaker in a great deal of trouble, and supply the
rebel propagandists a perfect example of the evil which lurked in the
heart of every "tory." Matthew Christian of Antigua, who had taken
refuge aboard HMS Scarborough which was anchored off the Fort,
allegedly wished "the small pox in all our borders and especially in
the damned rebel army ’round Boston." Christian, safe aboard a

37New Hampshire Gazette, August, 1, 1775.
38Though that discussion has little to do with our subject, it seems a word must
be said here. Beginning with a letter signed A Farmer on 1 August, 1775 a
steadily growing stream of pieces appeared discussing the problem of rising
prices. This would continue well into the war, trickling to a stop only after
the Continental Congress and the state assemblies passed extensive laws
regulating prices. The divide was not between consumers and merchants so
much as it was country farmers and town merchants. The farmers for the
most part blamed merchants for engrossing finished goods, charging
exorbitant prices compared to the prices that the farmers could get for their
raw produce. The merchants wrote back arguing that the costs of goods
coming into the country were inflated before arrival due to British
depredations on merchant ships and on the trade with other neutral states.
The farmers did not accept that and continued to blame merchants as disloyal
for their pricing practices, though the merchants fired back accusing the
farmers of overcharging for their crops as well.
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British warship was untouchable, but the committee of Portsmouth
voted to exile him from all ports "in the known world."39
The paper was quiet through August,

fa ilin g

even to mention

Wentworth's departure during that month. September's numbers
contained notices of the closing of the courts for a year and the text
of Wentworth's proclamation dissolving the assembly made hastily
from the shores of Gosport, Star Island, one of the Isles of Shoals. In
mid-October a notice was published of a

d in n e r

held by "a select

company of gentlemen, all true friends of America." This gathering
dined on turtle and raised a considerable number of toasts to various
patriotic causes including "may every noble whig in America be
always provided with good turtle, and the tories sent to sea in the
shells."40
In the middle of 1776 Benjamin Dearborn temporarily took
over the printing of the New Hampshire Gazette in Portsmouth.
Daniel Fowle had complained that he was tiring of the job in 1775
after nineteen years and it appears he turned the paper over to
Dearborn. Little changed editorially or visually. Dearborn even
continued to number the paper from its original publication date in
1756. He did append the title A Freeman’s Journal to the nameplate.
Dearborn also stepped up the number of opinion pieces in the paper,
specifically those relating to the political situation, especially as
compared to Fowle's last year of publication. One of those first was a
39New Hampshire Gazette, August 8, 1775. Exactly how that was to be
accomplished is unclear, though the plan did call for letters to be sent to
officials throughout the area with which Portsmouth could correspond.
40New Hampshire Gazette, October 17,1775
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scathing attack on loyalists reprinted from the Providence Gazette.
The authors, Amicus Patriae and Filius Libertatis desired that the
government "seize and confine within the narrow circuit of a jail or
prison the sons of this infernal monster." They alleged that "as our
saviour was betrayed by one of his disciples, so is our country by her
pretended friends." Their central theme included the idea that the
wealthy were not to be trusted either because they did not support
liberty or because they put personal interest before the general
good.41 The same number saw the first of many lengthy pieces
signed as Orthodoxus. That writer felt compelled in his first piece to
describe in extraordinary detail the "orthodox political faith of a true
whig." Orthodoxus continued to spew forth his windy political tracts
for months. In June, A Watchman advised that readers ought not
listen to tories who advise caution, adding that they had been
advocating such all along only seeking to delay or destroy liberty. Of
course the intent of A Watchman was to prepare the support for the
imminent break with Great Britain even then still being debated in
Philadelphia. The residents of New Hampshire were well aware of
the doings of the congress, and as discussed previously, they were
not all convinced that independence was such a great idea.42
Orthodoxus continued his weekly pieces in support of
independence and the liberty of America through the month of July,
ending the month with another piece of negative propaganda. On July
27 Orthodoxus described the British as "our cruel oppressors ...who
41 New Hampshire Gazette, June 8,1776.
New Hampshire Gazette, June 29, 1776.
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come armed with fire and sword to waste and destroy our country
robbing us of our lives, exposing to the greatest danger and distress
men, women, and children, and cowardly butchering even the
helpless and unarmed." This attack was followed the next week by
Amicus Reipublica who claimed that "America...is attacked by
unnatural enemies without and still more wicked wretches within
who are aiming to destroy her, may they fall into those very pits
themselves they have digged for her and like Haman be hanged on
the very gallows they have erected for others."43
Those two pieces and another in January of 1777 typify the
invective used by the rebel writers to create an image, an identity in
the minds of their readers. An Enemy to Tories contended that "there
are many such shameful wretches among us at this late hour that
would sell their God, their country, their wives, their children, and all
that is near and dear to them." The writers had a dual purpose, first
to totally destroy the loyalists in the eyes of their neighbors by
implicitly connecting them with the British enemy. The second goal
was to rid the land of the scourge of enemies within: "Upon the
whole, what ought to be done in order to rid us of such vermin?
provide some kind of a bark and after putting on board some
provisions, set them adrift and make it death for any of them ever to
land on any part of the American shore that is inhabited by free
men."44

43New Hampshire Gazette, August 3, 1776.
**New Hampshire Gazette, January 14, 1777.
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The language of the whig/rebels is complex and full of
resonances with other places and times. Their objective was to make
of the British a race of monsters, so infernal and frightening that
there could be no hope of compromise. In late 1776 and 1777 the
rebel cause was not as sure as the rebel leaders would have liked it
to be. A sizable number of the inhabitants of the province were as
yet unhappy with the precipitous nature of the declaration of
independence, and many were equally unhappy with the state of
provincial government. Some of the same arguments used against
John Wentworth in the matter of extending representation to towns
were still being used to attack the rebel assembly. In response, the
rebel writers were trying diligently to create an enemy so fearsome
it would drive the divisive issues right out of the minds of their
readers. While Gage and Burgoyne issued proclamations and pardons
to those who would listen and return to their loyalty to the crown,
the rebels related the loyalists to devils incarnate.
The passions of the readers were inflamed by continually
printing news pieces such as "An Account of the Inhumane Cruelties
to Prisoners in New York," which told of starvation and disease, of
torture and the introduction of the small pox by deliberate act.45
The trend continued through 1777 and 1778. The refrain became
familiar as the victory at Saratoga brought renewed confidence and
commissioners from the king seeking to make an early peace without
the grant of independence. But it was too late for such as that, and
too late for reconciliation with the loyalists as far as General

45New Hampshire Gazette, March 22, 1777.
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Livingston was concerned. Writing to the continental congress in
response to the suggested act offering pardon and reconciliation to
the loyalists, Livingston lamented "Alas, how m any lives had been
saved and what scene of inexpressible misery prevented had we
from the beginning treated our bosom traitors with proper severity
and inflicted the law of retaliation upon an enemy too savage to be
humanized by any other argument" He continued calling the loyalists
"a race of murderers before unequalled" who "waged an infernal war
against their dearest connections." Furthermore, they were "apostates
from reason....whose very presence among the genuine sons of
freedom would seem as unnatural as that of Satan among the sons of
God."46 Livingston's words might well be understood since in New
York the war between loyalists and rebels had become as savage a
civil war as had ever been fought. But the inclusion of this piece in
the New Hampshire Gazette, now back in the hands of its founder
Daniel Fowle, must have had some other reason than a need to fill
space.
The Gazette was by then reflecting a distinct sense of optimism.
Most of the news from the war front was good, especially that
surrounding the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. Problems still
remained, however, particularly problems involving money. The
battle still raged between shopkeepers and farmers over who was
raising prices faster, and why. Counterfeiting was having a serious
effect on the provincial and continental currency, a crime that was
rightly or not attributed primarily to loyalists. In fact the loyalists

46New Hampshire Gazette, July 7, 1778.
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were being blamed for the entire war: "to our internal foes are we
indebted in a great measure for the present war, the immense
expense incurred and the devastation, ravage, and ruin suffered by
us...”47 The rebel writers were attempting to convince the populace
that no war would have ensued had it not been for the loyalists. The
thrust of that contention arose from the idea that it was a loyalist
plea for the protection of their interest that impelled George HI to
embark on war in the first place. By the end of the war that idea was
prevalent. As late as 1781, just three weeks after the news of
Yorktown had arrived in New Hampshire, a satirical piece was
printed purporting to be a conversation between Prince William
Henry and Sir Henry Clinton. The Prince, upon being told of the real
situation in America cried "Damn the loyalists, all this comes from
listening to their tales. They teased my father into this cursed war. I
wish he may hang Galloway at the yard arm of a seventy-four....I will
be revenged on your vile loyalists who have divided the British
empire and brought this ruin upon my father's family."48
The rebels' intentions were multiple. First, in 1777, the rebels
were yet afraid of invasion, even in New Hampshire. The Canadian
threat seemed quite real especially as Burgoyne approached the
province through upper New York. Victories at Bennington and
Saratoga went a long way to assuage those fears. At that point a
secondary objective came into focus, the conversion of loyalist
property into funds the province desperately needed. To accomplish
47New Hampshire Gazette, August 23, 1777.
48New Hampshire Gazette, November 17, 1781.
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that, the enemy needed to be clearly identified and made to look as
though he were a minion of the devil himself. The reports of loyalist
and British atrocities from the other colonies provided the only clear
means of demonstrating the danger from within to which even New
Hampshire might fall prey. Despite the successes of 1777 the rebels
needed the apparition of "Britons, Hessians, Savages, and more
savage tories."49 That was especially true in New Hampshire where a
substantial body of the unconverted remained fairly unmolested and
residing in Portsmouth. The state of affairs there was, from the
perspective of one writer, terribly dangerous. M' Namora wrote that
"It's astonishing to see daily the insults offered by the Tories and
unnoticed by the Committee." Namora alleged that the loyalists had a
sophisticated network of intelligence agents who gathered reports for
the British in New York, and were able to learn of the outcomes of
battles elsewhere even before the rebel authorities. Thus these tories
were able to disappoint and delude the public by making claims of
British victories, exaggerating rebel losses and minimizing their
victories. Namora continued that these traitors continued to have
dinners and drink toasts and that they gave each other secret signs
in the streets by eye contact and head nods, and that something
ought to be done about i t 50
A reply appeared the following week. That Benjamin Dearborn
had the courage to print it is attributable to the fact that it came at a
time when the outcome of the conflict was still seriously in doubt,
49New Hampshire Gazette, May 25, 1779.
50New Hampshire Gazette, September 21, 1776.
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and to the fact th at the writer appealed to his pride as an
"unprejudiced impartial printer." Signed, I Am What You Will, the
loyalist writer mocked Namora's paranoia:
Well done Namora, you talk sense, you preach liberty,
real genuine liberty, downright alamode liberty, by God. I
must observe however that I was at first a good deal
alarmed on discovering your design of abolishing looks
and nods, those dear conveyors of our secret m e a n in g,
but when I found you only meant significant ones, and
that out of the abundance of your great goodness and
im partiality you had confined it to tories, I was
immediately reconciled to it and discovered by the help
of certain political microscopic glasses, that it tended to
the public good....'Tis a disgrace to the state to allow such
significant looks and nods and if the legislative body of
these states have not in their great wisdom alread y
provided a punishment adequate to the diabolical nature
of so black a crime (which hardly admits of a doubt) I
think the honorable committee of this town, if they desire
that the trumpet of fame should sound their praises to
after ages cannot have a fairer opportunity of
immortalizing their names, that by enacting laws against
such treasonable and unheard of practices which would
at once discover their patriotic zeal for their country,
their wise and godlike penetration into the nature and
cause of things, and their unerring knowledge of mankind
who carry on daily the most villainous conspiracies in no
other language than looks and nods
I humbly think a
significant look ought to be punished by a burning out of
the optics, and a nod by severing off the offending head
from the unoffending body.51
The humor of What You Will was lost on some like A. B. who
responded by saying "we have some among us who not only refuse
to submit to the authority by which we are governed, but in the most

51New Hampshire Gazette, September 28, 1776.
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insolent and unprovoked manner, ridicule those by whom we
consent to be governed."52 It is suggestive that A. B.'s was the only
response to What You Will, perhaps a sign that Portsmouth's or New
Hampshire's rebels had greater things on their minds, but it is also
interesting that no further loyalist writings appeared in the Gazette
until March of 1779.
By then the war appeared lost to most Britons and even the
loyalists who fought on beside the regulars sensed that perhaps the
ministry lacked any real will to win, or the ability to direct a war at
all. By that time too, the property of loyalists who had departed the
province or taken up arms under the king's standard had been
confiscated and at least awaited sale. Those who had left had either
been named and banished or proscribed by virtue of their action in
taking up arms, attainted traitors in either case. The loyalists who
remained may still have harbored some dim hope of a British
victory, but such is doubtful. It would seem that instead they were
endeavoring to ameliorate the impact that a rebel victory might
inevitably have on them and their absent friends. Toward that end,
when a town meeting was convened in Portsmouth in March of 1779,
a petition was introduced for the purpose of repealing a portion of
the confiscation act. The supporters of the petition desired that the
town meeting endorse their effort and transmit it to the legislature
for approval. According to AZ who wrote to the Gazette to protest this
meeting which he contended was hastily called, the whole thing was
a plan fomented by "those kind of beings called tories, together with

52New Hampshire Gazette^ October 12,1776.
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great numbers of a worse character (if possible), I mean the twofaced go-between gentry whose conduct is regulated by our good or
ill success..."53 AZ further claimed that the meeting was dominated
by that group and their friends.
The following week a response was printed from Veritas who
vehemently denied the presence of tories and their sympathizers at
the meeting but suggested instead that many of the foremost men of
the town had been there, including a former representative of the
state to the Continental Congress, and several members of the state
assembly. Veritas explained that the petition (which was submitted
to the legislature but after passing the lower house was defeated by
the council) was concerned only with the point that the loyalist
estates were confiscated without due process. A Freeholder, in the
same number, added "No one can detest a tory more than myself, nor
do I think any punishment too severe for such as have malignantly
deserted their country or took up arms against it, but I can never
consent that even one of them or any other person for any crime
whatsoever should be punished without a trial."54 The author
concluded by castigating a government more tyrannical than that
which the country was fighting against.
A reply from AZ was swift and scathing. In the number of the
13th, AZ responded with vitriol calling Veritas a liar in no uncertain
terms and at length, and then contended that the petition was a tory
contrivance. After blasting Veritas and tories in general, AZ advised
53New Hampshire Gazette, March 30, 1779.
54New Hampshire Gazette, April 6, 1779.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

233

A Freeholder to be very careful "in future about

ra ilin g

the present

government 'the mock liberties of a boasted American constitution'
as it is apprehended he will be indicted for high treason if he should
persist therein." As if threats and vilification were not enough,
beneath the letter AZ included a poem entitled "To Veritas" which
read:
Poor misguided Veritas, how couldest thou
in a fit so mad prostitute thy pen
to such ignoble use? Sure some demon
invaded then thy melancholy mind
and in that gloomy hour didst it turn all
thy noble flights of fancy to ______
and abuse to please but a wretched few
Harpies and Parricides that daily suck
the vital blood from this wounded country....55
The next number saw a reply from Veritas full of n a m e -c a llin g
but little else. A Freeholder, threatened in the last exchange, fought
back by saying he was not afraid to contend against "crafty and
designing men [that] thrust themselves into legislative power, who to
satisfy their own selfish purposes or indulge a malicious disposition
should subvert our happy constitution, abolish our most valuable
privileges and in their stead substitute the most arbitrary acts of
violence and oppression, then truly every honest man will have
sufficient cause not only to be cautious but to fear that instead of
being mocked with the formality of an indictment he may find
himself fettered in the dreary apartments of an Inquisition."56 The

55New Hampshire Gazette, April 13, 1779
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exchange of letters ended with that piece but the feeling that tories
represented a threat to the peace and security of the state persisted.
Those fears were fueled by the rebel writers who consistently
portrayed loyalists as "savage tories." The reading public was not
allowed to forget die kinds of atrocities practiced by the British and
the tories, crimes all the more heinous in rebel eyes for that they
were committed by former neighbors, by brothers. AZ's use of the
word "parricides"57 was not a conceit based on classical allusion but a
reference to a civil struggle which in other provinces actually saw
brothers slaying each other. The rebel writers complained that
"among the many errors America has been guilty of during h er
contest with Great Britain few have been greater or attended with
more fatal consequences to these states than her lenity to th e
tories."58 Despite the efforts of the rebel writers and the printer who
filled the pages of the New Hampshire Gazette with their words, the
loyalists still resident in New Hampshire rem ained relatively
unmolested. Indeed it might be that very situation which provoked
even more concern among the locals.
It became a pronounced fear among the rebels that loyalists
would somehow insinuate their way into a place where they could
assume responsible positions in the government. For that reason
56New Hampshire Gazette, April 20, 1779.
57The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines parricide as "One who murders his
father or near relative or one whose person is held sacred; person guilty of
treason against his country." H.W. Fowler and F.G. Fowler, eds., The Concise
Oxford Dictionary o f Current English. Oxford: 1917.
58New Hampshire Gazette, September 7, 1779, taken from the Pennsylvania
Packet, August 5,1779.
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Fowle copied a warning from A Whig reminding his readers that the
cause was not yet won, nor would it be if the vigilance of the
community were relaxed. "Rouse America, your danger is great from
a quarter where you least expect it, the tories. The tories will yet be
the ruin of you."59 In September of 1779 assembly elections loomed
large in the minds of the populace, and with the threat of imminent
invasion nearly gone, the electorate was in danger of sliding into a
sense of complacency which the ardent rebels found dangerous. Thus
their need to remind the readers, indeed to enlarge upon the theme
that the tories were responsible solely for the conditions of fear and
economic disturbance through which the province had suffered since
1775. "who were the occasion of the war?" asked A Whig. "The tories.
Who persuaded the tyrant of Britain to prosecute it in a manner
before unknown to civilized nations and shocking even to
barbarians? The tories." The whig/rebels would convince the voters
that the loyalists were completely responsible for the war, and still
in a position to affect the outcome. The solution offered was difficult
but necessary, "'tis time my countrymen to rid ourselves of these
bosom vipers....Think of these things betimes, my countrymen, before
it be too late and your posterity forever have reason to repent your
lenity to the tories."60
It is significant that such exhortations to persecution of the
loyalist remnant should need to come from the pen of a writer from
59Neiv Hampshire Gazette, September 7, 1779. taken from the Pennsylvania
Packet, August 5,1779.
60jvevv Hampshire Gazette, September 7, 1779. taken from the Pennsylvania
Packet, August 5,1779.
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Pennsylvania, and just as significant that Daniel Fowle, who h ad
resumed printing the Gazette, should choose to publish the writings
of A Whig. One might suppose that pieces of this sort were included
at the behest of the ruling faction, the rebel leaders requiring or
requesting the printer to print this campaign. If that were so,
however, one might easily wonder why no local writer took up the
refrain and called for a continued persecution of the loyalists in the
local community.

Fowle ran the article by A Whig in two full

columns on the front page of that number, a section generally
reserved for the most important war news or publications of the
rebel government. For the most part, the only other political analysis
which claimed front page priority were the letters exchanged
between Massachusettensis and Novanglus back in 1775 at the
outset of the struggle. Even those weighty words were quickly
relegated to the middle pages as they progressed, as were the
columns of Thomas Paine entitled the American Crisis. It is
conceivable that Fowle chose to attack loyalists so vehemently
because of his nephew, Robert Fowle.
Early in 1776 Robert Fowle had left the printing office in
Portsmouth and set up his own press in Exeter. There beginning
with an announcement broadside dated May 22, 1776, the younger
Fowle printed the New Hampshire Gazette or Exeter M orning
Chronicle. The first real number appeared in June. Robert Fowle's
paper was notable for the lack of letters and articles expressing the
positions of either side and the few pieces which appeared in the
single year the paper was published were exclusively rebel in origin.
The pieces included were also all by local authors, or the printer
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failed to attribute them to the papers from which he may have
copied them. Those facts would be less than remarkable were it not
for Fowle's arrest for counterfeiting in 1777 (the end of his
newspaper career), and that upon his escape, he joined the British in
New York. As mentioned previously, he became a m em ber of
Wentworth's Volunteers and eventually made his way to England.
The content of Robert Fowle's newspaper consisted of news and
advertisements, though it was the news that seems more interesting.
Fowle printed detailed accounts of rebel military movements, as well
as summaries of skirmishes and battles. In contrast to the similar
stories which appeared in the Portsmouth paper, Robert Fowle
seemed very interested in the numbers of rebel troops involved in
maneuvers, and in the numbers or amounts of supplies, arms, and
ammunition which were procured by the rebel faction. It is possible
that while Fowle disguised his loyalist inclination behind the few
anti-loyalist pieces he printed, he conveyed logistical information to
the British through the details of his news stories.61
Whether or not Daniel Fowle sought to distance himself from
his loyalist nephew, the elder Fowle continued his campaign against

61 New Hampshire Gazette or Exeter Morning Chronicle. June 1, 1776 through
July 15, 1777. Two arguments might be made concerning Robert Fowle. Either
he was a loyalist through and through and chose to gather intelligence for
the British, passing it to them through the means of his newspaper, all the
while allegedly counterfeiting provincial currency in order to throw the
rebel economy into turmoil, or he was a greedy counterfeiter who, when
caught, found a sudden call to the cause of the King’s standard. It is
impossible, I think, to discern the truth at this remove. It may be relevant
that he did return to New Hampshire and lived out his days in America, dying
in Brentwood, New Hampshire in 1802. But did he return because he was not a
true loyalist and he was no longer attainted for his treason, or did he return
because he could not live in Britain on the meager pension he was granted
by the Claims Commission?
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loyalists with another warning from A Whig. "Beware of those who
have not been firm and unshaken from the beginning of the contest
to the present time; beware of those who, under the mask of
Whigism, are now hand in glove with persons strongly suspected to
be enimical to our cause."62 The attacks of A Whig went
unchallenged by loyalist writers, either because none dared to raise
the pen or because Fowle chose not to open the forum to dissenting
voices. The last moderate loyalist writer was A Freeholder. In April
of 1779 he penned the last salvo in the exchange discussed
previously with AZ. Yet the rebel position was taken up the following
year by A Farmer who again (though for the last time during the war
years) asserted the rebel myth of "insinuating traitors, who at this
time employ every engine and pursue every probable method to
discourage a virtuous people bravely struggling for their freedom
and who would gladly wallow in the blood of those whom under a
veil of friendship they wish to deceive and ruin. The various artful
measures adopted by these cruel parricides are too numerous to
relate..."63
It can be seen now that the New Hampshire G azette of
Portsmouth, and only to a very minor extent Robert Fowle's paper in
Exeter, became the primary vehicles by which the culture war was
fought in New Hampshire. Such a discursive struggle was
necessitated by conditions peculiar to the rebellion in New
Hampshire, but present in different form in the other provinces as
62New Hampshire Gazette, November 23, 1779.
63 New Hampshire Gazette, August 5, 1780.
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well. The rebel faction in New Hampshire was neither large nor
particularly powerful at the outset of the contest. Indeed one writer
has concluded that it may have been more the influence of the
Massachusetts model than the incendiary leadership of indigenous
rebels which began the process in New Hampshire.64 Yet the faction
was faced with the task of converting a significant portion of the
populace to its viewpoint as quickly as possible, while faced with the
potential of invasion and actual fighting. The rebellion in New
Hampshire was fought not primarily in military terms but as a
struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the inhabitants. The struggle
from the rebel perspective was indeed one of conquest, in which
through the methods of discourse, a new identity was fashioned for
the community. Even the control of the militia and the sophisticated
surveillance and policing network encompassed by the provincial
and town committees were inadequate to meet that need through
coercion alone. Victory required the conversion of the mass of men in
thought as well as action. As Lincoln put it, "such a radical recasting
of collective identity, which amounts to the deconstruction of a
previously significant sociopolitical border and the corollary
construction of a new, encompassing sociopolitical aggregate, can
hardly be accomplished through force alone."65
The rebel strategy required more than mere acquiescence to
the change in status. Military means were inadequate to convince or
compel the populace to embrace the "glorious cause." It was
64Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 16.
65Lincoln, Discourse, p. 4.
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necessary to recast the colonial identity into a new American
identity, one based upon but superior to that identity which had
defined society for two centuries and more. In the course of doing so,
the rebels created the myth of the evil Briton and the even more
despicable tory, casting the enemies of the people into stark terms of
good and evil worthy of Milton. By creating the dichotomy of
righteous "patriot" versus diabolical "tory" and Briton, the rebels
accomplished a means of control and conquest far more effective and
lasting than any which could have come about through some form of
military occupation. The rebellion in New Hampshire was won by
effecting the change of allegiance among the people from the mother
country to the province, by shifting the commitment of the hearts of
the people to the new polity.66 No amount of force could effect that
change in identity, only a victory in a war of persuasion, a war for
which the loyalists were unprepared at the outset, and in which they
never succeeded in recouping their initial losses.
Both sides in the culture war of 1775 to 1781 appealed to
tradition, though each defined it differently. To the whig/rebels,
tradition began with the mythical freedoms of Saxon England,
freedoms tram pled underfoot by successively m ore despotic
monarchs until revived in the Glorious Revolution of 1689. Those
liberties were endangered again by the corruption and evil of the
ministry and the tyrannical George HL Only the virtue of a free and

66LincoIn, Discourse, "Ultimately, that which either holds society together or
takes it apart is sentiment, and the chief instrument with which such
sentiment may be aroused, manipulated, and rendered dormant is discourse."
p. 11.
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independent America withstood the gathering darkness, only the
righteous who hearkened back to the purity and strength of the
generation which had founded the New England colonies could hope
to persevere against the forces of the diabolical king and his savage
minions the tories.
Tradition in loyalist terms had its roots in the same soil, though
its proponents adhered to the belief that law and the English
constitution were alone a sufficient bulwark against the incursions of
despotism. The rending of society by rebellion and the crusade for
independence were unnecessary and unnatural. Rational men, they
believed, could calmly and deliberately reach an accommodation
with the government, and perhaps effect its dissolution and
replacement by right-thinking men who would recognize and respect
the colonial position. But the private agendas of the leaders of the
radical faction dictated rejection of such a course and the prosecution
of a struggle for the faith of the majority, a struggle won handily by
the rebels. The proof of the completeness and speed of the rebel
victory lies in the lack of organized resistance by the loyalists on
either the military or discursive levels. The rebels had taken control
of the legislature in 1774, and demonstrated control of the militia in
December of that year. They had monopolized the media and begun
the discursive conquest of the province by that time as well. By early
in 1775, the infrastructure of government was firmly entrenched,
and the revolution in New Hampshire had been completed before the
first shots were fired.
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Chapter Six
Zealous Sufferers, Identity and the Formation
of the Loyalist Community
I was sent for yesterday to visit a sick and dying man at
Greenland Place near the foundling hospital, whose name
was Thomas Cumings of New Hampshire in America. He
has a pension of £40, a wife, and several children....He has
been heard before your honourable board on his claims
and is now starving, dying, and wanting every necessary
of life. Is without money and indebted to his landlord (a
poor gardener) above £40 for house rent and victuals.
Physicians will not visit him unless for a guinea each
visit, and medicines cannot be had without money.
Several small collections have been made for him and his
wretched family among such American loyalists as have
small pensions...1
The next words penned by Samuel Peters in his letter to the
Claims Commissioners betray a sense of bitterness and loss. Peters
continued stating: "as those who have large pensions cannot spare six
pence for human nature in distress. The little whole has again and
again been expended and he as poor as ever."2 Peters' letter was too
little too late; Thomas Cumings died less than two weeks later. At
first glance the situation Peters described might seem to indicate that
1Samuel Peters to Claims Commissioners as part of the memorial of Thomas
Cumings, NH Claims, vol. I, p. 377.
^NH Claims. vol. I, p. 378.
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there was in London at that time no community of loyalists, no
support structure at all. Mary Beth Norton, at least has argued nearly
that very point. In The British Americans, Norton asserts evidence
showing that there was little interaction between the loyalists of the
various provinces during or after the war. But how much interaction
is necessary to show the existence of a community?
Samuel Peters was not suggesting that no community existed
among the New Hampshire loyalists in London. He was instead
lamenting a breakdown in that community. He was criticizing the
portion of the community that had the means to help those who
needed their help, and yet refused to do so. Their refusal did not
signify the absence of community, merely that the "better sort" were
shirking their community obligations.
This chapter will argue that as the process described in the
previous chapters unfolded, the transform ation of identity
undergone by the loyalists produced a num ber of physical
communities of loyalists (in Canada, the Floridas, and the Caribbean,
as well as in England). But it will also show that the transformation of
the loyalist identity produced a larger ideational community that
encompassed most if not all of the loyalists regardless of their
eventual geographic place of settlement.
The process through which the loyalist identity was created
began with a decision each potential loyalist had to make for himself
and possibly for his family. As we saw in Chapter One, several factors
guided the choice of remaining loyal as opposed to the perhaps easier
choice of joining the ascendent faction in rebellion. It might seem
that prominent loyalists had no choice to make. The lives of certain
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men were intrinsically tied to the royal interest, G o v ern o r
Wentworth for one. Yet to assert that Wentworth had no choice
would be untrue and would be to deny his human capacity for free
will. John Wentworth had a choice and chose to embrace the royal
cause. At the same time his opponents had assumed the choice he
would make and treated him accordingly. The same could be said for
most of the prominent men who would rem ain loyal.
Yet many prominent men figured in the forefront of the rebel
faction. So prominence, and the wealth and public influence that
produce that prominence, were not determining factors in the choice
to remain loyal. And as we have seen, n eith er were family
connections, religion, or profession. The cause of the decision to
remain loyal came from within the identity of each loyalist, the
identity that I have described as the "who" we perceive ourselves to
be. Amid the defining factors in each potential loyalist's self-concept,
was the deep-seated belief in law and constitutional government that
was revealed later in the claimant memorials. They were "zealously
attached to the King and Constitution of Great Britain."3
After the outbreak of rebellion the zeal and attachment of the
loyalists were manifested in the projected identities of "who" they
projected themselves to be. In Chapter Two we examined the acts of
loyalists as they projected their identities publicly. Certainly some
acted out of self-interest alone, or from some other reason. Among
the thousands of claimants and the thousands more who did not file
a claim for compensation, there must have been a considerable
3Loyalist Claims, Hugh Dean, vol. XII, p. 171.
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number who identified themselves as loyalists out of extrem e
necessity or other less defined motives. Certainly some of the claims
were fraudulent.4 For the Claims Commission to determine that a
claim was fraudulent, or at least unworthy of compensation, meant
that the claimant had not met some test of loyalty. The Claims
Commission itself determined the worthiness of a claim based first
on the identity of the loyalist. If the claimant did not m eet the
standards for conforming to the loyalist identity, the claim was lost.
Only after the claimant could reasonably be considered a loyalist
based on the criteria of the loyalist identity could the commission
weigh the validity of the material losses claimed. But these were two
separate issues. A man could be a loyalist but receive no
compensation, yet he could not receive compensation if he lost
everything but was not a loyalist.
One example of such a case might clarify the point. Under the
name of James Nevin, Isabella Nevin submitted a petition to the
"Lord commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury" on April 30, 1778.
Isabella claimed to have come to England "about the beginning of the
disturbances in America, which soon afterwards broke out into open
rebellion."5 Living in New Hampshire, she had been comfortable, as
her husband had held the post of Collector of the Port of Piscataqua,

4Among others, the claim of James Gordon, a self-styled land speculator who
had allegedly acquired an interest in a vast tract of Indian land in Georgia
with two partners. According to the other parties in the deal, Gordon had no
monetary interest at stake though he was claiming for compensation for a
full third of the lost land and improvements. See Loyalist Claims, James
Gordon, vol. XII, p. 79; and Alexander McNaighton, vol.XII, p. 141.
5NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. ID, p. 1460.
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and was a member of the Council. However she had been forced to
flee the province because of the demonstrated loyalty of her family.
Though Isabella Nevin's circumstances were reduced by her flight,
things went from bad to worse. As she reported "about seven months
ago, she had the misfortune to be crushed against a wall, and thrown
down by a brewer's dray in the street." Nevin added that she was
thankful to be alive and "able to crawl about again," but requested
the assistance of government to support herself and two children.
Despite the support of a certificate dated 25 April, 1778 from
Governor John Wentworth,6 Isabella Nevin's petition was denied by
the Treasury. Persisting, Nevin wrote to Lord George Germain in
May.7 Whether or not Germain replied, Nevin was unable to gain
support. She reiterated her claim to the Claims Commission in 1784,
but was again denied, the commissioners stating, "we are clearly of
opinion that Mrs. Nevin is not entitled to expect or receive any
allowance from government as an American Sufferer."8 Though
clearly a pathetic case, Isabella Nevin could not claim aid based on
her husband's loyalty. James Nevin had died in 1769, and in the
words of the commissioners he had "died many years before he could
have an opportunity of showing his loyalty in the present dispute."9
Certificate of John Wentworth, NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. Ill, p. 1459.
7Nevin to Germain, 5 May, 1778. NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. Ill, p. 1455-56.
8NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. m, p. 1472.
9NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. HI, p. 1472. The Nevin case raises complicated
issues of the loyalist identity and of gender. For the purposes o f the claims
process, neither Isabella nor her husband James could be identified as
loyalists. James Nevin was dead before the issue became a choice for him, and
his widow was already in England before the rebellion could force her to
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Chapters Three and Four considered the rebel response to the
loyalists' decision. By projecting the "who" they believed themselves
to be, the loyalists subjected themselves to reprisals from those
observers that received the "who" that others perceive. The loyalist
identity perceived by the rebel authorities was other than that which
the loyalists believed themselves to be. The loyalists saw themselves
as true Americans, men of principle who would fight if necessary to
preserve the union with Great Britain and the life that that
connection had provided. The rebels on the other hand perceived the
loyalists to be enemies and traitors, betrayers of the community to
which they had belonged. Their responses are indicative of a
community attempting to deal with outsiders, with "otherness."
To do so, the rebel leaders redefined their opponents, creating
the "who" they constructed the loyalists to be. Chapter Three
explored the physical repercussions which befell the loyalists as a
result of the perception of their identity as enemies to the
community. Once the period of physical reprisals subsided, the
creation of the "tory" identity began in emest. As Chapter Four
relates, the first constructed identity following that period was
defined by the legal definition of treason. Once the loyalists were
choose either. Mrs. Nevin was not denied compensation because of her
gender, but rather because she could not claim, directly or indirectly, to
have made the choice to remain loyal. The other female claimants in New
Hampshire did not share that disability. Two were widows of identifiable
loyalists, and one was the mother of the governor. The sources for New
Hampshire are not adequate to analyze the impact of gender on either the
claims process or the loyalist identity. The same may be said of blacks and
Indians. There simply is no data at all concerning them. As this study grows
in the future with the inclusion of all of the claims from all of the provinces,
I hope to add a chapter on the identity formation of loyalist women, and
should there be any claims from racial minorities, those will be considered as
well.
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defined as traitors and no longer as neighbors, the government was
able to attaint and banish them and to seize their property.
From the outbreak of the rebellion to its conclusion, a
discursive struggle raged concurrently with the military one. In New
Hampshire a t least, the high ground belonged to the rebels. With
nearly complete control of the press, rebel writers created a more
complete identity for their ideological opponents. Chapter Five
detailed the battle for the allegiance of the residents of the province,
a struggle m irrored elsewhere in the rebellious colonies. Only in the
garrison towns were the loyalists able to respond with any success to
the "who" the rebel writers projected them to be.10
As a result of this conflict of identities, the loyalists arrived at a
point where each had assumed a new identity, a new "who" each
perceived him self to be. Gone were most of the old defining
characteristics. Land and other property were lost to rebel cupidity.
Offices no longer existed, and most professionals struggled to ply
their skills in new and sometimes austere circumstances. Though
merchants and artisans still could carry on their business with some
success, their sense of place was lost. Their homes were in the hands
of strangers and they were banished by law from their former lands
and communities.
The newly defined loyalists created a new community, an
ideational one, if not a geographic one. It was a community of shared
experience, of shared suffering, and one of shared need. That need,

!0See for example, Cynthia Dubin Edelberg, "Jonathan Odell and Philip
Freneau: Poetry and Politics in the Garrison Town of New York City," in
Robert M. Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Com munity.
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as well as the experiences and suffering that created it were
revealed in the claims the loyalists wrote.
Jack P. Greene has argued that a society creates an identity
through the interaction of four forces or variables at work in the
community: environment, shared goals, shared standards, and a
shared history.11 Greene stipulated that the interaction of the four
variables produce a corporate identity, an identity vital to the
existence of a community since it provides each member of the
community with a way of finding "meaning in their own individual
lives."12 All of the variables were present among the loyalists of New
Hampshire during and after the war.
Once a community comes into being, it continually develops its
corporate identity. It does so as its individual members articulate
their conceptions of what that identity is, and refine their sense of
belonging to it. This is what Samuel Peters was attempting to do in
his letter to the Commission. Though he had probably chosen the
wrong forum for airing his sense of loss, Peters was affirming the
existence of the loyalist identity, and the community to which that
identity was now committed.
Greene added that the corporate identity is augmented by yet
another view, that of those who view the community from the
outside. So for the creation of a valid corporate identity there must
be not only self-conceptualization, but also the recognition of those

11Greene, "Changing Identity in the British West Indies," in Imperatives,
Behaviors, and Identities, p. 14.
12Greene, "Changing Identity," p. 15.
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outside the community in question. To a certain extent those outside
the community must agree with the individuals within as to the
nature of the community. The loyalists met Greene's criteria as a new
community and expressed their self-conception through their
writings, among them their memorials to the claims commission.
The New Hampshire loyalists shared geographic proximity in
their place of origin sufficient to forge a kinship wherever they
eventually settled, not only among themselves but also with loyalists
of other provinces.13 The loyalists certainly held shared goals:
survival at first, and then the reconstruction of secure and
prosperous lives. Perhaps more than most communities, the loyalists
held shared values, preeminent among them their adherence to what
they believed to be the lawful authority in British A m erica,
Parliament and the Crown. They developed over time into two
distinct communities due to environment, the settlers of peripheral
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Canada separating from those who
settled in metropolitan England, but by the time those distinctions

13The extent to which the loyalist community extended beyond the former
provincial divisions is in some doubt. Norton argued forcefully that the
absence of cooperation among the loyalist groups in London proved the lack
of a loyalist community. "In short, there was little sustained intercolonial
mingling among the refugees, either in residential neighborhoods or at
communal meeting places." (Norton, p. 68) "The various exile circles, then,
existed independently of each other. There were a few points of congruence,
places where the circles touched or interlocked, but on the whole these
connections were both peripheral and accidental." (Norton, p. 71-72) Norton
argued that the lack of intercolonial relations obviates the possibility that a
loyalist community can be proposed. I beg to differ, and suggest that the
supposed lack of intercolonial contact was relegated for the most part to the
loyalist community in London. I also offer that the circumstances described
by Norton do not rule out the communal sharing of the loyalist identity, nor
a place in the ideational community.
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arose, the community residing in England could no longer truly be
differentiated as loyalist from within the metropolis of which they
had become a part. In fact the loyalist community in England was
ephemeral, having only a brief life of its own, and transcending the
physical limitations of a particular environment. If that were the
case, and I believe it is, some other variable might substitute for
Greene's "most important ingredient in defining the identities of the
new society."14 A specific shared experience, a traumatic one, amply
provided the environmental component necessary to the formation
of the collective identity. This shared experience differed from the
collective experience Greene lists as one of his variables. The
collective experience, as he defines it, began at the moment of
conception in the birth of the new community, and continued
afterward. It was a shared history, expanding and changing with the
passage of time. The loyalists brought with them to their new
community a shared experience in the past, but that experience was
of sufficient physical or emotional violence that it would tend to form
a communal bond between individuals irrelevant of original
geographical proximity.15
The first step in the self-conscious development of a communal
consciousness was the concept of self-definition, or naming. As
mentioned above, the men and women who adhered to the crown
called themselves loyalists. That was the "who" each had become.
14Greene, "Changing Identity," p. 14.
15We see the formation of such communities in our own time over even larger
geographic areas thanks to the ease of mass communications. National and
even international communities form surrounding a shared traumatic
experience such as AIDS, disasters, or war experiences.
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There is significance to this seemingly obvious statement.

C erta in ly

the earliest historians of the revolution chose to use the word "tory."
Not in the sense that equated the loyalists to the court party of
English politics, but rather as a pejorative term, much like the origin
of the usage "puritan" in the early seventeenth century. By the time
of the revolution in the American colonies, the word "tory" was
reserved as an epithet, a verbal brand, a byword that tarred its
target as surely as the word traitor. Thus we do not find the loyalists
using it as a word to describe themselves. Tory was a word used
almost exclusively by the rebel writers who pursued the war in a
battle of words carried on in newspapers and pamphlets. One author
wrote:
The terms, Whig and Tory, had never been used
much in America. The Massachusetts people in
general were of the principle of the ancient Whigs,
attached to the Revolution and to the succession of
the crown in the house of Hanover. A very few who
might have been called Tories in England, took the
name of Jacobites in America. All of a sudden, the
officers of the crown and such as were keeping up
their authority, were branded with the name of
Tories, always the term of reproach; their opposers
assuming the name of Whigs, became the common
people, as far as they had been acquainted with the
parties in England, all supposed the Whigs to have
been in the right and the Tories in the wrong."16

16Qjaoted in North Callahan, Flight from the Republic The Tories o f the
American Revolution. Indianapolis: 1967. p. xi. Callahan attributes the quote
to " the man who might be called 'Mr. Tory himself,'" but gives no clue to the
identity of his source, its location, or really even its time. I have assumed the
words to be contemporary. It is interesting to note further that after using
this quotation in his preface, Callahan persists in the use of the term "tory"
throughout the book and quite exclusively.
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Nowhere in the claims of New Hampshire loyalists does a single
one of them ever refer to himself or a fellow as a "tory." Instead
several names or phrases frequently appear to describe the self
concept they had erected: loyalists, of course, and "friends of
government,"

"the King's friends," "American sufferers," and so

forth.17
For the past two hundred years scholars have differed over
what to call the loyalists. Writers of the nineteenth century, even a
man as interested in the loyalists as Lorenzo Sabine, often called
them tories while referring to the patriots as Whigs extensively. Such
usage reveals the degree to which a scholar who spent years
researching loyalists had bought into the myth manufactured by
contemporaries and perpetuated throughout most of the past two
hundred years, the myth of the stalwart virtuous patriot (whig) ever
vigilant and successful in opposition to the bloodthirsty, deceitful
tory whose response to the struggle for American liberty was to
forsake his country in its time of need and take to pillaging his
former countrymen or worse. To be sure, loyal military units were
extensively used to gather supplies, and there seems to be no
question that loyalist guerillas perpetrated numerous atrocities in
the course of the war, but self-styled patriots were guilty of similar
acts as well.

17NH Claims, infra. There are however two instances in the New Hampshire
Claims where loyalists use the word "tory" but only in the sense that they are
quoting or paraphrasing the words of their rebel opponents. I have yet to
find a single use of the word in any claims from other provinces.
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Even today there is confusion in the literature between the
terms tory and loyalist. Those who fear redundancy prefer to
interchange the terms as though they were synonymous, while some
like North Callahan or William Nelson18 prefer the shorter, and
perhaps more evocative, tory. But it would seem that the usage ought
to be determined by the thoughts and feelings of those we attempt to
understand after two centuries. Aside from their self-conception, we
might consult those communities outside who view the loyalists as a
discrete entity. Two particular witnesses to the creation of loyalist
communal identity were the patriots to whom they were opposed,
and the British, with whom they were allied. In no contemporary
accounts discovered for this study do British officials, military
officers or other commentators refer to the loyalists as tories. Again
and again in official dispatches letters home and so fo rth ,B ritis h
writers refer to the American loyalists as Loyalists or friends of
government. It was

the rebels who used the term as one of

18William H. Nelson, The American Tory. New York: 1961. Nelson admits to
using the term "for the sake of convenience," but he also claims it is a
relevant one because he wants to make a connection between loyalist
ideology and the court party in England earlier in the century. That might
not be possible. The loyalists, as so many recent works have pointed out, were
as incensed as the eventual patriots at the unfortunate turn government had
made beginning in 1765 with the Stamp Act. Prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, they differed with their neighbors really only in the question of
what nature the appropriate response ought to assume. The loyalist position
relied on traditional assumptions as to the nature o f resistance and the
degree to which that resistance could lawfully be exercised. The eventual
"rebels" shared no such concerns, arguing that all means of resistance to
oppression were legitimate.
for example the contents of K.G. Davies, ed., Documents o f the
American Revolution 1770-1783. Colonial Office Series. 21 Volumes. Dublin,
Ireland: 1972-1981.

^ C o n s id e r
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opprobrium, drawing frequently the caricature of the "damned
tory,"20 suspected of every misdeed, and certainly every malefactor,
committing whatever crime against the community must have been a
tory.
The views of the diverse groups who admitted the existence of
this loyalist community were crucial to its formation, its experience,
and its eventual fate. They were also central to the impetus which
produced the claims themselves. Continual British misunderstanding
of the situation in America contributed to the formation of the
loyalist community. Had the ministry been able to better understand
the strength and location of loyal support, and act upon it quickly,
the course of events might have been altered.21 Some estimates, like
that of Samuel Hale for New Hampshire, contend that "nearly one
third of the inhabitants for a long time retained their loyalty."22 But
popular support dissipated quickly in the absence of British military
support. Conversely, loyalist support was sometimes lost when the
army was nearby, since the British routinely failed to differentiate
between friend and foe. One correspondent writing home to England
observed: "the friends to government have been worse used by these
troops [the British army] than by the rebels. Plundering, and
20Anonymous, Historical Anecdotes Civil and Military: A Series o f Letters
written from America, in the years 1777 and 1778, to different Persons in
England; Containing Observations on the General Management o f the War,
and on the Conduct o f our Principal Commanders, in the Revolted Colonies
during that Period. London: printed for J. Bew, in Paternoster-Row 1779. p. 2.
Hereinafter cited as Historical Anecdotes.
21Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, A Study in British Revolutionary
Policy. Chapel Hill: 1964.
22JVH Claims, Samuel Hale, vol.

n, p.

733. in a letter, Hale to Ira Allen, nd.
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destroying property, without distinction, have been practiced;
insomuch that many people have joined Washington, because they
found most protection from him, though otherwise well affected to
the King."23 One claimant, John Fenton, complained that General Gage
had destroyed his farm on Bunker Hill to erect fortifications there.24
Bom in the experience of war, or at least severe dislocation, the
loyalist community sought ways to achieve its shared goals. Some of
its members quickly turned to government, seeking to find for
themselves that security promised in the proclamations of the King
and his commanders in America. The first choice for most was flight
from their homes and taking refuge within British lines. Once safe,
often without wife or children, the loyalists found themselves
engaged in work on behalf of the army. Gentlemen and officials
usually found some employment in adm inistration, like Edward
Lutwyche of Merrimack who was appointed "Superintendant of the
King's Spruce Beer Brewery" at New York in March of 1777.23 Many
engaged in the formation of loyalist military units. Though without
official duties while trapped in besieged Boston, John Wentworth
began the mustering of a regiment, and continued gathering men
upon his arrival in New York in March of 1776. Many of the New
Hampshire claimants proudly mention serving with Wentworth’s
Volunteers, though that unit may have never actually taken the

23Historical Anecdotes, p. 5.
24NH Claims, John Fenton, vol.

n, p. 523.

25Mf Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. II, p. 1048.
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field.26 Nor had Major William Stark's Corps, since it never reached
full strength. Several other New Hampshire men commanded loyalist
regiments. Robert Rogers, famous for his service in the Seven Years
War, commanded the King's Rangers raised in Nova Scotia in 1777.
Raised in New York in 1781, the King's American Dragoons were
commanded by Benjamin Thompson. The Queen's Rangers, another
regiment raised by Robert Rogers, eventually m erged with
Thompson's King's American Dragoons.27 New Hampshire loyalists,
like William Vance of Londonderry, were also "employed on secret
services for government." One of the John Stinsons of Dunbarton, the
nephew of General John Stark, went "out 28 times as a spy."28
Those of middling status or lower found employment either as
soldiers in the constantly forming regiments, or in varying jobs in
and around New York. Though only two of the New Hampshire
claimants mention menial work, Samuel Mallows of Portsmouth was
a waggoneer in General Howe's baggage train,29 and George Glen of
Wolfeborough served as a

"Forager,"30

many loyalists who took

refuge in Boston and later New York were forced by circumstance to

26See Appendix 1 for a muster roll from Wentworth's Volunteers.
27Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xix-xxi.
28Mf Claims, William Vance, vol. IV, p. 1864; NH Claims, John Stinson, vol. IV, p.
1744.
29Nff Claims, Samuel Mallows, vol. Ill, p. 1278.
30NH Claims, George Glen, vol. II, p. 705. Forager is his description of his
position. The only specific act he mentions is the acquisition of "a number of
the continental horse," which in the eyes of his enemies made him nothing
but a horse thief.
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act as water bearers, wood-gatherers, or in the work of erecting or
strengthening fortifications.31 Though laboring was tedious, the army
was able to pay a living wage without the loyalist having to file a
formal claim in England.32 Of course some were able to ply their
trades, especially professionals such as doctors33 or clergymen.34
The New Hampshire claims reveal a p attern among those
loyalists who abandoned their homes to serve their king, or merely
to save their skins. The most prominent among them, beginning with
Governor John Wentworth, left New Hampshire in 1775. Most of
those went immediately to Boston, and then on to either Halifax or
New York at the evacuation in March, 1776. Wentworth and several
other prominent men then made the trip to England in 1777 or 1778,
and there they petitioned the Treasury for assistance. They were
usually successful in obtaining some temporary support. Wentworth
received a pension, £600 per annum, until his appointm ent as
Surveyor General of the King's Woods with a posting to Nova Scotia in

31A considerable number of loyalists from the northern provinces who sought
refuge in New York worked diligently there as well. Those who did not serve
on active duty often proudly proclaimed their occupations while behind the
lines. Many worked as carpenters and at the other trades. See for example
two men from Newark, NJ in Loyalist Claims, Nathaniel Richards, vol. XV, p.
319-330; William Stile, vol XV, p. 331-346. Neither had listed carpenter as the
occupation held prior to the rebellion. One man was a carpenter before the
war and he served as a master carpenter in the quartermaster's department.
Loyalist Claims, Nathaniel Munro, vol.XV, p. 375-378.
32Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xi. The army was authorized to pay "a dollar a
day" for those make-work civilian jobs.
33NH Claims, Dr. Josiah Pomeroy, vol. IV, p. 1522.
34Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 546. John Houstonwas from Bedford. Badly treated
by the mob and his congregation, he apparently ended up in New York by
1782 and was off to Shelburne, N.S. with a family of five.
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1783. The pension was then reduced to £300 since the position
carried a salary of £800 per annum.35
Another group of New Hampshire men remained as long as
they felt reasonably sure of the safety of their persons and their
families. Those men, such as William Torrey or Zaccheus Cutter,
served under the crown as magistrates or at least held prominent
positions in their communities. They generally were able to hang on
into 1777, and some as late as 1778 before fleeing to the British lines
at New York or Rhode Island. A few, like Stephen Holland, were
imprisoned for long periods of time. A final wave of claimants
departed in 1777 to join Burgoyne on his march southward to the
fateful rendezvous with destiny at Saratoga. Among them were
Simon Baxter, Breed Batchellor, and the printer, Robert Lewis
Fowle.36
The spate of petitions to the treasury in 1777 and 1778 by
loyalists wealthy or lucky enough to get to England quickly became a
burden to the government. As Palmer reports, "all refugees who had
rendered some service to the Crown or who could claim to have been
driven out because of their visible loyalty, were considered eligible
for assistance."37 The number of refugees increased as the contest in
America wore on, and as British policy and British arms failed to
stem the tide of revolt. By March of 1782, at the fall of the North

^ N H Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pl984-5.
^ N H Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 131; Breed Batcheller, vol. I, p. 119; Robert
Lewis Fowle, vol. II, p. 657.
37Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xi.
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ministry, some 315 refugee loyalists had been granted temporary
support representing an annual expense of £40,280 sterling.38 Few
applicants were refused at least a minimal allowance. The Treasury
had held fast in the Nevin case.
Critics of the North ministry in Parliament were dissatisfied
with the expenditures on behalf of so many new mouths to feed.
Consequently a panel was appointed by the new government of Lord
Shelburne to "inquire into these Treasury allowances."39 T he
examiners were John Eardley-Wilmot and Daniel Parker Coke, a pair
of independent members of Parliament known for their impartiality
and integrity. Both would soon be appointed to the claims
Commission as well.
The language of the memorials and the supporting documents,
more than any other evidence, provides proof of the existence of the
loyalist community.40 The documents of the New Hampshire
claimants and their colleagues elsewhere, display a consistency of
vocabulary that can be neither coincidence nor conceit. Indeed the
shared vocabulary was necessary for the identification of the
community's goals.41 The language of the claims reveals the presence

38Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xii.
39Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xii.
40According to Hogg, "group cohesiveness might be seen as a linguistic
category or rhetorical device produced through discourse: something which
constructs individuals in relation to one another as members of a 'group' and
in contrast to other 'groups.'" Hogg, The Social Psychology o f Group
Cohesiveness, p. 63.
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of a number of deeply held views. The loyalists as a group refused to
acknowledge the sovereignty of any new government. They deplored
the excesses of popular action and the invasion of privacy. They tried
to ignore the serious character of the revolution even after it was
lost. They believed themselves to be the innocent victims of an
unprincipled group whose only concern was self-interest, and as time
passed many felt ill-used by the government they had sacrificed
everything to serve.
The loyalists refused to submit willingly to the rebel
authorities. From the loyalist perspective, the situation in New
Hampshire by 1775 was one of anarchy. Even Governor Wentworth
was forced to acknowledge, "the country is in the most deplorable
state of disorder without law or government."42 W entworth’s
admission was nothing new. As early as February, Lord Dartmouth
had written Wentworth with new instructions, but acknowledged the
situation and noting "so general a spirit of disorder and disobedience
to lawful authority." Dartmouth agreed there was little Wentworth
could accomplish until "other considerations will admit of giving you
such support as may be effectual for that purpose."43 The other
loyalists who described the situation in the province from 1774 to
1776 shared the view that authority had broken down or had been
4 l"Any group of people that has any permanence develops a 'special
language,' a lingo or jargon, which represents its way of identifying those
objects important for group action." Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 21.
42Wentworth to John Durand, May 17, 1775 in NH Claims, John Durand, vol. I,
p. 461
43Lord Dartmouth to Governor John Wentworth, February 22, 1775, in NH
Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2157.
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taken from its rightful holders. Simon Baxter of Alstead told of
having "opposed the measures of the rebels, [and] raised men to go
and protect the courts in 1774."44 As a result of his actions, Baxter
continued, the Cheshire County court was able to sit and transact its
business. But another consequence was the social and political
ostracism which eventually befell Baxter.
Two of Baxter's statements are of particular interest. First, he
alluded to a group of men attempting to block the proper business of
the county court, and he called those who would have interfered
with the operations of the county court "rebels." Elsewhere, Baxter
added two more names for those faceless characters who attempted
to defy constituted authority, "Whigs or M alcontents."45 In
attempting to form an identity for their community, the loyalists of
New Hampshire had also the need to create an identity for that other,
that group which had in a sense helped to create their community in
exile.46 Just as the Americans who fought for independence had
plastered the name of "tory" on the loyalists, the "King's Friends"
referred to their former neighbors primarily as "rebels." Other terms
were employed from claim to claim. While Samuel Hale called the
futile actions of crown officials the acts of "patriots," others referred
to the opponents of government as "leaders of sedition,"

"the

usurpers," and "the Faction."47 When referred to as a group, the

44NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 134.
45 NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 131.
46Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 21.
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crowds which roamed the seacoast towns at will in 1775 were called
"the armed multitude" or "lawless banditti."48 Nathaniel Hubbard of
Stanford Connecticut "signed an agreement in writing to support his
Majesty's government against all Innovations and Mobs."49
The rebels were a minority, a group of self-interested men, or
men swayed by the connivance of a few. The rebellion was a
manifestation of a singular disregard for law and authority. The
activities of the rebels, mobs, housebreaking, armed insurrection, all
exceeded the assumed limits of lawful behavior. Even the forms and
acts of the newly "usurped authority" contradicted the traditional
assumptions of the uses of law and legal procedure. The interference
with and subsequent closing of the law courts on the part of the
rebels was an action the loyalists feared and resisted with "zeal and
attachment." Denied any possible due process, the loyalists could not
acknowledge a government without laws to insure the rights of
private property. It would be nearly two years before the courts
again functioned regularly in New Hampshire, and by then the
ideological battle had been won by the rebels. Whether by coercion
and intimidation or by persuasion and the attraction of apparent

47NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. n, p. 777; Robert Fowles, vol. II, p. 677; and
Ann Hulton to Mrs. Adam Iightbody in Ann Hulton, Letters o f a Loyalist Lady
Being the Letters o f Ann Hulton, sister o f Henry Hulton, Commissioner o f
Customs at Boston, 1767-1776. Cambridge, MA: 1927. p. 29. NH Claims, John
Fenton, vol. II, p. 569.
48NH Claims, infra. See also Loyalist Claims, James Ketchum, vol. XII, p. 247 who
"was led by the dictates of reason to oppose the factious multitude at the first
dawning of the Rebellion." Nehemiah Clarke of Hartford was also assaulted
by "a numerous banditti." vol. XII, p. 387.
49Loyalist Claims, Nathaniel Hubbard, vol. XII, p.

235.
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success, tiie populace of New Hampshire was solidly in rebellion by
1778.
The committees of safety supplanted the courts in most
communities, subverting the role of magistrates and justices of the
peace. While many former officials as well as new men constituted
the committees, they had no parallel in the English experience.
English monarchs had governed through civilian commissions and
officers for several hundred years, but those committees or single
officials had had the legitimacy of royal appointment to rely upon.50
And the resulting mixture of administrative and judicial powers in
the hands of what were perceived to be venal, vengeful men could
not be tolerated. The use of paid informants by the committees and
the very acceptance of any whispered innuendo as evidence of a
crime became a severe concern to the loyalists, especially those who
remained in the province for as long as they possibly could. Coupled
with these non-traditional institutions of authority were the actions
of the provincial assembly, convened without the authority of die
crown and clutching to themselves the powers of trying individuals
for treason, and the widespread use of acts of a tta in d e r and
confiscation. It was no surprise then that the loyalists referred to
themselves repeatedly as "American sufferers" or "distressed
loyalist[s]."51

s0Albert Beebe White, Self-Government at the King's Command: A Study in the
Beginnings o f English Democracy. Reprint. Westport, CT: 1974
S1NH Claims, infra, but for example, Robert Lewis Fowles, vol. II, p. 687.
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The provisional government which replaced th at of John
Wentworth under the royal charter received no more respect from
the loyalists than the individuals who constituted its membership,
the "insurgents."52 The language in which the loyalists described the
new provincial government was indicative of more than their disdain
for its members. These were the "ringleaders or their adherents" who
had been central to the "insurrection."55 The loyal claimants,
representing their silent brethren, disagreed with the fundamental
existence of that institution. It represented "usurped authority," "the
insidious attempts of the disaffected," to institute what amounted to
an "usurped government." The structure revolved around "their
committees," which were constituted of "factious and designing
men."54 Feeling ran as high elsewhere. In Massachusetts Martin Gay,
a Boston coppersmith, "took every occasion to express his abhorrence
of the measures taken by the Americans."55
The New Hampshire loyalists also refused to acknowledge the
depth and permanence of the rift between their province and the
mother country. Like their British counterparts, the loyalists
employed euphemisms in their writing to soften the impact of the
emerging "war" on their psyches. The euphemisms varied. Their use,

52Loyalist Claims, Andrew Hewat, vol XIII, p. 41.
55Loyalist Claims, Matthew Hutchins, vol. XIII, p. 331.
54NH Claims, Fowles, vol. n, p. 679 & S. Holland, vol. n, p. 777 & 940; McMaster,
vol. Ill, p. 1231; Baxter, vol. I, p. 134; Hale, vol. II, p.733.
55Loyalist Claims, Martin Gay, vol. XIII, p. 358. Gay was a native of America but
abjured his nativity when he no longer identified himself with "the
Americans."
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even into the post-peace years, did not. The conflict was referred to
almost exclusively as a rebellion. It was either an "unnatural
rebellion" or an "unhappy rebellion."

Occasionally it was an

"unfortunate contest" or a "period of the commotions."56 Only twice in
the entire scope of the New Hampshire claims was the word war
mentioned, once as the "late war," and once as the "late unhappy
American war."57 The employment of such euphemisms was more
than a literary conceit or a denial of reality. It was the assertion that
legitimate authority resided in Great Britain and was dispensed to
the colonies by the king. Like the language used to describe the
"rebels" and the "usurped authority," the euphemisms concerning the
revolution itself were a means of displaying the loyalist position, a
position which became increasingly uncomfortable as the years
progressed.
The language employed by so many conveys the loyalist
position well. The political situation was not only disadvantageous to
them and to the British, it was "un-natural." The use of that word
implies far more than dissatisfaction. Something unnatural was
contrary to nature. It did not figure into the scheme of things. It was
monstrous, an abomination. The use of that term implies the sinful
nature of rebellion according to the cosmology of the traditionally
minded loyalist. Not only was this rebellion against "nature and
nature's God," but all rebellion was contrary to nature. It is easy

56NH Claims, Michael Jose, vol. H, p. 991; Paul Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2498;
William Torrey, vol. ID, p. 1807.
57NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. Ill, p. 1807; Elijah Williams, vol. V, p. 2556.
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today to append the label conservative to men of such a political
persuasion. But the loyalists were not defending the status quo,
meaning the specific situation that existed between Britain and her
colonies, but rather the fundamental belief system underlying the
existence of the empire. The supremacy and sovereignty of the king
was at stake, and resistance to th at deeply held belief w as
unthinkable.
The language of the Claims documents clearly reveals a group
of men who had lived in a community that had u n d e rg o n e
catastrophic change. From their vantage point it seemed as though
their neighbors had been afflicted with some sort of crowd hysteria.
Again and again the elites among New Hampshire’s loyalists referred
to being insulted by mobs,58 to being man-handled,59 and to having
their homes ransacked while their lives or the lives of their families
were threatened.60 Many claimants also complained of being
dragged before committees, sometimes repeatedly over the course of
weeks or m onths,61 an action they found to be more than
inconvenient. It was not merely that these committees consisted of
men who might be below the loyalist's social station. That complaint

58NH Claims, John Fenton, vol. II, p. 515. For only one example of many.
59NH Claims, Thomas McDonough, vol. ID, p. 1163; James McMaster, vol. HI, p.
123Z
60NH Claims, Bartholomew Stavers, vol. IV, p. 1704; William Torrey, vol. Ill, p.
1811.
61NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, p. 778; Thomas McDonough, vol. Ill, p.
1168; George Meserve, vol. IE, p. 1290.
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was not mentioned. It was instead that the committees were not
provided for in the Englishman's constitutional cosmology. There was
no basis in law for their existence, much less the power they wielded.
It is clear from the claims that the committees (never accorded the
continuation of the name "of Safety") exercised enormous judicial and
paramilitary powers. Arrests were made under their aegis, often at
night, and often of men taken from their homes with no more
evidence of a crime having been committed than the word of a
stranger who claimed to have heard the suspect utter a statement
either in favor of the king or in disparagement of the revolutionary
cause. Town committees held drumhead trials and acted as jury and
"executioner" at the same time. The only recourse the alleged loyalist
had was an appeal to the provincial assembly. Such inform al
observations of due process were repugnant to the loyalists. Despite
their published function of ensuring the personal safety and
property rights of citizens in a time of trouble, the committees
exercised no restraint over the mobs which formed in Portsmouth
and roamed the seaboard countryside in 1774 and 1775. In at least
one instance, it was the intervention of friends from town which
precluded tragic violence on the part of an armed mob. Daniel Rindge
had just returned from a neighbor's house where he had assisted in
its defense against a mob when an armed party demanded entry into
his home. As the argument escalated, muskets were leveled a t
Rindge's wife. Rindge believed the men would have fired had not
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"some humane and moderate townsmen" intervened, "pleading for
the defenseless sex."62
Faced with a situation they could n eith er accept nor
understand, the bulk of committed New Hampshire loyalists
departed.63 But even after fleeing the province, the loyalists' troubles
were far from over. Though not typical, William Torrey's experience
was illustrative of the extreme case of a loyalist's attempting to begin
a new life just as the revolution had gotten underway.
Torrey lived in Portsmouth, carried on the trade of a merchant,
and was a Justice of the Peace. He also held the office of "Landwaiter,
Weigher, and Gauger for the Port of Piscataqua, which with fees and
emoluments gave him upwards of one hundred pounds p e r
annum ."64 Torrey also owned a half interest in a sugar works,
discussed in Chapter Two. About the time of the governor's escape
aboard a British warship, Torrey was seized by a mob and roughly
treated. He was marched from Portsmouth to Exeter and there tried
for treason.65 Though he was apparently acquitted of that charge,
62NH Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV, p. 1571-72.
63The response was similar in other provinces. In those such as New Jersey,
where British military activity came early on in the war, large numbers of
eventual claimants flocked to the British standard in 1776. In the southern
colonies, such as Georgia, prominent loyalists departed early, seeking safety
in the Indies or in England. But a considerable number returned to the
various centers of British military power, New York for one, and there joined
the army or loyalist regiments to serve in the war. For examples see Loyalist
Claims, Thomas Millidge, vol. XV, p. 47; John Leonard, vol. XV, p. 61; William
Kennedy, vol. XIII, p. 179.
64NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV, p. 1781.
65This was Torrey's own explanation of the charge levelled against him. It is
unlikely he could actually have been charged with "treason," as there was no
treason law in place in the province.
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Torrey was sentenced to be confined in an unspecified interior town
for a year and forced to provide "heavy bonds that he should not
conspire against the state." After the year expired Torrey was given
permission to leave New Hampshire. Leaving his wife and children,
he traveled to Nova Scotia in June, 1778. Torrey owned a farm in
that province and settled there, intending to bring his family to him
as soon as the farm was profitable. But barely two months passed
before the crews of two American privateers came ashore a n d
"destroyed his dwelling house, & store houses, and plundered
him....and left him destitute of support"
His Nova Scotia farm in ruins, Torrey left for Halifax aboard the
first available ship, only to have the ship captured, not once but
twice by American privateers who stripped him of all his papers and
even his clothes. The second enemy ship put Torrey and some others
off in a "small shallop" barely large enough to see them safely to
harbor. The unfortunate Torrey found no assistance in Halifax and so,
by borrowing against the value of his farmland, he bought passage to
New York. The farmland was subsequently seized in satisfaction of
that debt. In New York he asked the assistance of Sir Henry Clinton,
but was told through the General's aide, Major Andre, that his only
recourse was to take passage for England and there to petition the
treasury. This was what Torrey did, and for his pains he was granted
temporary support in the amount of £50 per year, in addition to his
salary of £40. His salary was discontinued in October of 1782 when
his office officially ceased to exist
Following his arrival in England, Torrey's experience became
typical of the articulate members of the elite who filed claims under
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the act of Parliament. While many New Hampshire loyalists h ad
served with the army in America through the war years, the
majority of the wealthiest individuals, mostly former crown officials,
came to England in the period from 1777 to 1779. Those filed
petitions immediately with the Treasury for temporary support and
began a campaign to convince the government to compensate them
and other loyalists for lost property. After the disaster a t Saratoga
and the seeming abandonment of the northern theater outside of
New York, the brief campaigns in Rhode Island and the capture of
Philadelphia, New Hampshire loyalists came to recognize that a
return to anything like the pre-war state of affairs was a vain hope.
Almost all of the prominent New Hampshire men were banished by
Act of the Assembly in 1778 and another act provided for the
confiscation of all of their property in the same year. Other laws
were subsequently passed nullifying debts owed to aliens and
traitors who had taken up arms against the state, and making it
illegal for any non-resident to own property at all. Faced with this
bleak prospect for recovery, New Hampshire’s loyalist community
strongly supported the movement urging governm ent make
allowance for restitution. The ministry and Parliament waited until
the treaty of peace was negotiated, hoping in vain th at the
recognition of American independence would am eliorate the
situation regarding loyalist property. But sentiment in the new
nation was still running extremely high against allegedly treasonous
conduct, and resentment was inflamed by the memories of atrocities
committed in the name of war. That both sides were equally guilty
was forgotten quickly in the flush of victory as the leaders and
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loremasters of the new nation had already begun fashioning a
national myth with which to bind their citizens ideologically into a
"republican" community.
Even before the Claims Commission was established by
Parliament, loyalists began to vocalize the shared experiences that
would lead to a formulation of a community idea. The existence of
the Commission provided a forum of sorts for the articulation of the
story of the members of a new community cast out of their old
community which had been tom apart by war The majority of New
Hampshire claimants had made the journey to England and were able
to file claims immediately, and with the benefit of a network of
fellow claimants upon whose memories and testimony they could
draw.
The sheer volume of claims received overwhelmed the five
commissioners and delayed the payment of awards for years. All
told, when the Commission made its first recom mendation to
Parliament in 1787, over 5,000 individuals had submitted claims and
claimed estimated losses of £8,026,045 sterling.66 Though the
procedure was simple, delays inevitably resulted as claimants
searched for documentation to prove losses and witnesses had to be
summoned from distant parts. At times the list of supporting
witnesses could be quite impressive. The claim of George Sproule
stands out if for no other reason than the array of certificates he was
able to present in support of his claim. Sproule had served in
America seventeen years prior to the revolution as Deputy Surveyor
66Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xiii.
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to Samuel Holland in the Surveying Service engaged in a
comprehensive survey of British territory in North America. He had
intended to retire from the service, and toward that end, acquired
property in New Hampshire as well as the post of Surveyor General
of the province. Sproule went to Boston in April of 1775 and served
on active duty as a field engineer throughout the war. Appended to
his claim were certificates from governor John Wentworth, Sir
William Howe, Lieutenant General James Robertson his commanding
officer in the 16th Foot, Lord Cornwallis, Sir Henry Clinton, William
Tryon, former governor of New York, and Stephen Holland. Despite
these "several handsome certificates" and the certainty of his loyalty
and service, Sproule was awarded only £70 on a claim of
£2,328.14.0. Sproule was given nothing for his lost office since it was
not "an office held immediately under the Crown and understood to
be for life."67
The center of the New Hampshire loyalist community was the
person of the former governor, John Wentworth. Wentworth and his
closest allies formed a core group for their own mutual support and
the support of others. They seemed to have been willing to
substantiate the claims of nearly all of their fellow countrymen, at
least with an affidavit attesting to loyalty and to the fact that so and
so had been possessed of considerable property. A glaring exception
to this was George Boyd. Boyd's claim was bolstered by a certificate
from John Wentworth attesting to the fact that Boyd was set upon by

67Both quotes are from the Commissioners' notes in the summary and decision
on Sproule's claim. NH Claims, George Sproule, vol. Ill, p. 1626-27.
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a mob shortly after he returned to Portsmouth from England in 1775.
He had gone there to foment opposition to Wentworth and had
succeeded in getting himself appointed to the council.68 Boyd had
escaped the custody of the officials in Portsmouth and fled overland
to New York. He then went straight to England, arriving early in
1776. Boyd offered a fist of his property supposedly lost totalling
£34,000 sterling. However, the other members of the New Hampshire
loyalist community disavowed him totally. In a letter to the
Commission, George Meserve observed that far from being destitute,
Boyd had £20,000 or more in investment funds in England. Meserve
wondered in consequence how it should be that Boyd was receiving
£100 per year temporary support, a good bit m ore than most
pensioned loyalists were then receiving. Meserve then added: "it will
not be a matter of surprise should they [the Commissioners] in their
course of enquiry meet with some men who would wish and
endeavor to impose upon them. I think it therefore my duty to
advise you to be careful of a Mr. Boyd from Portsmouth in the
Province of New Hampshire who I understand has brought a claim
against Government to a very considerable amount and who I am
sure must fail in the first instance with regard to his loyalty for he
never was possessed of any."69 As if that were not damning enough,
the Commissioners also received a letter signed "No Imposter"
further condemning Boyd's character and the veracity of his claim.
The anonymous correspondent claimed that "I have lately returned
68Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism, pp. 43-44, 117.
69Nf/ Claims, George Boyd, vol. I, p. 190-91.
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from America. Was at Portsmouth New Hampshire last July in
company with the first gentlemen of the place. They were making
their laugh about a Colonel Boyd's humbugging the American
Commissioners. His property they informed me had never been
confiscated. They look on him as a staunch friend to their cause.....
You will find the above to be facts."70 Peter Livius, another councillor
and no friend to the Wentworth party, added that he had "a very bad
opinion of his [Boyd's] moral character."71 For his part, Boyd claimed
that a certain group of New Hampshire men had formed a
"conspiracy against him with a malicious intent" because many of
them owed him money. But Boyd's file contained no proof of his
supposed largesse, and no documentation for the huge estate he
claimed was lost. On the contrary, the commissioners did have a
letter from Supply Clap, "attorney to said Boyd," which gave the
distinct impression that his estate remained untouched and in the
possession of his wife, children, and elderly mother. Clap even
suggested that it would be no great trouble for Boyd to return to New
Hampshire and resume control of his property. The Commissioners
weighed the evidence and concluded: "We have decided that he has
not lost an acre of this property and that he falls within that clause
of the Act of Parliament which precludes him from any
compensation, his claim being adjudged fraudulent."72 Boyd did

7QNH Claims,

George Boyd,vol. I, p. 194.

71M / Claims,

George Boyd,vol. I, p. 214.

72Mf/ Claims,

George Boyd,vol. I, p. 215.
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attempt to return to Portsmouth in 1787, but died on shipboard two
days out from home.73
The other members of the London core74 were Dr. Stephen
little, George Meserve, Stephen Holland, and William Torrey. One or
more of those could be found attesting to the claims not only of one
another, but of nearly any prominent New Hampshire claimant.
Holland acted also as agent for a num ber of New Hampshire
claimants residing in Nova Scotia, and in one case, the guardian for
the children of a deceased loyalist.75 The New Hampshire loyalists
remained remarkably solid in their approach to the claims process,
and were solicitous on each other's behalf. The only exceptions to the
sense of shared loss and mutual respect were Boyd and Samuel Hale.
Hale however was accorded the courtesy of burial by form er
countrymen, as is d ear from William Pepperrell's letter of May 21,
1787 asking for a small grant to George Meserve in order to bury the
late Hale and settle his debts. No reply was noted, and no final
decision was rendered on Hale's claim due to his death.76

73Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 247.
74For a full account of the loyalist experience in London see Norton, The
British-Americans.
75M f Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V, p. 2536. Benjamin Whiting of Hollis
and former sheriff of Hillsborough County had died in 1779 while in the
King's service on Long Island. Holland filed a claim in his name on behalf of
Leonard Whiting, the guardian. The commissioners were unable to grant
compensation because there was no proof of loss. It is not clear what the
relationship of Leonard was to Benjamin, but he , Leonard, was still living in
Merrimack, NH, and was himself not a loyalist.
76NH Claims, Samuel Hale, vol. II, p. 759-769.
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The loyalist community, forged at least for a time in the bright
fire of a shared catastrophe, remained united in one assumption:
they shared the belief that they were not being fairly treated by the
British government in light of their services and losses. Rightly or
not, few if any of the articulate claimants felt they or their fellows
were receiving adequate temporary support or prom pt attention to
their circumstances. Some went so far as to question the awards for
claims. The claims files are full of letters to the Treasury and to the
Commission asking for an increase in allowance, a speedier decision,
or a reconsideration of the amounts awarded on claims already
determined. William Torrey is again illustrative. Torrey's first
memorial was dated February 11, 1784. He filed a second memorial
in November of 1786, but an annotation on that document reveals
that a decision had already been rendered, as the commissioners saw
"no reason to alter their former determination."77 Undaunted, Torrey
fired off another memorial in December 1786 which was again
rejected. In June of 1788, John Wentworth, Jr. wrote as "agent for the
Loyalists from New Hampshire" addressed to John Foster, secretary
for the Commission, proffering yet another memorial from William
Torrey. That was followed by another memorial in March of 1789, a

77 NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. HI, p. 1805. Torrey had added the assertion
that his brother had died during the course of the war owing him over £500.
How this had anything to do with compensation for services and losses the
commissioners could not see. However in a later supplement Torrey
explained that his brother, Joseph Torrey, was a partner in their merchant
business and was living as agent in Montreal. Torrey had sent a ship and
cargo valued at £3000 to the brother just at the outbreak of the war, and the
brother had sold the cargo but sent the ship back empty. The proceeds from
the sale had been used to raise a regiment of rebels from among the
Canadians.
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letter in June of 1790, and a last memorial on November 8, 1790
conveyed with a letter of endorsement from William Pepperrell.78
Sometimes it was necessary for a compatriot to express the
extent of the need or suffering a loyalist might endure. Samuel
Peters, as related above, wrote in May of 1786 on behalf of Thomas
Cumings, a claimant awaiting determination of his claim. Peters
described Cumings as "starving, dying, and wanting every necessary
of life, [he] is without money and indebted to his humane landlord (a
poor gardener) above £40 for house rent and victuals." Cumings
received no further aid and died on September 29, 1786. His claim
was continued by his widow.79
Prominence was no guarantee of success in the pursuit of a
claim. John Fisher, who claimed losses in excess of £14,000, worried
the commissioners incessantly with letter after letter repeatedly
lamenting the "peculiar hardship of my fortune" and lamenting the
loss of an "affectionate father" whose children's inheritance was lost
7&NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. in, p. 1806-08; p. 1809; p. 1818-23; p.1824;
p. 1826. Torrey's persistence was not rewarded. His original award granted
him £150 on a claim of £ 2277 in lost property and £100 per year for loss of
income from 1775 until 1782. In addition his pension of £50 per year was
continued. No additions were granted despite his barrage of plaintive
petitions.
79NH Claims, Thomas Cumings, vol. I, p. 377; p. 380-402. It is in that
continuation that Cumings' claim becomes most unusual. It seemed that
Thomas and Mary Ann Cumings had been married in Nova Scotia on July 20,
1784. But Mary Ann had been married previously to one Thomas Leslie, a
soldier. She had accompanied her husband to America in 1777 when his
regiment was stationed in Qjiebec, and had remained there when he marched
south with Burgoyne. Leslie was reported killed at Saratoga and his widow
remained in Canada until after the troubles when she met Cumings.
Unfortunately for Mary Ann, a Lieutenant I. Jones wrote to the commission
attesting that Thomas Leslie was alive and well and serving with the 20th
Foot in Ireland. Cumings' pension ceased at his death and his claim for £1413
in lost property was disallowed "for want of satisfactory proof of loss."
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in America. Fisher was eventually to collect £3500 on his claim,
though he hardly suffered in the interim despite his melodramatic
prose. John Fisher received a pension of £160 per year from
sometime in 1776 in addition to his salary as collector of customs.
The pension continued until he became Under Secretary of State in
October, 1781. By the time of his last request for further favor,
Fisher had become Secretary of the Excise and Distributor of Stamps,
posts which paid over £880 per year between them.80
Printer Robert Fowle had a somewhat different experience. He
remained in America attempting to aid "the British government in
the exercise of his profession as a printer." Forced to flee New
Hampshire in 1778, Fowle joined Burgoyne and was captured at
Saratoga. He was allowed to "retire to Canada," but proceeded to New
York where he served with Wentworth's Volunteers until December
of 1781 whereupon he went to England. Fowle received no pension
and in January of 1783 wrote to the Commissioners "I fear you are to
this hour uninformed of the wretched situation of many of us: some
have been obliged to apply to pawn brokers and I expect daily to
hear your jails are filling for our credit is gone." In March Fowle
wrote again to thank the commissioners for a pension of £50 per
year, though he adds that the sum was not as much as others of "his
Majesty's printers who are sufferers from the other revolted
provinces." As this was the case he added that he would "(as early
taught) be thankful for a little, as the proper road to obtain more." He

80NH Claims, John Fisher, vol. II, p. 552-655. Fisher was John Wentworth's
brother-in-law.
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then added that he would "retire to a cheaper p art of the kingdom
more suited to the provision you have made for me." 81
W hether o r not the pensions and awards were in reality
adequate, the loyalist claimants felt and wrote that theirs was a hard
lo t The language of the claims here argues for a new and deeper
reading. Perhaps it was not merely the m aterial loss th at the
claimants lam ented.82 It seems likely that the language reflects a
certain convention, an assumption on the p a rt of the loyalist
community that all were in some way suffering, despite the relative
wealth or dearth of their individual circum stances. That Fisher
considered himself as much a sufferer as Fowle is certain. In a sense
all suffered equally the loss of home. As pensioners in London or
Bristol, the New Hampshire loyalists had lost their sense of place and
their roles in the order of life. Some, like Fisher and John Wentworth
were able to go on to successful careers. Many died while awaiting
judgment on their claims. Others were left having to put lives back
together as best they could with little or no help from the
government they had sacrificed so much to uphold. Stephen Holland
had his half pay of £88 per year and a grant of £30 to pay his
passage to Nova Scotia where at age 50 he reclaimed his wife and
children. Holland was granted £2538 on his claim of £8085, almost
all of which was spent in support of his family left behind in New
8^NH Claims, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II, p. 657-703. Fowle eventually received
only £100 on a claim of £925 for lost property which included all of his
printing equipment. According to Sabine, Fowle returned to America where
he married his youngest brother's widow and eventually died here.
82Alan Radley, "Artefacts, Memory, and a Sense of the Past" in Middleton and
Edwards, eds., Collective Remembering, pp. 46-59.
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Hampshire. In the end Holland had a pension of £ 100 per year when
he retired "a lame invalid" to "Colerain in the north of Ireland." 83
Holland was fairly fortunate. Eleazer Sanger of Keene had left
his property behind in 1777 to join the army. He received nothing on
his claim for £300 in lost real estate because his memorial was late.84
John Stark, son of General William Stark, served through the entire
war in the army, had his father die attainted a traito r by his
homeland, and his mother driven mad by the death of her husband,
and lost his inheritance to confiscation. He finally received £1201 on
a claim of £3345, almost half of which went into trust for his minor
siblings.85
The majority of New Hampshire loyalists remain anonymous. Of
those identified in some way, less than half filed claims, and only a
small num ber received significant compensation. Those who did file
claims represent an articulate minority whose memorials recount
their sufferings and the suffering of their silent brethren. The claims
themselves, though never published, were in a real sense the last
salvo individual loyalists could fire in the losing battle of the culture
war.
Having been for the most part barred from competing in the
discursive struggle, a struggle which had seen them renam ed and
redefined by their enemies in most inglorious term s, the loyalist
claimants at last found themselves with pen in hand able to respond
83 NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, p. 971-1012.
84NH Claims, Eleazer Sanger, vol. IV, p. 1582-86.
S5NH Claims, John Stark, vol. IV, p. 1632-1702.
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to the charges brought against them by the rebel writers. Though
hardly conscious of what the effect was, each w riter was able to put
words to the shared experience of losing a home, a way of life, and
an identity. The loyalists were deprived of the "who" they perceived
themselves to be, first by the choice they felt compelled to make, and
then by their former friends and neighbors who seemed to forget all
that had gone before. The rebel writers created a new identity for
the loyalists to further a political agenda.
There were no distinguishing marks by which a loyalist could
be known. Their color and stature was not unlike th eir rebel
neighbors. They spoke the same language, dressed the same, and up
to a point, believed in the same things. It is perhaps th at lack of
"otherness" which compelled the rebel writers to seek the excessive
when trying to redefine their opponents.
It is certainly the lack of "otherness" that makes the study of
loyalism and its exponents so valuable. By understanding the loyalist
identity we can perhaps gain a greater understanding of the forces
and circumstances that produced a rebellion in America.
The voice of their community was lost to posterity, however,
and th eir contribution to the whole of the histo ry of the
revolutionary era and to the history of America has been subsumed
by the mythmaking of their victorious countrymen.86 The winners of
the conflict earned the right to define America and expurgate the

86Lawrence H. Leder, "The Loyalist Historians: An Introduction," in Lawrence
H. Leder, ed., The Colonial Legacy, Volume I: Loyalist Historians. New York:
1971.
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loyalists from what m ight have been their rightful place. Only the
memorials remained as the means by which they could express their
side, their story.
The language of the memorials reveals a community rebuilt.
The loyalists of New Hampshire, like their brethren from the other
provinces, formed an ideational community, briefly grounded in
reality in London, and eventually replicated in Canada. But that
language also reveals a sense of loss. The loss experienced by the
loyalists of the American Revolution went beyond acres of land and
homes. It went beyond offices and inventories, stores and shops. It
even went beyond the loss of friends and fam ily m embers left
behind or killed. The loyalists lost the "who" they had been prior to
the rebellion. They lost their identity, as individuals and as members
of a community. Only through much effort could they recover some
of what was lost and redefine themselves and the new community in
which they came to re st
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Conclusion
"There are many others but their distinctions
are so metaphysical and fine spun I cannot
comprehend them"1

The reasons for a m an to remain loyal to the crown and
constitution of Great Britiain have been the subject of much
discussion for two centuries. As A.Z. observed as early as August of
1775, it was sometimes difficult to understand the choice the
loyalists made. For him and the other rebel writers, loyalists, or
tones as they preferred, were identifiable as men who held positions
in government, as "men bom in the north part of Britain," and "men
of interest." But A.Z.'s attem pt to categorically identify the loyalists
was narrow and incomplete.
To be sure, most m en who held offices under the royal
governm ent rem ained loyal. Perhaps many of those of A.Z.'s
acquaintance who happen to have been bom in the north p art of
Great Britain chose loyalty, but the records show no correlation. If by
"men of interest" A.Z. m eant men of property, certainly many of
those remained loyal, but a considerable number of the rebel faction
were wealthy and prom inent as well. In the end there was no typical
loyalist
This study shows that the path to loyalism was n o t short or
easy. For every motive which produced a loyalist, office, wealth,
birthplace, family connection, religion, and so forth, an example could

lNew Hampshire Gazette. August 29, 1775. A.Z., "Definition of Whig and Tory."
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be found of a rebel who shared that circumstance or affinity. The
path to loyalism was a process of identity transformation.
While all of the motives discussed here and elsewhere were
significant, at the root of the process lay a strong belief th at "being
fully convinced as a Christian...his duty to his King m ust be
performed by him to answer a good and just conscience.”2 Once the
choice was made, the loyalists began to experience the new identity
they had chosen by projecting it publicly. As we have seen the public
projection of the loyalist identity took a variety of forms. The most
common was to simply depart the community in which the loyalist
had lived and worked, sometimes since birth. A m ajority of the
loyalists who left their homes and families took up arm s in support
of their beliefs, a second act proclaiming the loyalist identity. Other
acts of loyalism included speaking out against the rebel faction,
protecting the extant system of government and judiciary, or even
securing and returning British deserters to their regiments. Once the
war of words had been transformed into a war of bullets, spying,
recruiting, and counterfeiting became means of loyalist identification.
The coming of rebellion shook the identity of a portion of the
population to the extent that they chose loyalism. The "who" they
had been no longer fit the "who" they were to become. The public
projection of the loyalist identity was perceived by outside
observers, the rebels in particular, as yet another identity: traitors,
2Loyalist Claims, John Fowler, vol. XIV, p. 2 5 5 . 1 do not wish to suggest an
inordinate emphasis on Chrisitianity or religion in the decision-making
process. While religion may have had a role in the course chosen by some, it
was not a deining factor in the same sense as the shared aversion to
rebellion and usurped government so frequently expressed by the loyalist
writers.
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men inimical to their country. The rebels perceived their former
neighbors as radically different from the "who" that was projected.
While the loyalists projected the identity of those who stood for the
protection of longstanding traditions and rights under the age-pld
constitution, the rebels perceived them to be enemies of liberty and
agents of oppression.
The responses of the rebels and the uncom mitted in the
community took two forms. Prior to and dining the first years of the
rebellion, the rebel response was dom inated by active measures
designed to intimidate the loyalists or drive them from their homes.
Mob action was supplem ented by housebreaking, disarm ing,
shunning, harrassm ent, imprisonment, and ritualized oath-taking.
The last, the ritual of publicly signing an oath of allegiance was
designed as much to identify potential enemies as it was to secure
the support of those whose choice was as yet unmade.
For those loyalists who rem ained after the initial diaspora, a
new strategy was initiated around the time in which independence
was declared. The formalization of provisional governments allowed
for the creation of local and provincial committees which exerted
police powers. Bands of armed men harrassed and arrested loyalists
and suspected loyalists who could then be tried before the
committees. In New Hampshire, at least, the committees were used
by the rebel government as a substitute for the court system until
1777.
The provisional governm ent and the network of local
committees was perceived by the loyalists as a perversion of the
legitimate sources of authority. The lack of a traditional basis made

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287

the assembly and state committee in Exeter an usurping power. The
men who constituted the government were rebels, insurgents, and
usurpers. The institutions they created were unnatural in the eyes of
the loyalists. This profound aversion to a system they perceived to
be illegitimate solidified for many the decision to remain loyal.
W hether active physical penalties drove the loyalists away or
not, the rebel government extended their strategy to identify the
loyalists by means of law. Their first step was to redefine the crime
of treason and to incorporate language into the law th at supposed a
loyalist to be a traitor simply because he or she had left the province.
Further means of identifying a traitor included the suspicion or
charge that the accused had taken up arms with the British, or that
the accused had engaged in any activity that m ight be deemed
harm ful to the state. Left deliberately vague, the law was designed
not to preserve the rights and liberties of Englishmen, the avowed
design of the rebellion to begin with, but rather to identify almost
anyone as an enemy should the rebel authorities see fit. Once the law
of treason was in place, the rebel government moved to attaint
specific individuals and anyone else who m et a rath er loose
definition. Those so attainted were banished from the province on
pain of death. Closely on the heels of that act was yet another which
confiscated loyalist property, both real and personal, the sale of
which would benefit the state. The process of legally identifying a
loyalist was left deliberately vague, the easier to apply it as needed.
Equally anonymous in terms of its targets was the campaign
carried on by rebel writers in the press. The rebellion was as much a
civil war as it was a war for independence from Great Britain. One of
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the theaters of action in the civil war was a discursive struggle, a
culture war. The loyalists and rebels each had differing views as to
the face of the America in which they sought to live. Since a t the
outset of the rebellion neither side cocould claim as supporters a
m ajority of the populace, a battle was waged in terms of public
discourse. From the first the high ground belonged to the rebels.
Even before the reigns of government had slipped from John
Wentworth's hands, the control of the press had gone to the rebel
faction. The rebels were free to promulgate their agenda at will in
the only readily available medium, the New Hampshire Gazette of
Portsmouth. Certainly loyalist pamphlets might have been brought
into the province from the presses in the garrison town of New York,
but no evidence exists that significant numbers of such publications
were circulated in New Hampshire. The only other medium of any
account, the pulpits, were solidly with the rebels. Dissenting voices
from Anglican churches were silenced by mob action. Despite the
prin ter's attem pt at objectivity, few works sym pathetic to th e
loyalists were printed, and those were soundly criticised in
subsequent numbers. As with the m ilitary conflict, the culture war
was lost.
At some point in the years from 1774 to 1783 each loyalist had
to face the realization that the war was lost. That fact meant far more
to the loyalists than it ever could to the British government. The loss
of the war in America meant the loss of homes and shops, goods and
slaves, in some cases the loss of families. Each loyalist had to confront
the identity he had fashioned for himself and that which had been
fashioned for him, and somehow make sense of them both.
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Each individual loyalist created a personal identity that no
longer corresponded to the identity previously held. Stephen Holland,
for example, was no longer Colonel Stephen H olland from
Londonderry, no longer a prom inent, wealthy, and influential
backcountry gentleman, but rather became Stephen Holland, hunted
tory, condemned counterfeiter, British spy, and suffering loyalist.
Holland and the rest of the active loyalists of New Hampshire could
no longer identify themselves as readily and com fortably as they
might have in 1773.
By the end of the war new communities form ed among the
loyalists. Wartime communities formed and reformed in the garrison
towns. Refugee enclaves coalesced in London and Bristol. Eventually
mass emigration produced perm anent loyalist presences in Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick. Spanning all of these, this study suggests
the formation of an ideational community based on the emergence of
the loyalist identity, an identity formed by the shared experiences
and traum a nearly all loyalists underwent. Primarily, the evidence
for such a community lies in the shared vocabulary used by loyalists
from throughout the provinces to express their sense of loss and
outrage while attem pting to find some com pensation from the
government they had sacrificed so much to preserve, and which in
the end, many felt, had betrayed them.
This study describes the development of the loyalist identity,
communal and individual, as a result of the traum atic experience of
the rebellion. For many, that identity would be ephem eral. Robert
Fowle returned to New Hampshire and lived out his life in Brentwood
and Rochester. Joshua A therton, one of S tephen

H olland's
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counterfeiting ring, became a United States Senator. And for the
unknown number of loyalists who remained quietly living out their
lives amid the turmoil of the rebellion, when it was over, and their
side had lost, no alternative remained but a resigned acquiescence to
the new community, the new government, the new nation.
For others the loyalist experience, and the communal an d
individual identities it fashioned, remained the dom inant force of
their lives. Thousands of loyalists fled their homes and embarked on
a journey to a new land where they still retained that new identity
to their graves. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the loyalist
identity became a defining mark, a source of pride and a source of
division.3 Even today, the loyalist legacy survives in eastern Canada.
A considerable number of loyalists took up residence in England and
other parts of Great Britain. For some, the time there was brief, a
stopping off point before they ventured on to the West Indies or
Canada. For others, the stay would become permanent, in a sense a
return to the womb which had birthed their colonial experience.
There too the loyalist identity blazed brightly for a while but then
guttered into obscurity as the government slowly finished its task of
compensating the loyalist sufferers for their services and losses.

3See Ann Gorman Condon, "The Loyalist Community in New Brunswick;" Janice
Potter-Mackinnon, "Loyalists and Community: The Eastern Ontario Loyalist
Women;" Jane Errington and George A. Rawlyk, "Creating a British-American
Political Community in Upper Canada;" and Neil Mackinnon, "The Nova Scotia
Loyalist: A Traumatic Community," in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and
Community in North America. Westport, CT: 1994. In addition, a number of
books consider the loyalist population of Canada beginning with North
Callahan's Flight from the Republic. Indianapolis: 1967; Hazel C. Matthews,
The Mark o f Honour. Toronto: 1965;
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The study of loyalists and the identity they fashioned from the
shards of their shattered lives reminds us of the resilience and
strength of character we have always believed transform ed colonists
into Americans. In continuous juxtaposition to their effort wa* the
rebel effort to fashion an American identity as well. By

e x a m in in g

the "other" against which the new American identity was created we
may arrive at a better understanding of who we once were and who
we are today.
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